

BORIS LEIBSON

PETTY-BOURGEOIS REVOLUTIONISM

(Anarchism, Trotskyism and Maoism)



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Current events in China connected with the so-called cultural revolution have become a matter of great concern and anxiety to the world communist movement and all true friends of the Chinese people.

They cannot be said to have come like a bolt from the blue. For some years now, the communist movement has had to fight the ideology of Mao Tse-tung's followers, who have broken with the general line elaborated by the Moscow Meetings of 1957 and 1960 and are attempting to impose on all Communist Parties an adventurist policy alien to Marxism-Leninism. Mao's "great proletarian cultural revolution" is closely connected with the adventurist domestic and foreign policy his group has now been pursuing for many years.

The policy of Mao and his group has now entered a new dangerous phase. It harms the interests of socialism, the international working-class and liberation movement, endangers the socialist achievements of the Chinese people and objectively helps imperialism.

The monstrous forms that events in China have assumed, the outrages, lawlessness and provocations with their top-dressing of revolutionary phrase-mongering are naturally received as something unprecedented in history. Yet, though these events are unique, one cannot fail to see that the international communist movement is now faced with a phenomenon that bears a definite

resemblance to the symptoms of the "disease" Marx, Engels and Lenin and all true Communists fought, the disease they diagnosed as petty-bourgeois revolutionism.

This pseudo-revolutionism, which always crops up "in somewhat new forms, in a hitherto unfamiliar garb or surroundings, in an unusual—a more or less unusual—situation"¹ inflicts great harm on the struggle to do away with capitalism and, as historical experience demonstrates, tends to degenerate from revolutionary phrase-mongering and empty gestures into an anti-revolutionary and finally outright reactionary force.

The world revolutionary movement comes up against many varieties of petty-bourgeois revolutionism. They differ according to their specific social roots, national features, historical conditions and, finally, the personal qualities of their leaders and ideologists. But despite all their different manifestations and even sometimes their apparent dissimilarity, all these varieties have many common specific features.

When Lenin was fighting the Narodniks,² he compared the manifestations of petty-bourgeois ideology in Russia and in the West, notably the views of the Narodniks and those of the so-called economic romanticists in Europe. "It goes without saying," Lenin said, "that Russia's specific historic and economic features, on the one hand, and her incomparably greater backwardness, on the other, lend Narodism particularly marked distinctive features. But these distinctions are no more than those between varieties within the same

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 32.

² The Narodniks—a petty-bourgeois trend in the Russian revolutionary movement.

species and, therefore, do not disprove the *similarity* between Narodism and petty-bourgeois romanticism.”¹

Applying Lenin’s methodology, we see that Chinese petty-bourgeois revolutionism bears the stamp of that country’s historical and economic development. But comparing Maoism with other manifestations of petty-bourgeois revolutionism, particularly anarchism and Trotskyism, we find that, despite some differences between them, they all belong to the same species.

Historical experience is instructive. But reliance on it is fraught with danger. There is always the temptation to lull oneself with the fact that “something of the sort” has happened before and to be content with establishing analogies, overlooking the specific features of new phenomena a thorough understanding of which is indispensable for success in defending revolutionary Marxism.

Maoist ideology reveals a curious intermixture of anarchist and Narodnik views on the special historical mission of the peasantry and the pseudo-revolutionary phrase-mongering of Trotskyism and the postulates of the ancient Chinese philosophers. But the main thing in Maoism is that petty-bourgeois revolutionism is made to serve bellicose great-power chauvinism and is striving for world leadership. This is a case of nationalistic manifestation of petty-bourgeois revolutionism. The fact that the champions of this anti-Marxist ideology are at the helm of state in so vast a country as China constitutes a danger far worse than that of any previous anti-Marxist trend.

No past experience, not even the most tempting parallels and comparisons can substitute for a

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 2, pp. 250-51.

detailed study of the concrete events in China. This does not mean, however, that we can disregard history in this study. On the contrary, the history of the struggle of Marxism against anti-Marxist trends helps us gain a deeper understanding of the kind of enemies revolutionary theory had to contend with in its development. This historical experience helps us better to discern the modern enemies of Marxism no matter how they are disguised, helps us advance arguments against them, and strengthens our conviction of the invincibility of Marxist-Leninist ideology.

THE GENERAL AND THE PARTICULAR

Throughout its history the working-class movement has constantly had to fight petty-bourgeois revolutionism. This type of revolutionism emerged even before the proletariat became an independent class, since the petty bourgeoisie, having its roots in pre-capitalist social relations, is historically older than the working class.

Depending on the specific forms assumed by the disintegration of small commodity production and on specific historical conditions, petty-bourgeois revolutionism has different roots in different countries. The social basis of diverse manifestations of petty-bourgeois revolutionism in the Romanic countries of Western Europe was provided mainly by the ruined urban handicraftsmen, whereas in Russia it was provided chiefly by the peasantry, oppressed by survivals of serfdom. In countries where there is colonial or national oppression, petty-bourgeois revolutionism develops on the basis of the downtrodden state of the whole or nearly the whole population and naturally acquires a national liberation character. Certain sections of the intelligentsia in all countries are a feeding ground for petty-bourgeois revolutionism.

Numerous facts are known when the petty-bourgeois struggle has played a progressive role. Marxists assess highly the work of the Jacobins in France, the contribution of the revolutionary Narodniks to Russia's emancipation movement, and the role of Sun Yat-sen in the development of China's anti-imperialist struggle; they honour

the memory of Cuba's revolutionary democrat, José Martí. In modern conditions, the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie is capable of paving the way for progressive development in countries where there is as yet no working class. In many of the countries that have won national independence, an outstanding role was played by revolutionary democrats representing the interests of the working peasantry, semi-proletarian elements and petty-bourgeois urban sections. These revolutionary democratic forces succeeded in steering some of these countries on to the road of non-capitalist development and are implementing important social transformations. And although much in the ideas of the revolutionary democrats is inconsistent and contradictory, Marxists consider it their duty to support them, being convinced that the logic and experience of the class struggle will help honest revolutionary-democratic leaders to gradually rid themselves of many illusions.

The objective possibilities of petty-bourgeois revolutionism depend greatly on the period in which it asserts itself. Since the working class has become the most consistent revolutionary force of modern society, a force able to rally all those who are oppressed by capitalism, and still more so since socialism has become an international force, the positive role of the petty-bourgeois revolutionaries becomes the more apparent, the closer they draw to the proletariat and act as its allies.

At the same time, in addition to militant democratism, passionate love of freedom and resolute struggle for national independence, the petty bourgeoisie breeds also cowardly reformism, and what Lenin ironically described as petty-

bourgeois revolutionism—menacing, haughty and presumptuous in word, and hollow in deed.

The diversity of types of small-commodity economy are reflected in one way or another in the motley ideology of the petty bourgeoisie and the forms of its revolutionism. Being unable to create an objective, scientific theory to explain the process of social development, the petty bourgeoisie thinks up the most grotesque ideological conceptions. In so doing, it eclectically borrows propositions from various bourgeois doctrines, and, after the emergence of the Marxist ideology of the working class, from the proletarian ideology, and attempts to conciliate them.

For of all their erratic groping and the fact that their judgements are often diametrically opposed, all types of petty-bourgeois revolutionism at all times have certain features in common. Marx, Engels and Lenin showed great penetration in disclosing these common features, and subsequent events have brought additional proof that their analysis was highly accurate.

The principal feature observed in all types of pseudo-revolutionism is extreme subjectivism, unwillingness to take into account the objective laws of social development, blind faith in the miraculous power of revolutionary slogans, direct and immediate action, irrespective of the prevailing socio-political situation. Hence the tactics of unrestrained adventurism, or, as Lenin noted, passive "waiting for 'great days' along with an inability to muster the forces which create great events".¹ Proletarian revolutionism is notable for its combination of scientific sobriety in the analysis of the objective state of affairs with the most

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, p. 349.

emphatic recognition of the importance of the revolutionary energy and initiative of the masses, and also of parties and individuals that are able correctly to express the requirements of social development; whereas petty-bourgeois revolutionism is based on impulses and passions.

Defining petty-bourgeois revolutionism Lenin wrote in his *"Left-Wing" Communism—an Infantile Disorder*: "The instability of such revolutionism, its barrenness, and its tendency to turn rapidly into submission, apathy, phantasms, and even a frenzied infatuation with one bourgeois fad or another—all this is common knowledge."¹ Appalled at the horrors of capitalism, the petty bourgeois easily falls into extreme revolutionism but is unable to muster the necessary patience, organisation, discipline and endurance. This social phenomenon can be observed in all capitalist countries, and historical experience shows that it can cause harm not only during the period of the struggle against capitalism, but also after capitalism has been vanquished in individual countries by the revolutionary forces.

Before the victory of Marxist ideology in the working-class movement, when the struggle of the proletariat was still weak and the forms typical of the movement's initial stages still prevailed, anarchism was the fullest expression of the numerous shades of petty-bourgeois revolutionism. Lenin called anarchism "bourgeois philosophy turned inside out."² The individualist views and ideals of the anarchists, Lenin noted, were in direct opposition to socialism and looked not into the future of the bourgeois system, but into its past, when lone,

¹ Ibid., Vol. 31, p. 32.

² Ibid., Vol. 10, p. 73.

scattered petty producers were governed by blind coincidence. "Anarchism," Lenin wrote, "is a product of *despair*. The psychology of the unsettled intellectual or the vagabond, and not of the proletarian."¹

While the working-class movement was making its first steps, the anarchists did not attach any importance to it or else tried to co-operate with workers' organisations in order to subordinate them to their aims. But as Marxist views gained ground, the hostility of the anarchists towards proletarian ideology became more clearly manifest.

Opposing organised forms of the working-class struggle in general and political struggle in particular, rejecting the state as such, including the dictatorship of the proletariat, the anarchists incited the workers to spontaneous violent action. They accused the leaders of the working class of careerism and of forgetting the interests of the revolution, of "pursuing the worst kind of bourgeois policy".

The anarchists resorted to splitting activities in the First International, secretly organised their own "Social-Democratic Alliance" and declared that this secret organisation would accept people "combining brain, energy, honesty, ability to conspire and revolutionary passion".

Ignoring the laws of socio-economic development they were unable to analyse objective reality correctly and to reveal the social forces able to blaze the trail into the future. The anarchists thought that the future could be charted according to their subjective desires, and that all means were suitable to achieve their aim. Some

¹ Ibid., Vol. 5, p. 327.

extreme representatives of anarchism declared that poison, the dagger and the hangman's rope were the weapons of the genuine revolutionary, the rebel, the trouble-maker who is prepared to destroy everything that stands in his way.

The growth of the workers' mass movement and its better organisation deprived the activity of the lone revolutionary of any justification and petty-bourgeois ideas became increasingly meaningless. The anarchists gradually turned from revolutionary phrase-mongering to deliberate disorganisation of revolutionary struggle and began to rally to their black banners all sorts of degraded, declassed elements, half-crazed intellectuals dreaming of violence and destruction, people with a grudge against the whole world.

There were many varieties of anarchism. Having emerged as the ideology of the urban lumpenproletarian, it spread to the countryside and gave birth to various peasant variants. In Russia, anarchism considerably influenced the ideology of the Narodniks and the various shades of peasant utopian socialism. Lenin said of anarchism in Russia that "in the past (the seventies of the nineteenth century) it was able to develop inordinately...."¹

The assertion that the peasantry possesses a "socialist instinct", that the village commune is an embryo of socialism and that peasant uprisings will save mankind from capitalism and exploitation provides a family link between anarchism, various groups of the Narodnik movement and its epigons—the Socialist-Revolutionaries, in particular the Socialist-Revolutionary Maximalists.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 33.

In countries which were more backward than Russia, anarchism appeared later, and assumed specific forms bearing the imprint of national features. In China, anarchism began to spread in the beginning of the twentieth century. It became particularly strong after the 1911 revolution. However, as Lenin wrote as early as 1901, during the whole of its existence, anarchism "has produced nothing but general platitudes against *exploitation*".¹

Although ideologically sterile, anarchism nevertheless exerted a pernicious influence by obstructing the revolutionary struggle of the working class. Russia's anarchists gained evil fame in 1917 and during the Civil War. During the national revolutionary war in Spain (1936), the anarchists considered that their main task was not victory in the war and not the rout of the fascists, but an immediate "social revolution". In Aragon, where, for a short time, they managed to seize power, almost all the property of the people was socialised and all political activity except that of the anarchists was prohibited. On the pretext of collectivisation they took away the peasants' land and cattle, made them work for very low pay, "equal for all", under supervision of armed groups. What was called "collectivisation" led to a natural economy in which each village had to live on its own resources. At the enterprises too the anarchists concentrated all their ultra-revolutionary activities on equalitarian distribution. Outrages, violence, and expropriation became the official policy of the anarchists. This was so much grist to Franco's mill. Manifestations of anarchism are encountered even today, particularly in a number of Latin American countries.

¹ Ibid., Vol. 5, p. 327.

With the spread of Marxism in the working-class movement, anarchism, which according to Lenin is "one of the most harmful elements of the working-class movement",¹ degenerated more and more.

The extensive spread of Marxist ideas throughout the world does not mean, however, that the ideology of petty-bourgeois revolutionism has completely disappeared. It has begun to adapt itself to the changed conditions. "The dialectics of history," Lenin wrote, "were such that the theoretical victory of Marxism compelled its enemies to *disguise themselves* as Marxists."² When Lenin said that, he had in mind the "internally decayed liberalism", which strives to revive in the form of socialist opportunism, but his words apply just as much to petty-bourgeois revolutionism, which tries to survive by disguising itself as Marxism and using Marxist terminology in the hope of winning positions within the working-class movement developing under the banner of Marxism-Leninism.

A new stage thus emerges in the development of petty-bourgeois revolutionism, which now finds expression in various "Left" and "ultra-Left" interpretations of Marxism, but preserves its traditional subjectivism, its revolutionary phrasemongering, its blind faith in the miracle-working power of all direct action; the wrenching of "this 'direct action' out of its general social and political context, without the slightest analysis of the latter."³

If the anarchists accused Marx and Engels of

¹ Ibid., Vol. 19, p. 408.

² Ibid., Vol. 18, p. 584.

³ Ibid., Vol. 15, p. 195.

opportunism, representatives of later generation petty-bourgeois revolutionism spearheaded their vociferous accusations against Lenin and his followers. Arch-revolutionary anarchic phrases are now filled in with Marxist terms, but their sense has not changed. Lenin's book "*Left-Wing" Communism—an Infantile Disorder* which called for flexibility in tactics and the use of all forms of struggle, was considered opportunistic by the ultra-revolutionaries.

Later, too, Leftist elements continued to allege that the Leninist line of the Comintern was a continuation of the false path leading "from revolution to reformism, from struggle to tactics of diplomacy and the illusory embellishment of contradictions and antagonisms".¹

Lenin described petty-bourgeois revolutionism of that time as revolutionism "which smacks of anarchism, or borrows something from the latter and, in all essential matters, does not measure up to the conditions and requirements of a consistently proletarian class struggle".² Today revolutionism smacking of anarchism strives to act the role of the only mouthpiece of Marxism, loudly proclaims itself the only genuinely Marxist trend. Having failed in their attempts to set themselves up as a "Left" opposition to Leninism, Leftist groups which subsequently appeared in the working-class movement and fought against the Marxist-Leninist Parties generally assumed names which advertised their alleged links with Leninism, "Leninist Union", "Marxist-Leninist Party",

¹ "Activity of the Executive Committee and the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (from July 13, 1921 to February 1, 1922)" (in Russian), Petrograd, 1922, p. 96.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 32.

"Leninist Wing of the Party", "Back to Leninism", "Long Live Leninism!" are the names of some of the dissenting petty-bourgeois revolutionist organisations and their programme political documents.

In the early stage, the Bakuninists were the most typical representatives of motley anarchism, but later however Trotskyism became the main source from which the many hues and shades of petty-bourgeois revolutionism derived their ideology. It would be fruitless to try to discover a complete or still less a consistent ideological system in Trotskyism. It is sufficient to look at this petty-bourgeois trend in Russia in the period between the two revolutions to see that Trotsky's skips from one political line to another, so resolutely exposed by the Bolsheviks, are not just biographical episodes but a characteristic feature of the Trotskyist world outlook.

"In 1903 he was a Menshevik," Lenin wrote about Trotsky at the end of 1910; "he abandoned Menshevism in 1904, returned to the Mensheviks in 1905 and merely flaunted ultra-revolutionary phrases; in 1906 he left them again; at the end of 1906 he advocated electoral agreements with the Cadets (i.e., he was in fact once more with the Mensheviks)."¹ A few years later, Lenin noted that Trotsky "has never had any 'physiognomy' at all; the only thing he does have is a habit of changing sides, of skipping from the liberals to the Marxists and back again, of mouthing scraps of catchwords and bombastic parrot phrases."²

¹ Ibid., Vol. 16, p. 391.

² Ibid., Vol. 20, p. 160.

The only consistent feature in Trotsky's views, in all his vacillations, is hurrah-revolutionism, which ignores the objective conditions of the struggle, a type of revolutionism which he borrowed essentially from the anarchists.

In his attempt at an autobiography, as Trotsky styled his *My Life*, published in Berlin in 1930, he says that he has no truck with anarchism, but it is not difficult to see that Trotsky's views on revolutionism greatly resemble the ideas of the anarchists.

In his book, Trotsky repeatedly touches on the question of the "psychological type of the revolutionary", declaring that "with sufficient experience one can distinguish with a high degree of accuracy between a Bolshevik and a Menshevik by just looking at them". That is rather amusing, considering that it comes from a person who hobnobbed with the Mensheviks all his life and only joined the Bolsheviks in 1917. Trotsky admits with unconcealed self-satisfaction that he believes in "socio-revolutionary fatalism", flaunts his "revolutionary position" and his delight knows no bounds when he recalls that somebody wrote somewhere that "Trotsky went about like a Leyden jar and every contact with him caused a discharge".

Here is how Trotsky described what he calls the revolutionary inspiration of a political leader: "... the unconscious rises from its deep lair, subordinates the conscious working of the mind, and merges with it to form a sort of higher unity." In his opinion, the actions of the leaders of the October Revolution were determined by the fact that the "hidden forces of the organism, the deep-most instincts inherited from our animal ancestors, all rose to the surface, broke through the doors of

psychological routine and in conjunction with supreme historico-philosophic generalisations, placed themselves at the service of the revolution".

We cannot help recalling Lenin's apt description of Trotsky as a "windbag", as a "hero of the phrase", as a man of whom "unbearable phrasemongering", "senseless exclamations, bombastic words, arrogant tricks" were typical. His phrasemongering was by no means harmless, it served as a cover for his petty-bourgeois revolutionism, which, in certain historical conditions, comes close to proletarian revolutionism but usually opposes it and fights it.

In 1917, when revolutionary events were quickly coming to a climax, Trotsky came close to the Bolsheviks, but later, whenever a situation arose that called for patience, a temporary withdrawal, preparation for a lengthy struggle without any guarantee of an immediate effect, one could immediately discern the disorganising essence of Trotskyism, which was prepared to sacrifice the real achievements of the already victorious revolution for the sake of a high-sounding phrase about the future revolution.

The Trotskyists showed hostility to every step the world communist movement made to win over new allies, to work out a more flexible policy corresponding to the new conditions; they accused the Communists of revisionism, of rejecting revolutionary principles, of sliding towards bourgeois positions.

When the Trotskyists had been utterly defeated in the Soviet Union, they intensified their efforts to arouse international dissent. Trotsky hoped to unite all the ultra-Left sectarian elements that existed in some Communist Parties, to create a common platform, to enlist all renegades and by

first splitting up the individual parties, eventually to split the Communist International.

The subversion carried out by the Trotskyists for many years in the Communist Parties with the object of destroying the Comintern was unsuccessful. The Trotskyists suffered a complete fiasco with their pseudo-revolutionary platform in the international working-class movement and became an impotent sect. Having lost all hope of disintegrating the Third, Communist International from within, they set up their so-called Fourth International in 1938. This organisation, whose first aim was to undermine the unity of the Marxist-Leninist Parties, drags out a miserable existence and is torn by internal strife.

The history of the struggle against the efforts of Trotskyism to undermine the Marxist movement from within shows that Trotskyism has no social basis worth speaking of, that its adherents are recruited chiefly from groups of intellectuals and declassed elements reinforced by all sorts of dissidents and adventurists. Lenin once said of Trotsky that "such types are characteristic of the flotsam of past historical formations".¹ Yet such flotsam of the past can become dangerous; they can and do gain new life as soon as favourable situation arises.

Now that socialism has become the leading force in the world, and more and more peoples, after being oppressed for centuries, are appearing in the arena of history, one can speak of a new phase in the manifestations of petty-bourgeois revolutionism.

The enlistment of "recruits" to the labour movement, the drawing of new sections of working

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 347.

people into the class struggle, Lenin noted, was always accompanied by vacillations in theory and tactics, the repetition of old mistakes, temporary returns to obsolescent views and tactics. No wonder, therefore, that the winning over not merely of certain sections of the working people, but of whole peoples to the liberation movement is accompanied by vacillations and errors, and the revival and unexpected intermingling of long since rejected views.

Where backward economic relations prevail, Lenin pointed out, champions of the labour movement emerge who embrace only some aspects of Marxism, only separate parts of the new world outlook, only separate slogans and demands, because they are unable to break completely with all bourgeois and petty-bourgeois views. Russia's backward economic relations explain why the Russian Marxists had to wage such a long and stubborn struggle against various manifestations of petty-bourgeois ideology.

When the national liberation revolution was unfolding in China, the economic relations in that country were even more backward than in Russia. This vast country with stagnant semi-feudal relations was in bondage to the imperialist powers who exploited its backwardness in the most predatory manner. In its 1,200,000 villages, a multitude of peasant households, mostly small and on a rental basis, had to bear intolerable feudal oppression. From century to century, the primitive hoe and the sickle remained practically the only implements of labour. The urban petty bourgeoisie was numerous. Chronic hunger carried away millions and millions of people with inexorable regularity. The agrarian question and the liberation from imperialist dependence were the cardi-

nal issues that determined the nature of China's growing agrarian, national liberation revolution.

In the early twenties, when the Communist Party of China (C.P.C.) was forming, China's industrial proletariat numbered less than three million. At that time, however, the C.P.C. grew in pace with the labour movement, and workers constituted the majority in it. At the First All-China Party Congress in 1921, each delegate represented only about 50 Party members, at the Second Congress in 1922, 120, at the Third in 1923, 400, and at the Fourth in 1925, about 1,000. By 1927 the Party had over 57,900 members, and close on 58.3 per cent of these were workers.

Chiang Kai-shek's counter-revolutionary coup d'état in the spring of 1927 shattered the labour movement. Many experienced Communists who were connected with the working-class movement perished. The Party membership dropped to 10,000.

The conditions in towns were extremely unfavourable for Party activity. Reaction was rampant. The Kuomintang held strong positions and had a large army at its orders. Naval units and marines of the imperialist powers were stationed in the main proletarian centres. After 1927, the Communist Party was compelled by circumstances to work mainly in the remote countryside. For 22 years the Party was cut off from the industrial centres. It developed with the agrarian revolution and the growing peasant movement. Leading Party personnel became engrossed with the peasants and began to underestimate work in towns. The Comintern repeatedly drew the attention of the Chinese Communists to the fact that they were neglecting work among the working class.

As regards its composition, the Communist

Party became predominantly a peasant Party. In 1949, when the Chinese People's Republic was proclaimed, there were about seven million Party members, only four per cent of whom were workers. Ten years earlier Liu Shao-chi, speaking of the negative phenomena in the Party due to its specific composition, said: "The reason, I think, is simple, our Party did not drop from the sky, but emerged from the womb of Chinese society."

Some joined the Party for the sake of the great communist aims, but "to some of our comrades, of peasant origin, communism meant the 'overthrow of the Tu hao¹ and the division of the land' ". To the Party flocked also those who "were in a hopeless position, had no profession, no work, no chance to learn, wanted to throw off the family yoke, to escape a marriage being forced on them, etc. Finally some people joined the Party in the hope that it would help them to have taxes lowered and 'to get on in the world'. . . . It is therefore quite natural that when a critical moment arises some of them begin to vacillate in certain situations and change for the worse."

Lu Hsing, perhaps the only representative of China's progressive national culture who was not defamed during the "cultural revolution" and whom even "the great helmsman" recognises, wrote in the mid-twenties that when the slogans of the revolution are pronounced by revolutionary phrase-mongers they have a growling sound: "Revolution, r-r-r-revolution, r-r-r-r! . . ."

The petty-bourgeois medium not only formed the surrounding in which the Party existed, it also

¹ Tu hao—a category of rural exploiters, including particularly the kulaks, usurers, and den-keepers, linked with criminal elements and the police.—*Ed.*

affected its composition, was a constant source of many errors, of both a Right opportunist and chiefly a Leftist nature.

The history of the Communist Party of China abounds in manifestations of Leftist adventurism, which harmed the people's struggle enormously. The Sixth Congress of the Communist Party held in 1928 exposed the harm and dangers resulting from the activities of Trotskyist-putschist elements in the Party. But the semi-Trotskyist group headed by Li Li-san, which gained a majority in the Central Committee of the C.P.C. in the summer of 1930, pursued an anti-Leninist line expressed, as the Comintern noted, "in putschist, adventurist tactics".¹

The revolution in China was developing unevenly, there was as yet no revolutionary situation in the country. Yet the Leftist adventurists pursued a policy of organising insurrections and refused to reckon with the real conditions, insisting on "the immediate introduction of socialism" in the districts liberated from the enemy. Li Li-san relied mainly on China's Red Army, which at that time numbered only 60,000 badly equipped officers and men. Instead of consolidating the territorial basis of the revolution, the Left adventurists wanted to seize large towns.

This pernicious policy greatly undermined the authority of the Party among the masses and would have had catastrophic consequences for the cause of the revolution had not the Comintern

¹ Letter of Comintern Executive Committee to the Central Committee of the C.P.C. about the Li Li-san group (October 1930). In the collection *Strategy and Tactics of the Comintern in the National-Colonial Revolution. As Illustrated in China* (in Russian), Moscow, 1934, pp. 283-90.

helped the Chinese Communists to rectify their erroneous line.

In the late twenties and early thirties, many Communist Parties and the Comintern itself committed Leftist, sectarian mistakes, which were condemned and rectified by the Seventh Congress of the Comintern in 1935. However, the Comintern took the correct line in respect of China. It was worked out in sharp struggle with the Trotskyists, who ignored the uneven development of the revolution in various districts and advocated a general uprising, maintaining that the impending Chinese revolution would immediately be a socialist one.

The Comintern, however, proceeded from the assumption that, in the first stage, the Chinese revolution would be anti-feudal, and therefore recommended that, in addition to work in the towns, a territorial basis should be created for the revolution in the countryside. Since the revolution was developing unevenly, the Comintern warned the Chinese Communists against a premature general insurrection and stressed the necessity to strengthen the young Red Army and to master guerilla tactics.

The struggle against Li Li-san's Leftist anti-Comintern deviation was not an easy one. Even after Li Li-san was removed from the leadership, his followers maintained a conciliatory attitude towards him and their attacks were soon spear-headed against those who insisted on a consistent implementation of the Comintern line.

Subsequently, Mao Tse-tung did everything possible to falsify this period in the history of the C.P.C. For this purpose he worked out the "Decision on Some Questions of the History of Our Party", which after its approval by the Seventh

Enlarged Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.C., in April 1945, became the official interpretation of the preceding decade in the history of the Party under Mao Tse-tung's leadership.

This lengthy document appended to the *Selected Works* of Mao Tse-tung importunately stressed that Mao Tse-tung, "in particular, never supported it [the Li Li-san's line] but, on the contrary, rectified with much patience the 'Left' mistakes. . . ."¹ Actually, however, like Li Li-san, Mao Tse-tung at that time considered that "only after wiping out comparatively large enemy units and occupying the cities can we arouse the masses on a large scale. . . ."² He says so outright in his letter "A Spark Can Start a Conflagration" (January 5, 1930). Half a year later, in July 1930, Mao Tse-tung, echoing Li Li-san's views, wrote: "... the objective and subjective conditions for the victory of the revolution have matured throughout the country and a new revolutionary upsurge has set in. In this situation, the immediate task of the revolutionary masses is to concentrate all revolutionary forces, to seize political power throughout the country, to ensure the triumph of the revolution on a country-wide scale."

Condemning "petty-bourgeois hotheadedness" in words alone, the "Decision on Some Questions of the History of Our Party" glorifies Mao Tse-tung as the saviour of the Party, who never made any mistakes and hushes up the fact that Mao's plan to seize the large town of Nanchang as early as 1929 was one of the most dangerous manifestations of Leftist adventurism at that time. The capture of the town of Changsha by the troops

¹ Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Vol. 4, p. 179.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, p. 123.

under Mao Tse-tung in September 1930 was also a reckless step. The siege of the town took a heavy toll, and the troops were able to hold it only for a few days. This venture too was nothing but a practical implementation of Li Li-san's policy.

Thus, there are no grounds for asserting that Mao Tse-tung disagreed with Li Li-san. On the contrary, Mao shared Li's views, and dissociated himself from Li Li-san only when Leftist adventurism ended in failure.

This explains why the "Decision on Some Questions of the History of Our Party" is surprisingly soft-spoken where it concerns Li Li-san's deviation but castigates the followers of the Comintern line severely. The latter are accused of criticising Mao Tse-tung for "riflesmania", "parochialism, conservatism, typical of the peasant mind", for underestimating the hegemony of the working class and work in towns.

A comparison of various documents shows that the services Mao Tse-tung claims he rendered by substantiating the importance of the revolutionary bases in the countryside, the need to form a single national anti-Japanese front and other propositions were in the final analysis nothing but a particularisation of the relevant Comintern directives. The success of the Chinese revolution under Mao Tse-tung's leadership was possible only because the Comintern persistently corrected the Leftist and Right-opportunist mistakes in China. That is apparently why the "Decision" makes no mention of the Comintern from the time when Mao Tse-tung assumed the leadership of the Party, and all activities of the Party are reviewed in complete isolation from the international communist movement.

The Li Li-san line—by no means the only manifestation in the Chinese Communist Party of “Leftism”, semi-Trotskyism and Trotskyism—is closely related to the views then held by Mao Tse-tung. Great interest attaches in this connection to Li Li-san’s speech of repentance at the Eighth Congress of the C.P.C. in 1956.

Admitting his previous mistakes, Li Li-san made no promises for the future, because petty-bourgeois faults, he said, are like weeds which even a “fire in the steppe does not fully destroy and which grow again when the spring winds blow.”¹

The years following the Eighth Party Congress showed that Li Li-san displayed a certain clear-sightedness when he forecast that the defects of petty-bourgeois revolutionism would be revived if conditions were favourable.

While the Chinese revolution was still in the anti-colonial, anti-feudal, bourgeois-democratic stage, the numerous petty-bourgeois elements joining the Communist Party proved to be revolutionaries capable of clearing the road of various feudal and colonial vestiges for further advance. At that time Mao Tse-tung said: “Two steps have to be taken in the Chinese revolution: the first is New Democracy, and the second socialism. Moreover, the first step will take quite a long time and can by no means be accomplished overnight. We are not utopians, and we cannot depart from the actual conditions confronting us.”²

During that period, the C.P.C. scored major

¹ *Materials of the Eighth All-China Congress of the Chinese Communist Party* (in Russian), Moscow, 1956, pp. 368-75.

² Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, p. 128.

victories and the Chinese people benefited under its leadership, especially in the field of agrarian reform and economic rehabilitation. However, when the country was faced with more complex tasks in building the economic basis for socialism and developing new social relations, there was growing evidence of petty-bourgeois impatience and the inability to switch over from methods which were justified during the war period to methods of long-term socialist construction in peace-time aimed at winning one economic position after another.

Without this change of methods, there can be no successful socialist construction. But such a change requires great patience and consistency.

However, with the formation of the Chinese People's Republic in 1949 it was announced that the democratic stage of the revolution was over; democratic measures began to be called socialist and socialist changes began to be introduced with great haste, in direct violation of the principle but recently proclaimed by Mao Tse-tung, "We cannot depart from the actual conditions confronting us." There were more and more manifestations of petty-bourgeois impatience, the desire to rush ahead regardless of real possibilities, attempts to skip over unavoidable stages of development determined by objective socio-economic factors, in particular by the level of development attained by the productive forces.

Criticising Leftist views on the possibility of achieving socialism "at one go", of gaining a paradisaical life practically by a single cavalry attack, Lenin drew attention to the petty-bourgeois, adventurist character and the enormous danger of such views. In the article "The Importance of Gold Now and After the Complete Victory of

Socialism", written in 1921, Lenin spoke of the need for a "gradual, cautious, and round-about approach to the solution of the fundamental problems of economic development". "The greatest, perhaps the only danger to the genuine revolutionary is that of exaggerated revolutionism, ignoring the limits and conditions in which revolutionary methods are appropriate and can be successfully employed."¹ The revolutionary will surely perish if he elevates "revolution", to something almost divine, if he loses his head and his ability to reflect, weigh, and ascertain in the coolest manner under what circumstances there should be revolutionary action and when it is necessary to switch to reformist action.

Mao Tse-tung, who knew how to act in a revolutionary way when it was necessary to struggle against imperialism and internal reaction, proved absolutely unable to implement the methods necessary for the successful building of socialism. After the rehabilitation of the economy ruined by long wars, the Mao Tse-tung group began imposing upon the Party a policy that threatened to plunge the country into economic catastrophe. Naturally, this policy was resisted by all those who strove to build socialism along Marxist-Leninist lines relying on the experience of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

For a long time the differences in the C.P.C. were carefully concealed and there was only indirect evidence of the struggle within the Party. It intensified and began to take various forms after the Eighth Congress of the C.P.C. (1956). The so-called cultural revolution has shown what extremes the Maoists are ready to go to in order

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, pp. 109, 110-11.

to suppress all resistance to their adventurist line.

The stand of the Mao Tse-tung group roused fresh hopes in the adventurists in the so-called Fourth International. They thought that there had appeared enormous opportunities which "open up a field of activity such as Trotskyism had never had before". As early as September 1960, that is, before the Meeting of Representatives of 81 Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow, the so-called Fourth International sent an open letter to the Central Committee of the C.P.C., in which it applauded its stand, saying that it coincided with Trotskyist positions, and called upon it to initiate an open discussion with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the entire world communist movement. "The Fourth International," the letter read, "which from the moment of its foundation has been fighting ... against the ideas against which you are fighting today, supports you."

The Trotskyist press praised Mao's subsequent splitting activities and declared that in its differences with Moscow, Peking stood practically on Trotskyist positions. The Trotskyist "International Secretariat" welcomed the "theses of the C.P.C. ... since they clearly resemble some Marxist revolutionary propositions of our movement". In Britain, the Trotskyists were even more outspoken. After publication of the C.P.C. letter outlining the 25 points of the Chinese leadership's line, they declared: "The Chinese call it 'the 25 points' —we call it Trotskyism."

The fact that Mao Tse-Tung's views coincide on many points with those of the anarchists and Trotskyists and that the methods they use for subversion against the Marxist-Leninist Parties

are similar does not mean that these manifestations of petty-bourgeois revolutionism are based on identical conceptions.

It would be over-simplifying to hold that Maoism emerged on the basis of anarchism or Trotskyism and is only a variant of these trends. If Maoism has "developed" on its own a number of propositions resembling anarchist or Trotskyist propositions, this only proves that, in the face of the objective laws of social development, petty-bourgeois pseudo-revolutionaries of different trends generally resort to the same "remedy"—unrestrained voluntarism.

The difference between the social basis that gave birth to anarchism and Trotskyism and the one that fosters the views of Mao's followers also has its influence. Anarchism is the world outlook of the tramp, of the urban lumpenproletarian. Trotskyism also reflects mainly the views of *déclassés*, of townspeople, including intellectuals, who have lost all ground for action. But the Mao group's petty-bourgeois revolutionism is not of urban, but of rural origin.

The specific conditions in China, a vast peasant country, in whose liberation from colonial dependence and feudalism the peasants played an enormous role, left their imprint on the manifestations of petty-bourgeois revolutionism. Therefore the views spread by the Maoists contain, besides anarchist and Trotskyist ideas, also purely Narodnik ideas, reminiscent of those which were professed by the Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries of both Right and Left wings, and so resolutely opposed by the Bolsheviks.¹

¹ Many books have been published in China in recent years to "prove" the exclusive nature of the Chinese peasantry; in particular, some 500 works have been devoted

The opinion that there can be no comparison between Trotskyism, with its initially clear-cut anti-peasant trend, and the views of the Narodniks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, which are advertised as an expression of peasant interests, is wrong. The evolution of the views of the Trotskyists and Socialist-Revolutionaries has erased many of the differences between them.

K. V. Gusev, a Soviet historian, who studied the ideology and history of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party and drew widely on new archive materials,¹ found that Trotskyism and the petty-bourgeois socialism of the Narodniks and Socialist-Revolutionaries have much in common as regards their methodological principles and also possess many common features typical of all petty-bourgeois revolutionism. Among these features, the author says, are emphasis only on the destruc-

to the history of the peasant wars in the Middle Ages. Garushyants, a Soviet historian, who has made a study of the research methods of modern Chinese historians, writes that some historians were accused of dogmatism for applying to China the view expressed by Lenin that "lack of consciousness and vaguely expressed political demands are typical of the peasant mass". Historians who quoted Lenin's words that the medieval ideals of peasant equality are utopian were also branded as dogmatists. Engels's characteristic of the religious mythical consciousness of the peasants is considered outdated. According to the Chinese historians, only the Russian peasantry could be considered as "tsarist", and the views held on this score by the founders of Marxism-Leninism should, they say, not be applied to China. The "classical revolutionary tradition in China" is said to be a result of the "peasantry's deep consciousness".

¹ In 1919 the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries declared that they were willing to join the Comintern, if their views—a mixture of Trotskyism and Narodism—were recognised. The peasantry, they wrote, is a powerful detachment of the international army of labour fighting for socialism. The backward countries which have predominantly a peasant

tive role of the revolution, and inability to determine the role and place of the classes in it, the opinion that it is a purely volitional act, undue haste, and some others.¹

In the present epoch, in which the historical transition from capitalism to socialism is taking place under the guidance of Marxist-Leninist ideas, it is natural that many people who wish to be considered revolutionaries declare themselves Marxist-Leninists.

But as the old saying goes: Not all those who say "Lord! Lord!", however will enter the Kingdom of Heaven. It is not enough to declare oneself a Marxist, one must actually be one, and the Maoists are not. At first, Mao declared that he would "apply the general truth of Marxism-Leninism in the concrete conditions obtaining in China". A few years later he set himself the task of "making Marxism Chinese, of seeing to it that it has a Chinese character in its every manifestation". Later Mao's followers declared that he had transformed Marxism from a European into an Asiatic form, had "sinicised" Marxism. Now Mao is presented as the greatest Marxist of all times and all peoples.

But the Marxist teaching cannot be sinicised, Japanised or Russified. Reformists, revisionists and anti-communists of all shades have at differ-

population stand closer to socialism and therefore "if imperialist capital is defeated in an international war... and the Russian and West European industrial workers give their support, a world socialist revolution may be carried out (as envisaged by Karl Marx), especially if the Chinese and the Indians help".

¹ See *Lenin's Fight Against Petty-Bourgeois Revolutionism and Adventurism* (in Russian), Moscow, 1966, pp. 289-90.

ent times wasted a sea of ink trying to picture Leninism as a purely Russian phenomenon, one that does not fit the European countries. These views have been refuted not only by Marxist critics, but by life itself. The falsifiers of Marxism have now found support in China.

Marxism-Leninism is omnipotent because it correctly reflects the general laws applying to all countries without exception, irrespective of their specific features. Marxism-Leninism makes it possible to find one's bearings in any situation and to find solutions promoting progressive development. If any part of Marxism-Leninism is accepted by itself, and the others rejected or overlooked, the integrity of revolutionary theory is destroyed, leaving a heap of eclecticism of the type characteristic of the pre-proletarian period in social development or, at best, of the first steps of the labour movement.

What has happened in China is what Lenin meant when he spoke of the danger that arises in backward countries, where ideologies emerge which "seize upon *one* aspect of the labour movement, elevate one-sidedness to a theory..."¹ Mao Tse-tung's group seizes upon only one aspect of Marxism: it recognises the role of the subjective factor in the historical process and rejects the other, which requires a sober scientific analysis of the objective state of affairs. This one-sidedness, which amounts to a break with Marxism, is "elevated to a theory" and, furthermore, has a pronounced nationalist tint, differing in this from many previous manifestations of petty-bourgeois revolutionism.

Peking uses Marxist terminology to disseminate

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, p. 349.

views which have nothing whatsoever in common with Marxism-Leninism. Maoism emerged in a backward country which had for a long time been subjected to colonial oppression. It is a peculiar peasant variant of petty-bourgeois revolutionism. It is an ideology which reflects the determination of the petty bourgeois to improve his position immediately through a universal levelling or let the whole of mankind perish if he fails.

The claim of the present representatives of petty-bourgeois revolutionism that they speak on behalf of a 700-million nation does not make their ideology any more viable. This freakish patchwork of bits of conceptions long since smashed by Marxism-Leninism and tailored to narrow nationalist interests cannot pretend to a future.

The objective conditions for a flourishing of petty-bourgeois revolutionism are naturally present in China just as they were in Russia and still are in other backward peasant countries. But the presence of the conditions for a disease to spread does not necessarily mean that there must be an epidemic. The task of Marxist political leadership is precisely to diagnose ills, and then to fight them, to correct erroneous views capable of ruining the revolution.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union succeeded in this task because it was implacable in the fight against Right-wing opportunism and all variants of Leftist pseudo-revolutionism. "When it came into being in 1903," Lenin wrote in 1920, "Bolshevism took over the tradition of a ruthless struggle against petty-bourgeois semi-anarchist (or dilettante-anarchist) revolutionism. . . ."¹

The Bolsheviks had to wage a particularly in-

¹ Ibid., Vol. 31, p. 33.

tense struggle in subsequent years, when the Party was defending the Leninist line in socialist construction. The Theses of the C.C., C.P.S.U., *Fiftieth Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution*, note the great importance of the ideological and political rout of Trotskyism which "sowed distrust for the working class of the U.S.S.R., maintaining that socialism could not be built in our country without the victory of the proletarian revolution in the West. . . . Using the screen of Left ultra-revolutionary phraseology, they [Trotskyists] tried to impose an adventurist policy of artificially pushing the revolution in other countries and dooming the building of socialism to failure in our country."¹

The absence of serious traditions in the struggle against Leftist ultra-revolutionism was felt in China when it had to face the difficulties of building socialism in a backward country. Renegades and advocates of an adventurist, great-power policy disguised by Leftist phrases got the upper hand in the leadership.

Communists are convinced that in the present epoch any country, even the most backward one, can successfully develop along non-capitalist lines and arrive at socialism. If the Mongolian People's Republic was able to travel that path at a time when there was only one socialist country in the world—the Soviet Union—which, moreover, was surrounded by hostile capitalist states, now, when the world socialist system is marching from strength to strength, it is all the more possible for socialism to triumph in any developing country.

¹ *Fiftieth Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, Theses of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.*, Moscow, 1967, p. 12.

The events unfolding in China are by no means inevitable in a backward country. Here we have the exception that proves the rule.

Trampling upon the principles of proletarian internationalism, the Maoists are rejecting co-operation with the socialist countries, with the Soviet Union, whose assistance played such a substantial role in the achievements of the Chinese People's Republic. The consequences of this policy prove that, in a backward country such as China, advance towards socialism is possible only with the co-operation of the socialist community, its assistance and experience.

Petty-bourgeois revolutionism is an enormous danger at all stages of the struggle against capitalism. It becomes particularly harmful when the victorious revolution opens up prospects for the practical building of a new society. Proof of this is the serious danger threatening China's revolutionary achievements through the fault of the Mao group.

THE POVERTY OF PHILOSOPHY

The integrity and theoretical power of an ideological trend are judged according to its philosophical basis. The theoretical foundation of Marxism-Leninism is dialectical materialism, which has transformed socialism from a utopia into a science, and enables the working class to act consciously in accordance with the historical necessity and objective laws of social development.

Essentially, petty-bourgeois revolutionism has no integral philosophical basis. No matter how widely the ramifications of that revolutionism differ, they are all based on an eclectic blend of the most contradictory theoretical propositions and never rise above pragmatism, which has as its motto: "Only that which is practically useful and profitable is true."

Karl Marx's book criticising the economic views of Proudhon, one of the founders of anarchism, appeared 120 years ago. It analyses the foundations of petty-bourgeois political economy and yet it is called *The Poverty of Philosophy*. It was given this title not only because Marx wanted to use a play on words in his reply to Proudhon's book *The Philosophy of Poverty*. His analysis of Proudhon's economic constructions is combined with an elucidation of the initial methodological positions of anarchism, and of its theory, which is absolutely untenable and wretched in the literal sense of the word. Hence the poverty of that philosophy!

Proudhon's economic constructions with their reactionary orientation on the levelling of classes and the preservation of small ownership were eroded by time and consigned to history. But the specific feature of that petty-bourgeois ideologist's method of thought, the vulgarity of his initial conceptions and the metaphysics of his reasoning which Marx caught so splendidly were resurrected later in new variants of petty-bourgeois opportunism or revolutionism.

There has also been frequent repetition of Proudhon's manner of expression which Marx described as follows: "The style is often what the French call *ampoulé* [bombastic]. High-sounding speculative jargon. . . . A self-advertising, self-glorifying, boastful tone and especially the twaddle about 'science', and sham display of it."¹

History has shown that these traits were not only an individual characteristic of Proudhon, but a general feature of petty-bourgeois ideologists, a sort of protective reaction to conceal the emptiness and insipidity of their conceptions, a sort of inferiority complex of the poverty of philosophy.

At first sight it may appear that petty-bourgeois revolutionism gives birth to the most contradictory modifications. Bakunin's anarchism differs from Proudhon's anarchism, even if only because the former recognised only collective ownership, while the latter advocated the preservation of private ownership. Proudhon stood for peaceful means of struggle, Bakunin—for violence. Anarchism rejects political struggle; Trotskyism, conversely, recognises only this form of struggle, neglecting all others. We could carry on this comparison. But despite all the differences within the species, the

¹ K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, p. 155.

views held by representatives of petty-bourgeois revolutionism have a common methodological source—unlimited subjectivism, the intention to remake the world according to a speculative scheme, with the help of a small number of people who are aware of the need for change.

The philosophy of anarchism is extremely primitive. Marx characterised its doctrine as “the mess . . . borrowed from Proudhon, St. Simon, etc”.¹ Lenin also noted that in anarchism there is “no doctrine, revolutionary teaching, or theory”.² Metaphysics, disguised by dialectical phraseology, and undisguised subjectivism—such are the methodological foundations of all the ramifications of anarchism.

Approximately the same can be said of Trotskyism.

Speaking of the peculiar methodology underlying the ideas Trotsky advanced during the trade union discussion in 1920-1921, Lenin criticised them for their eclecticism, metaphysics, scholasticism and one-sidedness. Remarking on Trotsky's scholastic approach to the trade unions and his constant harping on “the general principle”, Lenin said: “What we actually have before us is a reality of which we have a good deal of knowledge, provided, that is, we keep our heads, and do not let ourselves be carried away by intellectualist talk or abstract reasoning, or by what may appear to be ‘theory’ but is in fact error and misapprehension of the peculiarities of transition.”³

Trotskyism was always distinguished by an

¹ K. Marx/F. Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 33, S. 329, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1966.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, p. 328.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 32, pp. 24-25.

incorrect understanding of the state of affairs because it substituted subjective wishes for objective reality, and recognised no other way of resolving contradictions than by their extreme exacerbation and catastrophic clashes.

Trotsky understood Soviet society as a sort of equilibrium of classes which would inevitably be disturbed. The only way he could see for solving the contradictions between the proletariat and the peasantry was through inevitable antagonistic clashes, and since the peasantry outnumbered the proletariat, he predicted an unavoidable "thermidor"—a restoration of capitalism.

This panic-stricken exaggeration of the objective "inevitabilities" he had himself invented co-existed in Trotsky's theories with purely adventurous views on the possibilities of the subjective factor. It should be noted that by the subjective factor Trotsky understood not the masses and not even the Party, but the "leading personnel", as he called it. According to his recipe, the problem of the trade unions could be solved by a simple reshuffle. In later years, criticising the Comintern, accusing it of delaying the world revolution, Trotsky again reduced everything to the problem of the "leading personnel". Modern Trotskyists of the "Fourth International" give the same answer to the question why the hour of world revolution has not yet struck: it is the "crisis of the revolutionary leadership" that is to blame for everything.

Trotsky endows the "leading personnel" with supernatural powers. It can jump over stages as it sees fit, make leaps, "tighten screws". This is unadulterated subjectivism, and if Trotsky added to it anything of his own it was only that he transformed it into bureaucratic subjectivism.

Camouflaging his views as Leninism, Trotsky, fighting the Comintern, described Bolshevism as a linear process. "It is not flexibility that was and should be the main feature of Bolshevism, but rock hardness," he wrote in 1928 in direct contradiction to Lenin's demand that the Communist Party should "resort to changes of tack, to conciliation and compromises. . . . It is entirely a matter of *knowing how* to apply these tactics in order to *raise*—not lower—the *general* level of proletarian class-consciousness, revolutionary spirit, and ability to fight and win."¹

The one-sidedness, exaggeration, theoretical falsity and other similar features which Lenin noted in Trotsky's methods are also the "philosophical stock-in-trade" of Maoism.

But Maoism, bred on Chinese soil, naturally reflects the ideological, moral and ethical doctrines which began to form in antiquity and were inculcated into the people's minds as the official state ideology for two thousand years. The doctrine of Confucius—that great philosopher of ancient China—affected many features of the Chinese national character and way of thinking.

One of the Confucian postulates is implicit obedience to one's elders, blind submission to the bidding of the "sage". L. Vassilyev, a Soviet historian, writes that many sinologists noted the tendency of Chinese thinking towards scholasticism, towards blind and absolute faith in the teaching of the sage. The whole system of education was so built that from his very childhood man saw the world only through the eyes of ancient sages, so as to educate in him not an inclination towards independent thought and reasoning, but only the

¹ Ibid., Vol. 31, p. 74.

striving to apply the precepts and aphorisms of the sage, to rely on approved views.

In his work, *The Manchurian Rule in China*, S. L. Tikhvinsky, a Soviet sinologist, convincingly shows how Confucian dogmas were implanted during the last few centuries.¹ His book tells of emperors who declared that on this earth the "main task is to correct the people's minds", of the public burning of objectionable books, of the profanation of the graves of their authors and of many other things which gave Karl Marx ground to speak of "learned ignorance" and "pedantic cruelty" in China.

Academician V. M. Alexeyev, an outstanding sinologist, travelled in the interior of China in 1907, at the beginning of his scientific career. In his travel notes, which are full of deep sympathy with the Chinese people, he says, among other things, that the Chinese are "inclined to use quotations and allusions whenever possible." He also tells of their instruction which consists in "learning facts and names by heart and later reading scholastic historical treatises"; he speaks of the cult of the "perfect personality", which with them becomes a form of "worship"; he tells about special collections "containing the most interesting maxims for every imaginable situation",² and many other things which still continue to live on and occupy a by no means negligible place in the epoch of big social transformations.

All these specific features of China's social, economic and cultural development had their

¹ See *The Manchurian Rule in China* (in Russian), Moscow, 1966, pp. 12, 23, etc.

² V. M. Alexeyev, *In Ancient China. Travel Diaries 1907* (in Russian), Moscow, 1958, pp. 34, 49, 51, 69.

effect on the petty-bourgeois revolutionism which emerged in that country a long time ago and of which Maoism is a particularly repugnant form.

Unlike other proponents of petty-bourgeois revolutionism, who did not consider themselves philosophers and left no philosophical works, Mao Tse-tung claims a place in the philosophical pantheon. When he related his biography to Edgar Snow, an American journalist, Mao emphasised that early in his life he "studied philosophy with passion", read Confucius and other ancient Chinese philosophers, although, he asserted, he did not like the classics. Mao claims to have read Spinoza, Kant, Goethe, Hegel and Rousseau, but this is not noticeable in his works which abound in all sorts of quotations, especially from ancient Chinese philosophers. He admits that he admired Kang You-wei and Liang Tsi-chao, the two bourgeois reformists of the late 19th century, Kang You-wei strove to reform Confucius's teaching and make it serve China's new social forces. In his "Study of the Counterfeit Classical Canons of the Sin School", he wrote "...I want to do away completely with false teachings, annihilate the enemy, destroy his lair, exorcise the evil spirits, dispel the thick fog and illuminate the darkness. The sun will then shine even more brightly, the stars will sparkle more brilliantly and the classical canons and holy behests of Confucius which had almost perished will be revived."¹

Kang You-wei explained the long feudal stagnation in China from an unscientific, idealistic

¹ S. L. Tikhvinsky, *The Movement for Reforms in China at the End of the 19th Century and Kang You-wei* (in Russian), Moscow, 1959, p. 76.

position, blaming it on neglect of the ethico-philosophic teachings of antiquity. Liang Tsi-chao (one of Kang You-wei's pupils) notes that "Kang You-wei either regarded objective reality with contempt or tried to force it into the framework of his views."¹

Mao Tse-tung also took a great interest in anarchism. He admitted this to Edgar Snow. He said what a deep mark the peasant uprisings left on his "young brain already inclined to mutiny". In those years, he said, "I often discussed the problems of anarchism and its possibilities in China. At that time I agreed with many of its aims."

Mao Tse-tung first became acquainted with a Marxist book (*The Manifesto of the Communist Party*) at the age of 27. He has considered himself a Marxist ever since. But the Marxist seed fell on a soil thickly sown with ideas having nothing in common with Marxism. There was a real danger of the result being a hybrid. And that is what happened.

Years passed and Mao Tse-tung became the author of philosophical treatises. All of them, beginning with the two lectures "Regarding Practice" and "Regarding Contradictions", which appeared in 1937, have now been declared in China "a brilliant contribution to the treasure of the world Marxist-Leninist philosophy", "an enrichment and development of dialectical materialism".

Actually these works contain an eclectic blend of a simplified exposition of well-known propositions of dialectical materialism and an independent "contribution" of the author substituting

¹ Ibid., p. 401.

idealism for Marxist materialism and metaphysics for dialectics.

Having declared himself a Marxist, Mao Tse-tung naturally recognises the primacy of matter and the secondary nature of consciousness, that is, the materialist view on the fundamental question of philosophy. However, Mao Tse-tung's practical activity and many of his explicit statements show, as was the case with many others before him, that one can admit that the material principle determines the spiritual and yet not be a consistent materialist.

In his pamphlet *Where Man Gets Correct Ideas From* Mao Tse-tung says that all correct ideas spring from man's dual ability: 1) to transform spirit into matter and matter into spirit, and 2) to accept spirit as matter, and matter as spirit. In substance Mao replaces the primacy of matter and the secondary nature of consciousness by their identity, from which it follows that everything that happens in the world can be identified with what is happening in one's mind.¹

By representing in an oversimplified manner the ability of human consciousness to reflect objective reality and by reducing the complex process of cognition simply to a complete coincidence of the ideological and the material, Mao assures us that "every difference in man's concepts should be regarded as reflecting objective contradictions".²

By that means it is easy to find a so-called "materialistic", but in reality pragmatic, justi-

¹ I. Elez, G. Davydova, "The Philosophy of Random Action and Random Action in Philosophy" (in Russian), *Za Rubezhom*, 1967, No. 11.

² Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Vol. 2, p. 20.

fication of any ideas, no matter how far they are from reality. What is useful to me is a reality. There is no need to know much in order to have an opinion.

Lao Tse, the naive elemental materialist of ancient China who exerted a major influence on the formation of Mao's views, taught: "Know thyself to know others, know one family to know other families, know one village to know all others, know one empire to know all empires, know one country to know the world. How do I know the world? Thanks to this."¹

Judging of the world at large by himself, his family, village and country, Lao Tse was convinced that excessive knowledge brings nothing but harm. He said: "It is difficult to govern a people that has too much knowledge. Therefore to govern a country by means of knowledge is to be its enemy, to govern it without knowledge is to bring it happiness."²

In a talk with medical workers in 1965, Mao Tse-tung said: "The more books you read, the more stupid you become." That seems to indicate that he is not disinclined to make the country happy according to Lao Tse's recipe.

It was not a mere coincidence that the discussion "On the Identity of Thinking and Being" was organised precisely in 1960, when the full effects of the voluntaristic economic policy were already being felt in China. This "discussion" gave short shrift to all philosophers who correctly thought that the invention of this identity

¹ Yang Hing-shun, *The Ancient Chinese Philosopher Lao Tse and His Teaching* (in Russian), Moscow-Leningrad, 1950, pp. 144-45.

² *Ibid.*, p. 151.

was camouflaged idealism and that its purpose was to justify the failures and mistakes in the country's domestic and foreign policy.

Since everything Mao Tse-tung says is immediately declared in China a "new brilliant contribution", the theory of the identity of thinking and being was also declared a "new" one. Actually, it is the same old idealistic theory which Frederick Engels styled "one of the most delirious fantasies" and of which Lenin said that it was absolute nonsense and a through and through reactionary theory.

If the endeavour to deduce the reality of one's own judgements from the identity of thought and being is camouflaged idealism, the endowment of the "ideas of Mao Tse-tung" with a supernatural and universal power is stark naked idealism. Here idea dominates over matter. All one has to do is to study the ideas of Mao and everything will be all right. Material production is assigned a negligible role, the level of man's consciousness, not the development of production, being declared the source of all progress.

Considering people the true makers of history, Marxism-Leninism allots to man the decisive role in social production and recognises the great power of progressive ideas in social development. However, the genuine revolutionary teaching does not isolate man from material production, it considers the two as a unity. It is not abstract ideal man that makes history, but the living, real man with all his merits and shortcomings, acting in the concrete historical conditions, with the obtaining level of the productive forces and means of production. The ignoring of this unity of man and the material medium has led and continues to lead to gross mistakes.

When one side of the unity is set up against the other, truth becomes falsehood.

Right opportunists always set up the level of the productive forces in opposition to man and practically leave no room for man's transformative activity. Everything, they say, depends on the material conditions. This is vulgar economic materialism, the philosophy of passivity and laissez-faire, justification of inactivity and time-serving.

All sorts of "Leftists" Lenin said, commit the same mistake, only some commit it "the other way round". Placing man in opposition to the productive forces, they essentially deny the need for objective preconditions for the successful transformative activity of people. Everything, they say, depends only on man, on his will and consciousness. This is vulgar subjectivism, the philosophy of absolute voluntarism, justifying adventurism and scheming.

It is not hard to see why this philosophy spread in China. The low level of the productive forces, the predominance of the most primitive instruments of labour and the vast and steadily growing population created objective conditions for the simplified view that it is enough to make an all-out effort to attain desired ends.

This setting up of man in opposition to material possibilities is applied not only to all spheres of the economy, but also to the question of war. Lin Piao, who, according to the Chinese press, "upholds the red banner of Mao Tse-tung's ideas higher than anybody else", affirms in his article "Long Live the Victory of the People's War!" that "the best weapon is not some death-dealing weapon, such as a plane, gun, tank or atom bomb but the ideas of Mao Tse-tung". (By the

way, this eulogising of the power of Mao's ideas has not prevented the Maoists from investing huge sums in the production of nuclear weapons, involving an excessive strain on the economy.)

Contrasting man to ambient reality, the Maoists have constructed a simplified scheme of man deprived of any feelings, thoughts and emotions and fully adapted for the mechanical implementation of Mao's instructions. This is in strict contradiction to Lenin's view, who said: "We can (and must) begin to build socialism, not with abstract human material, or with human material specially prepared by us, but with the human material bequeathed to us by capitalism. True, that is no easy matter, but no other approach to this task is serious enough to warrant discussion."¹

The fact that there are objective conditions in modern China for voluntaristic ideas and all sorts of fantastic structures does not make these ideas and structures any more correct or justify the erroneous practices based on them. The substitution of idealism for materialism sooner or later leads to a dead end, to bankruptcy, because only ideas correctly reflecting the genuine needs and laws of life can assert themselves, take root and grow.

Passing off subjective idealism for Marxist materialism, Mao likewise interprets Marxist dialectics after his own fashion. The unity and struggle of opposites—that law of development as a result of the internal contradictions of phenomena—is reduced by Mao to a primitive scheme of no practical use in analysing reality. For

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 50.

the multiformity of life with its various contradictions—necessary and incidental, essential and secondary, antagonistic and non-antagonistic—he substitutes a simple enumeration of opposites. In fact, he repeats what the ancient Chinese philosophers did when a scientific interpretation of the universe was still in its diapers.

Here is the static interpretation of opposites, as seen by Mao Tse-tung: "Without life, there would be no death; without death, there would also be no life. Without 'above', there would be no 'below'; without 'below', there would also be no 'above'. Without misfortune, there would be no good fortune; without good fortune, there would also be no misfortune. Without facility, there would be no difficulty; without difficulty, there would also be no facility. Without landlords, there would be no tenant-peasants; without tenant-peasants, there would also be no landlords. Without the bourgeoisie, there would be no proletariat; without a proletariat, there would also be no bourgeoisie. Without imperialist oppression of the nations, there would be no colonies and semi-colonies; without colonies and semi-colonies, there would also be no imperialist oppression of the nations. All opposite elements are like this."¹

How does Mao see development, the struggle of these opposites? He sees it as a simple transformation of one into the other through a change of place: "...Each of the two contradictory aspects within a thing, because of certain conditions, tends to transform itself into the other, to transfer itself to the opposite position."²

¹ Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Vol. 2, pp. 43-44.

² *Ibid.*, p. 44.

According to Mao, the essence of socialist revolution is merely that the subordinated class, the proletariat, becomes the ruling class, and the bourgeoisie takes the place formerly held by its antipode, the landowners and peasants change places, peace and war succeed each other, etc.

According to this scheme, opposites can change places infinitely, all movement is reduced to disturbance and restoration of equilibrium. In Mao Tse-tung and in the Peking textbook *Dialectical Materialism*, which propagandises Maoism, this proposition is explained at length. The law of development, the textbook says, is "equilibrium—disequilibrium—equilibrium" or "cohesion—the splitting of unity in two—new cohesion". Imperialism, according to that scheme, plays the following role: "It commits outrages, is defeated, again commits outrages, is again defeated, and so on until its destruction." Planning is reduced to achieving a temporary and relative equilibrium. "A year passes and, on the whole, this equilibrium is disturbed by the struggle of opposites and becomes disequilibrium, unity stops being unity, and next year equilibrium and unity have to be achieved again."¹

This scheme has nothing in common with Marxist dialectics. The interaction of contradictions and their interpenetration has disappeared and their struggle is always understood as a clash of antagonistic forces. This is very convenient for justifying "theoretically" the Mao group's subversive activity in the international Communist

¹ Mao Tse-tung, "On the Correct Resolution of Contradictions Within the Nation" (in Russian), Moscow, 1957, p. 17.

movement (after unity there must inevitably be a split), for justifying any errors in planning (the equilibrium achieved is necessarily followed by disequilibrium), for denying the struggle for peace which must inevitably be succeeded by war, for declaring that in socialist society, too, the class struggle must not differ from the struggle before the triumph of the socialist revolution.

Such "dialectics" is extremely convenient, for it helps to evade the concrete analysis of a concrete situation and to construct contradictions according to one's wishes, to reduce the science and the art of political leadership to aggravation of contradictions, to present unrestrained subjectivism as ideology.

The elemental materialism and naive dialectics of the ancient Chinese philosophers reflected the level of science in their day. They were progressive views for the time. But to return to them in our day would be not a mere archaism, but downright reaction. The people in the propaganda apparatus serving Mao's ideas understand the striking propinquity of the propositions they disseminate to the philosophy of the ancients. Since it cannot be denied, they try to present ancient Chinese philosophy as something universal and of intransient significance.

The tendency to present ancient Chinese philosophy as the principle of principles has been asserting itself more and more strongly with every passing year. Works have appeared which described this philosophy as a source of atheism, materialism, naturalism and the rationalism of the French encyclopaedists, a cornerstone of the Great French Revolution. The authors of these books also see the influence of Chinese philosophy

in the works of Kant, Fichte and Hegel. However, even this was not enough for them.

Early in 1957 a discussion was held on the history of Chinese philosophy. In May 1959 a debate was held on the philosophical system of Lao Tse and on problems of Confucius's philosophy, neo-Confucianism, etc. F. S. Bykov, a Soviet philosopher, noted that in modern Chinese philosophical writings we observe a trend towards the modernisation and idealisation of China's philosophical heritage, a striving to picture its specific traits as an achievement. Now the claim that ancient Chinese philosophy influenced all philosophy from Descartes to Hegel is considered too modest. Chinese philosophers made attempts to prove that there is no essential difference between the views of Confucius and some theoretical propositions of Marxism-Leninism, while some even read into the principal work of Confucius, *The Book of Changes*, propositions supposed to have much in common with dialectical materialism.

This sort of modernisation is not new in China. Go Mo-zho has long since portrayed Confucius as Marx's direct predecessor. In a story published in 1920 and republished in 1950, telling of an imaginary conversation between Marx and Confucius, the author makes Marx express pleasure at meeting an Eastern sage who held the same ideas as he more than 2,000 years ago.

The attempts to pass off as Marxism views which have nothing whatsoever in common with it assume different forms. The substitution of metaphysics for dialectics was in evidence at the philosophical discussion held in 1964 before the "cultural revolution". The Chinese press reported

that "as regards the number of participants and its influence and significance, the discussion has had no equal in our scientific circles for many years". The central problem of the discussion was the "splitting of unity into two" and the "fusion of two into one". Between June and August alone, according to the *Hung-chi*, 90 articles were dedicated to this problem. The aim of the discussion was to "expose" those who stood for a concrete historical approach to the unity of the objective and subjective, who maintained that dialectics consists not only in the splitting of unity, but also in the combination of opposites, only on a new basis and in a new quality.

It condemned philosophers adhering to the principles advanced by Lenin in his polemics with the Trotskyists, who had adopted a metaphysical approach by setting up moral stimuli in opposition to material stimuli and declaring the two kinds to be mutually exclusive. The Maoists did not like what Lenin had said at the end of 1920: "But after all we do have some knowledge of Marxism and have learned how and when opposites can and must be combined; and what is most important is that in the three and a half years of our revolution we have actually combined opposites again and again."¹

The Maoists correctly saw criticism of their policy in the fact that dialectics requires us not only to distinguish between opposites but also to see their combination, and to learn to use this combination in socialist construction. But being subjectivists they decided not to correct their policy but to "correct" the objective laws of

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 27.

dialectics. Actually Mao himself did this long before the discussion. "The contradictory aspects in every process exclude each other, struggle with each other and are opposed to each other. Such contradictory aspects are contained without exception in the processes of all things in the world and in human thought,"¹ he declared.

There are no exceptions to this! That means that if contradictions emerge within a party, the only way of resolving them is the moral or even physical destruction of all those holding their own views. If we admit the significance of subjective endeavours, the Maoists say, there is no point in speaking of the influence of objective conditions. A philosopher was severely criticised for describing the development of oil production in Da-tsin as follows: "The Da-tsin experience was an example of coincidence of the subjective and the objective. The point is that the people concerned had a very clear idea of the subsurface conditions. If there had been only revolutionary efforts, without any knowledge of the conditions below the surface, the successes would not have been so spectacular."² This statement was appraised as a challenge to the official version of the Da-tsin experience, which was advertised as a result of revolutionary efforts and the power of Mao's ideas.

The significance of this line of "splitting unity into two" becomes particularly clear when we look more closely at the view the Maoists take of man: all people are divided into good and bad, into true pupils of Mao and "dogs' heads";

¹ Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Vol. 2, p. 43.

² *Guangming ribao*, September 11, 1964.

the good have no defects, the bad have no virtues.

Looking at all phenomena in an ossified state, as isolated from one another and deprived of their interpenetration, the Maoists have invented the following scheme: the ideal hero (the revolutionary) has only virtues: courage, staunchness, etc.; the negative personality (the reactionary, the revisionist) has only vices: cowardice, instability, self-indulgence, and so on.

The propaganda apparatus declared a bitter war on the portrayal in literature and art of the "average man", in whom virtues live side by side with defects. The "splitting unity into two" excludes such co-existence, it leaves no room for human qualities extending beyond the approved scheme. Metaphysics ousts dialectics completely.

In his *The Poverty of Philosophy* Marx derided Proudhon for having "nothing of Hegel's dialectics but the language. For him the dialectic movement is the dogmatic distinction between good and bad". Marx says that Proudhon "has the drawback of being stricken with sterility when it is a question of engendering a new category by dialectical birth-throes. What constitutes dialectical movement is the co-existence of two contradictory sides, their conflict and their fusion into a new category. The very setting of the problem of eliminating the bad side cuts short the dialectic movement. It is not the category which is posed and opposed to itself, by its contradictory nature, it is M. Proudhon who gets excited, perplexed and frets and fumes between the two sides of the category."¹

¹ K. Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Moscow, 1962, p. 108.

Mao Tse-tung has no need to suffer the "birth-throes" of Proudhon, he commands the army, the gangs of thugs with whose help he expects to make short work of contradictions. Mao has not only the "advantage" over Proudhon of holding the government in his hands, but also of being able to use everything that has "enriched" petty-bourgeois ideology in the past 120 years. This includes the subjectivism of anarchism and Narodism, the eclecticism of Trotskyism, and the straightforwardness, one-sidedness, inflexibility and inertness, the inflation of one of the aspects of cognition into an absolute, the dissociation from matter, which Lenin considered indispensable roots of philosophic idealism.

Petty-bourgeois philosophy has advanced but little, it has remained practically as barren as it was before, and can give birth only to illogical theoretical constructions and adventurist practices.

"PERMANENT REVOLUTION"

Marxism explains the necessity and inevitability of the social revolution by the conditions and requirements of the material life of society and by the objective laws of the class struggle. To petty-bourgeois revolutionism, however, the revolution is the reaction of a mutinous soul to injustice, the struggle for a moral ideal, the abstract idea of a better future.

Marxists consider that the basis for correct tactics can be "only an objective consideration of the sum total of the relations between absolutely all the classes in a given society, and consequently a consideration of the objective stage of development reached by that society and of the relations between it and other societies".¹ At the same time they regard all classes not as immobile, but in movement. That is why Marxists insist on a clear definition of the motive force and the nature of every revolution, its direct and ultimate aims, the relation between the various stages the revolution has to go through.

The only criterion for tactics advanced by petty-bourgeois revolutionism is that they be "the most revolutionary of all". This explains their complete indifference to the assessment of the objective possibilities offered by the actual stage, their striving to advance maximalist slogans according to the "all or nothing" principle.

The anarchists accused Marx and Engels of opportunism. "Don't you understand," they said,

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 75.

"that a revolutionary always should and does consider himself entitled to rouse the people to insurrection." He who does not believe in the "readiness" of the people for revolution, they say, does not believe in revolution in general. "That is why we cannot wait, refuse to tolerate hesitation and wavering. The question 'What is to be done?' should not worry us any longer. It has been solved long ago. We should make revolution. How? Everybody should do it as he can and knows best," they add. Answering such revolutionary babble, Engels convincingly showed that all these slogans are advanced as though the people making them do not inhabit our sinful planet but live in the transcendental spheres of empty phrases, and that these are only phrases to "conceal revolutionary inaction".¹

In Italy, Spain and other countries the wild "revolutionary" phrases of the anarchists awoke a response when the working-class movement was only in embryo. The anarchists presented every manifestation of dissatisfaction as the end of the capitalist system. In 1873, when revolutionary events were maturing in Spain, the anarchists wrote in their newspaper: "... *As yet nothing has happened in Barcelona, but on the squares, in public places there is permanent revolution!*" Engels caustically commented that this revolution of the anarchists "consists in constant drum-beating, and for this reason 'permanently' does not budge from the 'spot'".²

Anarchism does not draw any distinction between the concepts "bourgeois", "bourgeois-

¹ K. Marx/F. Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 18, 1962, S. 552, 554.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 481-82.

democratic" and "socialist" revolution. It solves without any difficulty the concrete problems which each one of them is called upon to solve as well as the complex relations between the successive stages of revolutionary struggle. The anarchists reduced the concept "revolution" to spontaneous mutiny, which was to become a "social liquidation". The state is liquidated, the old culture uprooted, everything that can be destroyed is destroyed, and the new society grows up from nothing.

Hence the assertion that a revolutionary "knows only one science—the science of destruction"; hence also the gamble on the inborn instinct to mutiny, which is supposed to be present in everybody. When the working-class movement became more organised and rejected the naive mutinous ideas it had initially held, the anarchists declared that the working class was unfit for struggle. Bakunin divided all nations into those able and those unable to carry out a revolution. In his opinion, peoples who did not suffer material hardships lost the revolutionary spirit; only poor peoples, in particular peasants, could be revolutionaries. The peasantry was declared to be the spontaneous bearer of socialist ideas.

The utopian views of the special mission of the peasantry, the fantastic ideas of the tactics in the revolutionary struggle were overcome as capitalist development eroded the basis on which the peasant utopias rested and Marxist ideas increasingly gained ground and recognition as the only ones correctly expressing the development needs of modern society.

However, the ideas of the past do not disappear completely, they are able to revive under new

conditions, to adapt themselves to views that have become dominant in the revolutionary movement. A case in point was the adaptation by petty-bourgeois revolutionism of Marx's and Engels's term "permanent revolution" to create a concept having nothing in common with Marxism.

In the first appeal of the Central Committee to the Communist League, published in March 1850, Marx and Engels emphasised that the working class cannot rest content with victories that satisfy the bourgeoisie, and even the democratic petty bourgeoisie whose aim is to finish with the revolution as quickly as possible. "Our task," they said, "is to make the revolution permanent, until all more or less possessing classes have been forced out of their position of dominance, until the proletariat has conquered state power. . . ."¹ The appeal ended with a call to the workers to take up an independent stand, not to allow themselves to be sidetracked from organising their own party, whose slogan "should be the uninterrupted revolution".

The Marxist idea of the permanent revolution follows logically from the fact that the proletariat is the only consistent revolutionary class, one that refuses to stand any form of oppression—the class whose historical mission is to build a classless society.

At that time, Marxists thought that the socialist revolution could be victorious only if there was a world revolution, one embracing at least the main capitalist countries. By "permanent revolution" Marx and Engels understood the

¹ K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, p. 110.

victory of the proletariat in all the dominant countries in the world.

Half a century later, the Marxist view of the revolution in permanence was developed by Lenin in his theory on the growing-over of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into the socialist revolution. Since the world capitalist system as a whole has now become mature for transition to socialism, a revolution which begins as a bourgeois one has every objective possibility not to stop with the destruction of feudal survivals, but to continue until the dictatorship of the proletariat is established. Lenin said that everything would depend on who would head the revolution: the bourgeoisie, interested in stopping it as quickly as possible, or the proletariat, which rallying all working people around itself, can lead the revolution to the victory of socialism. "...From the democratic revolution," Lenin wrote in 1905, "we shall at once, and precisely in accordance with the measure of our strength, the strength of the class-conscious and organised proletariat, begin to pass to the socialist revolution. We stand for uninterrupted revolution."¹

In 1905, Lenin had not yet formulated the conclusion on the possibility of socialism triumphing in a single country, but his entire theory of the growing-over of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into the socialist revolution is based on the internal possibilities of the revolution. His book *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution* and all other works written during the turbulent years of the first Russian Revolution are permeated with the conviction that the prospects of the movement, and

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 9, pp. 236-37.

the speed with which the stages of the revolution will change, depend primarily on the strength of the working class, its organisation and its ability to win over the peasantry.

This explains also Lenin's demand "to expand enormously" the limits of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and his thorough understanding that it is impossible to jump over the stage of that revolution and to begin to solve socialist tasks immediately. Lenin said that disregard of the democratic stage and of the tasks connected with it, belittling of these tasks, means "a travesty of theoretical Marxism. . . ."¹

He called upon the Party to set the entire people broader general democratic tasks with more courage and initiative, and considered the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry as a new type of power, one that can carry the bourgeois-democratic revolution through to the end and ensure its growing-over into a socialist revolution.

This was not the only period during which a "travesty of theoretical Marxism" was made. It appeared in many variants in later years, and not only in Russia, but also in the international communist movement.

Trotsky, too, made a travesty of Marxism when in opposition to Marx's and Engels's propositions on permanent revolution and to Lenin's theory of the growing-over of a bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution he advanced his own "permanent revolution" theory which Lenin called "absurdly Left".²

¹ Ibid., Vol. 9, p. 112.

² Ibid., Vol. 20, p. 346.

"No tsar, but a workers' government"—was the slogan Trotsky proclaimed in 1905. It expressed the endeavour to jump over the bourgeois-democratic revolution which was already under way in Russia. "Trotsky's major mistake," Lenin said, "is that he ignores the bourgeois character of the revolution and has no clear conception of the transition from this revolution to the socialist revolution."¹

After the February bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1917, Lenin advanced the slogan "All power to the Soviets!", realising that they could pave the way for the transition to the socialist revolution. "Are we not in danger of falling into subjectivism, of wanting to arrive at the socialist revolution by 'skipping' the bourgeois-democratic revolution—which is not yet completed and has not yet exhausted the peasant movement?" asked Lenin in his *Letters on Tactics*. "I might be incurring this danger if I said: 'No tsar, but a *workers'* government.'"² Some time later, speaking at the Petrograd City Party Conference, Lenin again emphasised that Trotsky's slogan "No tsar, but a workers' government" was erroneous.

Under Russian conditions, the Trotskyist "permanent revolution" meant to ignore the revolutionary possibilities of the peasantry, to regard it as an anti-revolutionary force. The Trotskyists continued their anti-peasant policy also after the triumph of the socialist revolution. If, however, we look at Trotskyism not only in its Russian variant, but also consider it as a claim to provide a general scheme for the world social-

¹ Ibid., Vol. 15, p. 371.

² Ibid., Vol. 24, p. 48.

ist revolution, we see that the main thing in Trotskyism is its endeavour to jump at any cost over stages of revolutionary development. In some cases this skipping means a break with the peasantry, in others, it may lead to the rejection of other allies—the national bourgeoisie, the urban petty-bourgeoisie, etc.

Characteristically, modern Trotskyists, while continuing to admire the so-called “permanent revolution” theory, which the “Fourth International” considers its “precious heritage”, actually reject Trotsky’s view of the peasantry as a reactionary force. Wishing to adapt their stand, at least in some degree, to the growing national liberation movement, the Trotskyists now speak of the peasant countries of the East as of “the emergent new vanguard”, and ascribe to them “a radical and decisive role”, while continuing to propagandise the “doctrine of permanent revolution”, which is supposed to hold out for Asia, Africa and Latin America the prospect of a leap to socialism.

Trotsky, trying to prove the possibility of skipping stages of social development, said: “It is nonsense to claim that it is impossible in general to jump over stages.” Marxist-Leninists do not deny leaps in the revolutionary process, but they regard a leap as an objective phenomenon prepared by the entire preceding development and not as the result only of revolutionary enthusiasm.

Mao Tse-tung holds the same methodological views as the Trotskyists as regards both the subjectivist striving to jump over stages and the contraposing of the revolution in one country to the world revolution. Like the Trotskyists, the Maoists have always and everywhere stood for the establishment of socialism in every country, irrespective

of the conditions prevailing there, and have always insisted that this must be done by armed insurrection.

According to the views of the Maoists, the peoples in the developing countries who have embarked on the road of independent national development should overthrow their governments by force of arms and immediately proclaim socialist construction.

Peking attacks the Communist Parties in the developed capitalist countries for regarding the struggle for the vital needs of the working people, for democracy, and for peace as a means of promoting the victory of socialism. Since this struggle has not yet taken the form of a revolution they call it opportunism.

This is obvious from Peking's attitude to the parliamentary activity of Communists and their courageous struggle to defend democracy. The dialectics of history is such that with the growth of the liberation movement and the influence of the working class, the bourgeois democratic system becomes irksome to the monopoly bourgeoisie. It therefore launches an assault on democratic freedoms and endeavours to revise the constitution, to cancel all more or less progressive laws. Under these conditions, the defence of democracy, even if it is a very limited and formal bourgeois democracy in many respects, the movement for the extension and renovation of this democracy becomes a struggle against the monopolies and undermines the foundations of the capitalist system.

"At a time when the united anti-monopoly front is consolidating and expanding, when the working class and its allies are gaining ever greater political weight in society, they can make

a wider use of their hard-won democratic rights and institutions in the struggle against monopoly rule. The democratic reforms, expressing the interests of the working class and the non-proletarian sections of working people, which are being enforced under pressure of the masses, result in the consolidation of the positions of the progressive forces, and expand the bridgehead for launching a decisive offensive against capitalist positions. The movement to win greater rights for the people in the bourgeois countries is an important aspect of the class battles and an integral part of the struggle for socialism."¹

The Mao Tse-tung group denies any possibility that the working people's struggle for democracy may be successful, and calls even its most obvious successes hand-outs of the ruling classes.

In the article "Once Again on Comrade Toglliati's Differences With Us", the editorial offices of the *Renmin ribao* and the *Hung-chi* "explained" that seats in a bourgeois parliament are not won by struggle but are handed out at will by the bourgeoisie in order to deprave the working class and its leaders. "In its interests," they wrote, "the bourgeoisie admits representatives of the working class political party to its parliament under definite conditions. It thus strives to lead some representatives and leaders of the working class astray, to corrupt and even to bribe them." So it seems that the victories of the Communists in elections are no more than bourgeois hand-outs and parliamentary cretinism.

¹ *Fiftieth Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, Theses of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.*, pp. 57-58.

Only blind supporters of pseudo-revolutionary schemes can deny that democratic gains reflect the balance of forces in the country, that they are the result of struggle and proof of the growing influence of the working class and the Communist Party. Many facts from the practice of the international communist movement corroborate Lenin's statement that political changes "of a truly democratic nature, and especially political revolutions, can under no circumstances whatsoever either obscure or weaken the slogan of socialist revolution. On the contrary, they always bring it closer, extend its basis, and draw new sections of the petty bourgeoisie and the semi-proletarian masses into the socialist struggle".¹

By revolution Marxism-Leninism understands first and foremost the conquest of state power by the revolutionary class. It does not link the concept of revolution with the method by which this conquest is made. "The passing of state power from one *class* to another is the first, the principle, the basic sign of a *revolution*, both in the strictly scientific and in the practical political meaning of the term."² That is why Marxists never agreed with those who shift the emphasis from the content of revolution to the methods by which it is carried out. Peking, however, holds a different view. The pamphlet *Long Live Leninism* says: "By revolution we understand the use of revolutionary violence by the oppressed class, a revolutionary war."

When in 1938, during the long drawn-out civil war and the armed resistance against the Japanese invaders, Mao Tse-tung said that in China

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 339.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 24, p. 44.

war was the main form of struggle and that "the rifle gives birth to power", this really applied in the concrete conditions then prevailing in China. But even at that time Mao did not intend this as a characteristic of the specific features of the struggle in China, he considered it universally valid. His article extolling weapons as the source of all power begins with a categorical statement: "The central task of the revolution and its highest form is the seizure of power by force of arms, i.e., the solution of the question by war. This revolutionary principle of Marxism-Leninism is universally correct, it is undoubtedly correct for China and also for other countries."¹

The activity of the Maoist groups in the European countries shows how they regard revolutionism in modern conditions. To them revolutionism is expressed by terrorist acts, arson, obstructions, fights, and the cut-throat methods once advocated by the anarchists, methods which did not rest on a sound basis even then, and are absurd today, when the working-class movement is organised on a mass scale.

Thus, the Maoists recognise as revolutionary action only a revolutionary war, only armed insurrection, and consider all other forms of struggle against the ruling classes as opportunism and treachery.

Such stereotyped patterns for the methods and forms of struggle have nothing in common with genuine revolutionism. An analysis of the specific features of our epoch has shown that under definite conditions there is a real possibility of uniting the bulk of the people, of carrying out a

¹ Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Vol. 2, Russian edition, p. 379.

successful socialist revolution and of seizing state power without civil war.

In appraising the forms of struggle, Lenin did not proceed from abstract positions of maximum revolutionism; he assessed them according to their suitability in the objective conditions in which the social forces have to contend and according to how much these forms help to expand the mass movement and raise it to a higher stage. Lenin emphasised that the Bolsheviks could not and would not adopt the slogan of being "more revolutionary than anybody else", that the senseless "revolution-making" of the anarchists was entirely alien to them.

The most revolutionary slogan calling for the most decisive form of struggle must inevitably become an empty phrase if it is proclaimed without due regard for the specific conditions of the current stage and the forms taken by the mass movement. "When people refuse to reckon with the actual situation that has arisen and the actual conditions of the particular mass movement, because of a slogan misinterpreted as unchangeable," Lenin said, "such an application of a slogan inevitably degenerates into revolutionary phrase-mongering."¹

There are not and cannot be universal forms of struggle suitable in all conditions. A form which in some conditions might seem the only possible one, and might really play a revolutionary role, may become anti-revolutionary in other historical conditions. And, vice versa, a form which in certain conditions might be a rejection of revolutionary struggle, may become

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 215.

an important form for advancing the revolution in different historical conditions.

Any attempt to make some form of struggle universal is dogmatic and essentially anti-revolutionary. Nobody can invent forms of struggle. They are evolved by the mass movement and depend on the concrete features of every historical moment. "Under no circumstances," Lenin said, "does Marxism confine itself to the forms of struggle possible and in existence at the given moment only, recognising as it does that new forms of struggle, unknown to the participants of the given period, *inevitably* arise as the given social situation changes."¹ That is why Lenin stressed with such insistence that the revolutionary class "in order to accomplish its task . . . must be able to master *all* forms or aspects of social activity without exception . . . must be prepared for the most rapid and brusque replacement of one form by another."²

Jumping over stages is only one aspect of the "permanent revolution" of the Trotskyists. The other deals with the relation between the revolutionary struggle within the country and the development of the world revolution.

Realising that the ignoring of bourgeois-democratic tasks in a backward country would put the proletariat in a difficult position by isolating it from the broad mass of the peasants, Trotsky saw only one way out of this dilemma, namely to spread the fire of revolution to the international arena. In 1922, he explained the essence of his "permanent revolution" as follows in the preface to his book *1905*: "The contradictions in the

¹ Ibid., Vol. 11, p. 213.

² Ibid., Vol. 31, p. 96.

position of a workers' government in a backward country with a predominantly peasant population can be resolved only on an international scale, in the arena of the world proletarian revolution."

Lenin's theory of revolution did not underestimate the importance of the external conditions in which the revolution develops or ignore the significance of the international factor, but it proceeded first and foremost from the internal motive forces and proved that the revolution could be accomplished by relying on those forces. The "permanent revolution" theory, however, stresses not the development of the internal possibilities of the revolution, but the degree to which it can enkindle revolutionary development in other countries, making the fate of the revolution in one country entirely dependent on international support. The seeming revolutionism of the slogan "No tsar, but a workers' government" reflects not faith in the internal possibilities of the revolution but, on the contrary, complete disbelief in them, and adventurist reliance on external support alone.

Compelled to reckon with the triumphant spread of Lenin's ideas in the working-class movement, Trotsky hypocritically camouflaged his ideas as Leninism, denied that Trotskyism was hostile to Leninism. Right up to 1928 Trotsky stated that "the difference between the two lines, the 'permanent' and the Leninist, are of secondary and subordinate significance..." He attempted by all means to prove that the "permanent revolution" theory was nothing else than the Leninist theory of the growing-over of the democratic revolution into a socialist one, with the only difference that he (Trotsky) regarded the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the

proletariat and the peasantry (which Lenin considered to be the substance of the "growing-over") as unrealistic, and the "permanent revolution" slogan as leading directly to the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Trotsky's attempts to picture the difference between the Leninist theory of the socialist revolution and his "permanent revolution" as a matter of secondary importance were designed to screen over the main thing, the substance, and to conceal the abyss dividing Leninism and Trotskyism.

However, the fact that these were not abstract theoretical problems, not differences of "subordinate importance", but vital policy problems was becoming obvious not only in Russia, but also in all other countries where Leftist elements endeavoured to make the fate of the revolution depend on the victory of the revolution on a world-wide scale.

The anti-Marxist views on the relation between the revolution in one country and the world revolution became current in China as early as the thirties. Li Li-san, maintaining that "a direct revolutionary situation is maturing throughout the world", said in 1930: "The victory of the Chinese revolution cannot be ensured and achieved without the victory of the world revolution." Here, as in petty-bourgeois revolutionism in general, ultra-revolutionary phraseology easily co-exists with capitulationism and lack of faith in the internal revolutionary forces. Many variants of the "permanent revolution" theory spread in China during subsequent years.

The problem of the relation between the revolution in one country and the world revolution has a direct bearing on the prospects of social

development after the triumph of the revolution.

Immediately after the Great October Socialist Revolution, Trotsky's "permanent revolution" theory was intended by its creator to justify a policy leading to the destruction of the young Soviet state, since the latter was unable to crush world imperialism. After the Civil War and the defeat of the interventionists, the "permanent revolution" theory was used as the ideological basis for denying the possibility of building socialism in one country.

When the country had to decide whether it was to advance along the road of socialist construction without relying on immediate help from the world revolution, whether it was to make every possible use of the peaceful respite or to carry out a policy of unleashing a revolutionary war, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union displayed new vigour in exposing the adventurist nature of Trotsky's "permanent revolution" theory.

The success of the C.P.S.U. in rousing the people to work for socialism and winning a brilliant victory solved the question whether or not it was possible to build socialism in one country. Events disproved the Trotskyist Cassandras. Socialism triumphed in the Soviet Union in the most difficult conditions, at a time when the country was surrounded by capitalist states. Despite persistent efforts by the defenders of the "permanent revolution" theory over many years to deny the socialist nature of the Soviet system and their predictions of its inevitable degeneration, the facts belied them.

Mao's followers also practically deny that it is possible for socialist society to develop successfully in a single country or even in a community

of socialist states. They make the prospect of socialist construction and the gradual transition from socialism to communism directly dependent upon the destruction of world imperialism.

When the new Programme of the C.P.S.U. outlining the basic directions of communist construction in the U.S.S.R. was approved by the entire world communist movement, the Chinese leaders also called it a "grandiose plan for the building of communism by the Soviet people". This was said in the greetings addressed by the Central Committee of the C.P.C. to the 22nd Congress of the C.P.S.U. and signed by Mao Tse-tung.¹ Some time later, however, Mao Tse-tung ceased to call the construction taking place in the Soviet Union communist,² and subsequently he declared that the Programme of the C.P.S.U. was aimed "against the revolution of the peoples", "at preserving and restoring capitalism".

Again the thesis is advanced that, as long as capitalism exists in the world, a country that has carried out a socialist revolution is unable to solve its internal contradictions on a national scale, that this can be done only on an international scale. Formerly this pseudo-revolutionary but actually capitulationist statement was directed against socialist construction; now it is levelled against communist construction. Formerly the Trotskyists denied the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country; now Mao Tse-tung's

¹ See *The Twenty-Second Congress of the C.P.S.U., October 17-31, 1961. Stenographic Report*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1962, pp. 327-28.

² See "Greetings on the Occasion of the 46th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution", *Pravda*, November 7, 1963.

followers deny the possibility of the triumph of communism in several countries, asserting that this is possible only on a world scale. They refuse to believe that a programme for building communist society can be implemented in present-day conditions, in a world in which there is still imperialism. Similar to the approach the Trotskyists once adopted to socialist construction, the Maoists now say that any attempt to build communist society in one or several countries while imperialism still exists is an effort to achieve the impossible, that is, acting without a sense of responsibility and at variance with proletarian internationalism. How familiar all this sounds! Even the same old words are used: "striving to achieve the impossible", "departure from proletarian internationalism", etc.

In their attacks on communist construction in the U.S.S.R., the Maoist propagandists seek enthusiasm in verbal strivings to kindle the world revolution by all and every means. The danger of building communism, they say, is that people will rest content with what they have achieved in their country and will stop thinking about the world revolution, that "the political consciousness of the people, its militancy will drop. . . ." In their opinion, the shortest way to communism is not to work out and implement a programme of communist construction, but "to fight imperialism by all possible means".

It is extremely difficult for adherents of the abstract formula "a revolutionary must make revolutions" to understand that earnest, conscientious work in a socialist country is also an expression of revolutionism, that a diplomat pursuing the peaceful policy of a socialist country is also working for the revolutionary cause. Naturally

the image of the Red Army man with a cartridge belt over his shoulder is more impressive than the image of a scientist in the laboratory or the director of a factory, but today revolutionism in the socialist countries is expressed not by fighting on barricades but by working to improve the socialist system, by raising its economic and military potential, by increasing its spiritual wealth.

The Chinese hurrah-revolutionaries reject Lenin's view that socialism will exert its main influence on international development by its economic successes, that the emergent new society will revolutionise human development by the force of its example. They want to implant in the communist movement adventuristic ideas springing essentially from their distrust of the socialist forces.

Attacking communist construction in the U.S.S.R., the Maoists do not believe it possible that socialism will triumph in their own country. The ninth article in the series, "Replies to the Open Letter of the C.C., C.P.S.U.," published in the *Renmin ribao* on July 14, 1964, states explicitly that it is impossible to build full socialism before imperialism and capitalism have been destroyed throughout the world. In accordance with this statement, the Maoists believe that the period of building socialism and the transition to communism will take not years or decades, but centuries or even millennia. This article says that "the stage of the permanent socialist revolution", the "stage of the dictatorship of the proletariat" will last "hundreds, thousands and even ten thousand years". Throughout that period, which is longer than the entire preceding history of class society, there will be, they say,

a sharp class struggle conducted according to the principle of "who will beat whom".

It should not be thought that Mao has always held such views. Quite recently, in 1958, he advanced the slogan "three years of persistent labour—10,000 years of happiness".

It is not hard to see what has brought about this radical change of mind—it is a typical case of petty-bourgeois swinging from one extreme to the other.

At its Eighth Congress in 1956, despite pronounced Leftist trends on some concrete questions of economic construction, the C.P.C. still stood on more or less realistic positions. The resolution of the congress set the task of "creating within three five-year plans or a somewhat longer period an integral industrial system so that industrial production should hold the basic place in social production", emphasised the need for "a rational combination of construction in the country with an improvement of the well-being of the people", and warned that, if the real situation was not taken into account and excessively high rates were fixed "this will hinder economic development and the fulfilment of the plan and therefore be an adventuristic error".¹ The tendency "to run blindly ahead" was criticised at the congress.

Subsequent events showed, however, that Mao Tse-tung's followers, unable to make their line prevail at the congress, had begun to carry it out in circumvention of the decisions adopted by it.

In 1958, the "great leap" was announced.

¹ *Materials of the Eighth All-China Congress of the Communist Party of China* (in Russian), pp. 472, 477, 478.

Slogans were advanced which had no chance of success whatever and which expressed the unbridled voluntarism and complete irresponsibility of their authors. No sooner had the Politbureau of the C.C., C.P.C. decided in August 1958 to increase the grain harvest in a year by 60 per cent than the *Hung-chi* (November 16) wrote that Mao Tse-tung demanded that the grain harvest be doubled not only in 1958 but also in 1959. The slogan "To overtake and outstrip Britain in the output of key industrial production within 15 or a few more years", advanced early in 1958, was soon amended and the task was set for seven years, and later, in some branches, for 2-3 years. The 1962 targets for many branches were higher than the output of these branches in U.S. industry. This clearly subjectivist attempt to skip unfulfilled tasks of the transition period was a dismal failure. It took several years to make up for the losses caused by the adventurist "great leap". According to many observers (statistics are no longer published in China), the Chinese national economy is still on the 1957 level.

However, as soon as the economy had recovered a little, Mao renewed his drive for new "leaps". During the "cultural revolution" it was announced that Mao had taken no part in the decisions of the Eighth Congress of the C.P.C., which were thenceforward considered erroneous by his group.

During the "cultural revolution", the subjectivism and arbitrary appraisal typical of petty-bourgeois revolutionism were accompanied more than ever before by wanton vilification of all those who held different ideas, and accusations of revisionism and opportunism were levelled

against everybody who did not share the adventurous ideas of Mao Tse-tung.

From the hysterical outcries against "the handful of highly placed people in authority in the Party who are following the capitalist line" it is impossible to determine exactly what that "handful" is accused of. The use of allegory and allusion is here carried to the extreme. "The black line", "revisionism", "reaction" are labels which provide no clue to what is behind them. This puts one in mind of Lenin's sarcastic description of the heroes of the revolutionary "screeching" "who regard 'slogans', not as a practical conclusion from a class analysis and assessment of a particular moment in history, but as a charm with which a party or a tendency has been provided once and for all".¹

However, some of the most frequent reproaches show that the points at issue are the ways of progress and the methods of resolving internal contradictions.

The revolutionary overthrow of the exploiting classes and the conquest of power by the working people ushers in the period of building a new society. Here, as Lenin said, an entirely new approach must be adopted, and he called it a reformist approach as compared with the preceding, revolutionary one. "The period of unprecedented proletarian achievements in the military, administrative and political fields has given way to a period in which the growth of new forces will be much slower; and that period did not set in by accident, it was inevitable; it was due to the operation not of persons or parties, but of objective causes. In the economic field, develop-

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 154.

ment is inevitably more difficult, slower, and more gradual; that arises from the very nature of the activities in this field compared with military, administrative and political activities. It follows from the specific difficulties of this work, from its being more deep-rooted, if one may so express it."¹

The C.P.S.U. succeeded in overcoming all difficulties and leading the country to the triumph of socialism because it smashed the Leftist adventurists and steadily strove for as deep-rooted as possible economic development, although the international situation continually called for accelerated rates.

China's transition to peaceful construction after 22 years of armed struggle inevitably also provided an occasion for Right opportunist and Leftist vacillations. Her economy was more backward in 1949 than Russia's had been in 1921. It is true that the difficulties facing China were different in quality to those that had to be overcome by the Soviet Union, the first socialist state in the world, surrounded by hostile capitalist countries.

However the leading group in the C.P.C. capitulated in face of the difficulties. It refused to reckon with the fact that military methods are no good for peaceful economic development. Mao Tse-tung disregarded the fact that the transition to other methods and rates is not accidental, but inevitable, that it is not the fault of individuals or parties, but is a result of objective causes. He also refused to reckon with the fact that socialism can be built in a backward country only in alliance with the world socialist system and the

¹ Ibid., Vol. 33, p. 28.

international working-class movement. Having renounced this alliance, the Maoists have actually abandoned socialist ideals and begun to look for a way out in adventuristic policies.

It is an objective law that questions of economic development and increased production are placed in the foreground after the victory of the revolution. Socialism can assert itself only on the basis of a highly developed industry and progressive technology in all branches of the social economy. A backward country, in which political power is held by the working people, can by-pass the capitalist stage of development, but not the stage of providing the material and technical basis of socialism. No matter how much economic growth rates rise after the triumph of the revolution, socialist construction cannot be carried out in leaps and bounds. Despite all its power to work changes, politics can be successful only if it is not opposed to economics, but corresponds to it, or, as Lenin said, becomes a concentrated expression of economics.

In adopting a subjectivist stand and refusing to reckon with reality, Mao's group set their politics in opposition to economics in the most adventuristic way. Politics, they allege, is a commanding force, superior to any economic laws. According to the leader in *Hung-chi*, No. 11 for 1967, "all talk about a so-called organisation of social life and the development of the productive forces is but knavish tricks of old revisionism".

All those who thought that the development of the productive forces should take a central place in the Party's activity, that economic progress should be gradual and balanced, were declared revisionists.

In China the enormous army of Hungweipings is "educated" on such "exhaustive directives" of Lin Piao, as the following: "There are two ways to build our state. The first is that of the Soviet Union, where one-sided attention is given to the production of material wealth, to the production of machinery, mechanisation, and some sort of material incentive.

"The other way is the one we have taken under the leadership of Chairman Mao. Under the leadership of Chairman Mao we have created a state of a new type. This state considers that, alongside mechanisation, revolutionisation is most important. We shall guide mechanisation with the help of revolutionisation".¹

This hazy definition gives us no idea what should be understood by "revolutionisation". But some hints now and again appear in the Chinese press to the effect that "we must be ready to accept responsibility for the liberation of the bulk of the peoples throughout the world".²

Shattered hopes about the possibility of ensuring the complete victory of socialism at one stroke led to the declaration that socialist revolution was uninterrupted. "One leap after another, one revolution after another"; one uninterrupted leap, one uninterrupted revolution; "when one revolution is complete, the next should begin"—such statements began to appear in the Chinese press as early as 1958 and increased in frequency until revolution was finally declared a permanent state of society. The Maoists began to portray "permanent revolution" as the only way of solving all social problems, as a means

¹ *Chienfangchiun pao*, March 5, 1967.

² *Jiefang ribao*, May 23, 1965.

which "constantly stimulates the enthusiasm of cadres and masses", while the propagandist apparatus began to extol Mao as the creator of the teaching on the revolution under the proletarian dictatorship.

The Maoist variant of the "permanent revolution" theory as applied to the internal tasks of a country declares that problems of building a new society which may seem to have been solved long ago will emerge again and again with ever greater urgency.

It now appears that China, where according to all official documents of the C.P.C., a dictatorship of the proletariat has been set up, again faces a struggle for power. That is why fanaticism and personal devotion to the leader are extolled instead of the qualities typical of a revolutionary of Lenin's type—the ability to maintain constant links with the masses, organisational talent, firmness and flexibility. The terminology of the anarchists, who reduced the concept "revolutionary" to "rebel", "mutineer", has been dusted off and put to use again. Detachments of young people and adolescents—the Hungweipings and the Tsaofans (made up of people a bit older than the former)—have been set up. They not only call themselves rebels, but also resort extensively to the methods of violence and destruction extolled by the anarchists.

The idea of a struggle for power after the revolutionary conquest of power has nothing in common with the Marxist-Leninist theory of classes and the class struggle. Classes differ from each other according to their relation to the means of production. "The abolition of classes," Lenin said, "means placing *all* citizens on an *equal* footing with regard to the *means of production*

belonging to society as a whole. It means giving all citizens *equal* opportunities of working on the publicly-owned means of production, on the publicly-owned land, at the publicly-owned factories, and so forth."¹ This process was going on in China, as also in other countries which embarked on socialist construction.

Equal relations to the means of production are the basis on which the unity of society is built and they also determine the way in which the contradictions emerging in that society are resolved. However, this does not suit Mao Tse-tung's followers. Some ten years after it was announced that the question of "who will beat whom" had been solved in China, it is explained with a wise air that in order to liquidate the exploiting classes it is necessary not only "to liquidate classes in the economic sphere", but also to "destroy the classes in the sphere of politics, ideology, world outlook, way of life, etc.". This makes it more than easy for political or ideological reasons, because of world outlook or way of life, to accuse anybody, irrespective of his social position, of being a bourgeois and a class enemy. It is enough for a person to express disagreement with, or even doubt in the correctness of, any statement by Mao, and he is branded a "capitalist".

The Socialist-Revolutionaries in Russia were indignant when Lenin exposed them as champions of petty-bourgeois interests. They held extremely ridiculous ideas about classes, and Lenin derided them saying that they "... write about the petty-bourgeoisie as if this term did not signify a social category, but was simply a polem-

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 146.

ical turn of speech".¹ Similarly, for the modern Chinese representatives of petty-bourgeois revolutionism, the concept "bourgeoisie" does not denote a social category. It has become merely a term of abuse, a label that can be attached to anybody who does not agree with them. They fulminate against those whom they call bourgeois, yet the real bourgeois in China are let alone and are still entitled to share in the profits from their former enterprises.²

For example, the Chinese press seriously alleged that Lu Ping, Secretary of the Party Committee and rector of Peking University, had established in the university a "dictatorship of the bourgeoisie", that Chou Yang, assistant chief of the propaganda department of the C.C., C.P.C., was nothing but "a representative of the bourgeoisie". But that was only the beginning. Later, generalisations were made from these individual "facts". The editorial of the *Hung-chi* No. 3 for 1967 asserted that "not a dictatorship of the proletariat but a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie has been carried out" in organisations which were for a long time controlled by a handful of people disagreeing with Mao's ideas.

Then, Chen Po-ta, one of the chief ideologists of the "cultural revolution", took it upon himself to "explain" what was happening in the country. In January 1967, he said: "Our struggle for power must lead to the assumption of power by the proletariat from the bourgeoisie, from the repre-

¹ Ibid., Vol. 6, p. 199.

² There are over a million capitalists in China. The payments of a share of the profits made by their former enterprises was to end in 1962, later the term was prolonged to 1966. now it has been extended by another ten years.

sentatives of the bourgeoisie, from the agents of the bourgeoisie. As our Chairman Mao once said, this is a struggle for the elimination of one class by the other." It appears that, in spite of what Mao asserted before, liberation has not fully solved the question of the seizure of power, it is being solved now, in the course of the "cultural revolution", which is an "unprecedented, great event in the world".

When asked what sort of government Chairman Mao had headed for 18 years, Chen Po-ta, his ideological henchman, did not give any answer. It would have been embarrassing to admit that Mao had headed a bourgeois state; but if it was stated that the victory of the people's democratic revolution had placed the working class and peasantry at the helm of state, how could one ideologically justify the severe repressive measures carried out under the so-called cultural revolution against people holding different views.

However, these "irksome questions" had to be answered. Obviously, the question, what kind of power had been established in China since 1949, was bound to arise again and again. That is why, in the summer of 1967, the *Hung-chi* explained that for 17 years the dominating "position was held in our state by the dictatorship of the proletariat and not the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. This was the case also in recent years. There should be no doubt about it".

Thus, Mao's followers are forced to recognise that the Maoist "permanent revolution" is a purely subjectivist scheme, in no way connected with the social character of power, and adapted to the task of destroying those who oppose Mao's adventurism.

The struggle against Mao's opponents, which is pictured as a struggle "for the elimination of one class by the other", shows that Mao's clique tries to bolster up its power by using revolutionary terms. But that is the end of all ideology.

Those who are unable to make both ends meet are given "ideological" assistance by the Hung-weipings, the witches' sabbath experts. It is said that out of the mouths of babes and sucklings come forth pearls of wisdom. Ignoramuses called to the banner of the "cultural revolution" are not burdened with the knowledge of Marxism, their perception needs no intermediary. Proclamation No. 1 of the HQ of the revolutionary rebels in the Shansi Province, published in January 1967 says, "Chairman Mao Tse-tung teaches us: many thousands of Marxist principles can in the final analysis be reduced to one: 'Mutiny is a just cause.'" This echoes Bakunin, who said that "every mutiny is always useful".

This statement would have shocked even Trotsky, although the press of the so-called Fourth International recently noted with satisfaction that the "Chinese have worked out a theory directly related to the theory of permanent revolution". The founders of mutinous anarchism may congratulate themselves on having found new followers. And thus, sterile revolutionism with its "permanent revolution" leads to senseless mutiny.

The Maoist "permanent" revolution is an endless process. *Wenhui pao* wrote on February 26, 1967 that the "victories" of the Tsaofans cannot be regarded as final. "It will not be long before the overthrown, those in power in the party and following the capitalist path, are able to find agents in our revolutionary organisations,

while the revolutionary Tsaofans now in power may degenerate."

So as not to leave any doubt about the endlessness of the fight against the "black line", the leader of the army organ *Chienfangchiun pao* explained on April 18, 1966 that "after the liquidation of this black line, there may emerge new black lines, and then it will be necessary to renew the fight. This is a difficult, complex and lengthy struggle. It will take several decades, perhaps even centuries".

Such are the prospects of the "permanent revolution". No wonder the adventurers who advocate it are looking for a way out of their difficulties in the international arena, and break out in hysteria over the "crafty designs" of external enemies as their internal difficulties grow. The world revolution is expected to save the bankrupt adventurers and if it has not broken out yet, it must be given a push.

Lin Piao said at the so-called Ninth Congress of the C.P.C. in 1969 that final victory in one socialist country requires not only efforts by the proletariat and the broad mass of the people of that country, but depends also on the triumph of the world revolution and the abolition of exploitation of man by man all over the globe. The Trotskyist denial of the possibility of a victory of socialism in individual countries is now proclaimed in China the official line, with all the consequences arising therefrom.

Communists in all countries link the expectation of future victories with an upsurge of the mass revolutionary movement of their people. They object against any import of revolution, against pushing it from outside, they condemn those who think that revolutions can be arranged

artificially, at somebody's wish. "Of course," Lenin said in 1918, "there are people who believe that revolution can break out in a foreign country to order, by agreement. These people are either mad or they are provocateurs. We have experienced two revolutions during the past twelve years. We know that revolutions cannot be made to order, or by agreement; they break out when tens of millions of people come to the conclusion that it is impossible to live in the old way any longer."¹

The ideas once developed by Trotsky and other "revolutionary phrase-mongers" on the need to push revolutions, were resolutely condemned by Lenin as adventuristic, deeply alien to Marxism, and fraught with the danger of bringing about a state of affairs when the working people who were to have been "made happy by socialism" through a revolutionary war, through the import of revolution, will, as a result of this policy, be prisoners of their own bourgeoisie. Now Mao endeavours to turn to his advantage the absurd theory of "permanent revolution" with its jumping over stages, its denial of the possibility of socialism triumphing in separate countries and its calls for "revolutionary wars".

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, p. 480.

STAKING THE FUTURE ON WAR

Gambling on war, which they expect to resolve all revolutionary tasks, has long since been a feature typical of petty-bourgeois pseudo-revolutionaries. Mistrust of the internal forces of the revolution has made them resort to conspiracy, incitement to mutinies, and also the search for external impulsions to hasten the course of history.

Back in the days of the Communist League Marx and Engels had to fight sectarian groups who thought that all questions of the revolution could be solved by military force. The fantasies such adventurists indulged in led them to hope that the conflict between Austria and Prussia in 1850 would develop into a war which would become a prologue for a new revolution in Germany. A year later, these sectarians (there were about 200 of them) stated in all seriousness that a "European revolutionary army" should be raised to put an end by force of arms "to decaying capitalism, which was on the very verge of collapse".

The 19th century, during which the development of capitalism was relatively peaceful, provided no special conditions for the spread of such military-revolutionary illusions. But the epoch of imperialism, and especially the First World War, nourished the petty-bourgeois revolutionists' adventuristic hopes that the war would help them to carry out the world revolution.

When the Great October Socialist Revolution triumphed, the petty-bourgeois revolutionists attempted to impose upon the first socialist state

in the world a policy of revolutionary war, declaring that the policy of peaceful co-existence between countries with different social systems was a surrender to imperialism, and the struggle for peace a hopeless aim, one which excluded the victory of socialism on a world scale.

One of the chapters in Trotsky's *Permanent Revolution* is entitled "From Marxism to Pacifism". In it Marxism is described as denying any possibility of struggle for peace. For this reason, the Soviet Union's peace policy and all its efforts to foil imperialist attempts to unleash a new war were alleged to be a deviation from Marxism and a transition to pacifist positions.

"Frightened pacifists", "They have made the struggle against war a self-contained task"—such are some of the phrases Trotsky used in the attempt to make the struggle of the Communist Party for peace look like a rejection of the world revolution, a refusal to carry out its internationalist duty. When the Soviet Union strove to enter into collective security agreements with Britain, France and other capitalist countries to avert the growing danger of fascist aggression, the Trotskyists immediately began to clamour that this was an attempt to stop the proletariat from carrying out a socialist revolution.

According to Trotsky the whole question is what ways and means should be used to avert war. He categorically declares: "The struggle against war can be decided only through the revolutionary struggle for power." In other words, peace cannot be secured before the triumph of the world revolution.

Since the Trotskyists linked all their hopes for revolution with war, they naturally stood for un-

leashing military conflicts. In this respect they have not changed much in later years.

Between the two world wars, the international forces of peace were not yet strong enough to thwart the policies of the imperialists who hoped to destroy the Soviet Union by war. The Soviet Union's efforts for peace, the active struggle of the Communist International and all peaceful forces against the war danger, did not succeed in averting the war. But they did play a great part in postponing the conflict and providing more favourable conditions for victory over the war-mongers.

This victory, and the ensuing formation of the socialist world system, disintegration of colonialism and emergence of numerous national states interested in preserving peace, together with the enhanced influence of the democratic forces, wrought major changes in the international situation.

The alliance of the socialist countries and all anti-imperialist forces became a decisive factor in international politics. Imperialism ceased to dominate in the world. The peoples are now powerful enough to avert a new world war by their energetic and concerted action. The foreign policy of the socialist countries plays a major role in the struggle for peace, against imperialist aggression. This policy is aimed at consolidating all anti-imperialist peace-loving forces in the struggle against the forces of reaction and war. Its integral component is the line of peaceful co-existence between states with different social systems. This line is directed against the unleashing of a new world war by the imperialists, against international provocations and the export of counter-revolution, and at the provi-

sion of the conditions enabling the peoples to assert their sacred right to determine independently the path along which their countries are to develop, to establish mutually advantageous economic, scientific and technological co-operation and cultural exchange between countries.

Although the relation of forces in the world has radically changed, the Trotskyist maniacs of the "Fourth International" repeat their teacher's hocus-pocus that there can be no struggle for peace except by the seizure of power, and if it is impossible to seize power, then let there better be wars.

The Maoist adventurists repeat with a few minor changes what Trotsky said about war and peace 30 to 40 years ago and what is asserted by the modern Trotskyists today.

The Maoists declare that the struggle for peace and the policy of peaceful co-existence between states with different social systems amount to rejection of the world revolution, almost betrayal of the working masses' interests. All those who stand for this policy are called revisionists, who are betraying the interests of the world revolution for the sake of their own well-being. The Maoists maintain that peaceful co-existence substitutes pacifism for the world proletarian revolution and rejects proletarian internationalism (sixth article in the *Renmin ribao* and *Hung-chi* in connection with the Open Letter of the C.C., C.P.S.U.). This is a word-for-word repetition of what Trotsky said in his time.

For the sake of fairness let us note that these are statements found in Mao Tse-tung's early works. According to him, wars can be prevented only by force of arms. "There is only one means

to destroy wars," Mao wrote in 1936, "and it is to fight war by war. . . ." Two years later he said: "War can be destroyed only by war."

Naturally, in conditions of the civil war and the national liberation war against Japan, China could achieve victory and peace only through armed struggle. The trouble is that everything Mao Tse-tung said in certain concrete conditions is immediately declared by him and his followers to be an absolute truth applicable to all times and all peoples.

Recently, Mao Tse-tung issued a new instruction: "As regards the question of world war," he said, "there are only two possibilities—either the war will call forth a revolution, or else the revolution will avert war." Since the Maoists consider that war is the road to revolution, the "instruction" on the two possibilities is sheer hypocrisy. Actually it implies only one "possibility"—the solution of all problems through war.

It is not only what the Chinese extremists say, but also what they do, and not only in recent times, that shows that they regard war as the exclusive means for solving all problems.

In the early thirties, Li Li-san, Mao Tse-tung and other adventurists in China did not have much chance to provoke a world war. But they did all they could. The decisions adopted by the Li Li-san leadership of the C.P.C. in June, July and August 1930 attached considerable importance to organising an "insurrection in Manchuria". In planning this insurrection, Li Li-san expected it to result in a clash between Japan and the Soviet Union, since Japan was at that time endeavouring to secure Manchuria as a bridgehead. Li Li-san did not conceal the fact that the strategy he proposed was designed to

plunge the world into war, and, as he put it, "to draw the international proletariat into the decisive struggle against imperialism". Later Li Li-san admitted that he considered it possible "to sacrifice the Soviet Union" in order to bring about a world conflagration. Thus the irresponsible Leftist extremists in China were willing to risk the future of the first socialist country.

The changes in the world after the rout of fascism did little to moderate the views of the Chinese extremists. Standing at the helm of state in China, they now have far greater opportunities for implementing their adventuristic policies.

In the fifth article written in connection with the Open Letter of the C.C., C.P.S.U., the *Renmin ribao* and *Hung-chi* quote statements Mao made in 1946, which they consider to be no less correct for all subsequent times. Calling upon the peoples to unite in the struggle against the U.S. reactionaries and their henchmen in various countries, Mao Tse-tung declares that only by victory in this struggle will it be possible to avoid a world war and that world war is otherwise inevitable.

The statement is very guarded concerning the exact meaning of "victory in this struggle", but from Maoist propaganda it is clear that this is a variation on the old Mao formula: "War can be destroyed only by war." This is now presented as "the struggle of blade against blade", or in the form of the assertion that "peaceful co-existence serves the interests of imperialism and plays up to the imperialist policy of aggression and war" (sixth article on the Open Letter of the C.C., C.P.S.U.), and so on.

The article in the *Renmin ribao* of October

27, 1958 entitled "Comrade Mao Tse-tung on Imperialism and All Reactionaries Being Paper Tigers" shows the dogmatic "stability" of the formulas advanced by Mao's followers. This article is a collection of Mao's sayings over a period of twenty years. The editors enthuse over this material "giving the impression that it is a new and accomplished political article". In fact, all the definitions contained in it, though made by Mao over a long period and in very different conditions, are remarkably alike.

In 1940, the "paper tiger" was the Chiang Kai-shek group. In 1946, the "paper tiger" underwent a metamorphosis: "the atom bomb with which the American reactionaries endeavour to scare people is a paper tiger. It looks frightening but really it is not frightening at all."¹ In 1957 Mao Tse-tung declared that U.S. imperialism was a paper tiger, and in 1958 that "taking a long-term view of the substance of imperialism and all reactionaries, they should be regarded from a strategic standpoint as what they really are—'paper tigers'". In the sixties, "revisionists" too were declared to be "paper tigers".

This vain bragging, this lumping together of the most diverse forces—from Chiang Kai-shek to U.S. imperialism and to so-called revisionists—is intended to prove that a trial of armed strength with imperialism is a trifling matter and that it is not at all difficult to "slay the paper tiger". At the same time, this bragging is intended to defame those who really fight imperialism, who understand that in order to checkmate interna-

¹ After China tested the hydrogen bomb, the Chinese press stopped calling nuclear weapons a paper tiger and began to play up its power with a view to fanning up a chauvinist psychosis.

tional reaction and prevent it from plunging the world into a war, it is necessary to display vigilance, to mobilise all peace-loving forces and peoples and be prepared to rebuff aggressive imperialist action.

While shouting that only military means are effective in the class struggle, the Maoists reject all other means of struggle, regarding them as manifestations of opportunism and revisionism. But nobody in the world considers hurling invectives at the imperialists or endless "serious warnings" as effective measures. This is the same drum-beating which has always accompanied petty-bourgeois revolutionism since its inception and is meant to camouflage its lack of revolutionary activity.

Peaceful co-existence, which the representatives of petty-bourgeois revolutionism are attacking, is actually a most acute form of class struggle on an international scale; it requires considerable self-control, resolve and flexibility, daring manœuvring, skill, and a knowledge of when to present ultimatums and when to compromise. It stands to reason that peaceful co-existence presupposes the communist movement's high vigilance as regards imperialist intrigues, and the socialist states' constant concern for their military potential and defence capacity.

What is the essence of the policy of peaceful co-existence between countries with different social systems which the Soviet Union and other socialist countries pursue? As stated in a resolution of the Twenty-Third Congress of the C.P.S.U., "the Communist Party of the Soviet Union proceeds in its foreign policy from the basic interests of the Soviet people and its internationalist revolutionary duty to the fraternal

socialist countries and the working people of all countries.”¹ The Soviet Union aims at ensuring favourable international conditions for the building of socialism and communism, supports the national liberation movement, resolutely rebuffs the aggressive forces of imperialism, and strives to preserve mankind from a new world war.

Peking “explains” that “the struggle for peace and the struggle for socialism are not the same thing”. But it does not at all follow from this that there is no connection between the two. The policy of peaceful co-existence between states with different social systems is designed to ensure the conditions in which socialism can and does demonstrate its superiority over capitalism. Lenin predicted that there would inevitably arise a competition between the two modes of production, two formations, two economies—the communist and the capitalist—on an international scale, and that socialism’s force of example would have a telling effect in that competition.

The struggle for peace slogan, far from contradicting the tasks of the struggle for communism, facilitates their solution. The struggle for peace helps to resolve the class tasks of the proletariat; it is a general democratic struggle, capable of uniting not only the working class, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia, but even part of the bourgeoisie which realises the danger of a thermonuclear war. Any extension of the front of peace fighters objectively strengthens the position of those who are blazing the trail to socialism. This shows the connection between the struggle for democracy and work

¹ *Twenty-Third Congress of the C.P.S.U.*, Moscow, 1966, p. 287.

for the triumph of socialism, a connection which the Communist Parties consider as extremely important, but which Mao's followers categorically deny.

By striving to impose upon the world communist movement an imaginary alternative—either the struggle for peace or the struggle for the socialist revolution—and calling revisionists all those who think that peace strengthens the positions of socialism throughout the world, the Chinese extremists are out to assert that no matter how great the losses in a war, they will be quickly made up by the victory of the world revolution.

This is a stale argument. In 1936, Trotsky said that if the imminent "war remains no more than a war, the Soviet Union will inevitably be defeated". But should we be afraid of that, he asks? For "even the military defeat of the Soviet Union will be only a short episode if the proletariat wins in other countries".

History has made a laughing-stock of those monstrous predictions. It was owing to the Soviet Union that mankind was saved from fascism, that socialism asserted itself in other countries, that the disintegration of the colonial system of imperialism set in. How different our planet would have been if history had taken the course charted for it by Trotsky!

Now Mao Tse-tung is willing to "sacrifice" the population of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, including a large portion of the Chinese population. He has slightly modernised his adventurist ideas to suit the atomic age. Speaking at the Moscow Meeting of Representatives of the Communist Parties in 1957, Mao Tse-tung said: "Who can predict how

large a toll of human lives the future war will take! Maybe it will be one-third of the 2,700 million populating our planet, that is, only 900 million people. I think that is not much if atom bombs are really dropped." Mao then went on to say that he was willing to sacrifice 300 million Chinese for the sake of "the victory of the world socialist revolution". He added that there was no need to be afraid of that, for "if half of mankind is destroyed, half of it will be left, imperialism will be completely destroyed and socialism will assert itself throughout the world, and in 50 or 100 years' time the world's population will grow again, even by more than fifty per cent". This statement made a very bad impression on the participants in the meeting.

Chinese bourgeois ideologists once declared that China need not fear other countries because "we Chinese are extremely numerous". In 1903, for example, the bourgeois ideologist Chen Tien-hua wrote: "Even if a few million or several dozen million Chinese should perish, that would be no calamity. When we save the country, the population will be replenished in a few decades."¹

Now this old bourgeois and essentially misanthropic idea has been adopted by a man who calls himself a Marxist. In 1957, this monstrous talk of being ready to sacrifice half of mankind might have appeared as a Chinese metaphor or legend of no practical import, but only two and a half years later the pamphlet *Long Live Leninism* cynically stated that such sacrifices as the destruction of fifty per cent of mankind

¹ A. M. Grigoryev. *Anti-imperialist Programme of the Chinese Bourgeois Revolutionaries, 1895-1905* (in Russian), Moscow, 1966, p. 69.

would be easily made up for. "On the ruins of destroyed imperialism, the victorious people will build a civilisation a thousand times higher than that of capitalism, will build its own, genuinely wonderful future, and build it at exceedingly high speed."

In spite of all that, many people thought that the statements made by the Maoists against the propositions of the international communist movement that war can be averted, that the struggle for peace and the struggle for socialism are interlinked, that it is precisely peaceful co-existence between countries with different social systems that creates the most favourable conditions for the development of the national liberation struggle, were strictly confined to the sphere of ideological differences and had no direct bearing on practical policies.

While the men in Peking, proclaiming such arch-revolutionary views, refrained for state reasons from dotting the i's, the modern Trotskyists, who had no formal obligations to anybody, remained true to their ideology of intolerance and hastened to offer their Chinese counterparts a piece of "sound" advice. As early as December 16, 1962, the "Fourth International" suggested in its so-called Open Letter that Mao should "discuss the question of the inevitability of world war and that of preventive war as is posed by the C.P.C. and the Fourth International". The Trotskyists were dissatisfied because Mao's followers had not dotted the i's and, noted that, unlike them, "we Trotskyists call upon the popular masses to seize power after taking steps to provide, if necessary, for military intervention in other countries from Cuban or Chinese territory".

Like the Maoists, the Trotskyists, attacking those whom they accuse of not assisting "the oppressed classes and the oppressed nations of the world in their revolutionary struggle", declared that support of revolutions in the colonial countries "must be not passive, but active, direct, militant, and scientifically and politically consistent". Since the authors of this adventuristic document rightly doubted whether anybody would understand what they meant by "scientifically and politically consistent", they took pains to clarify its meaning. It appears that the socialist countries must "give all their power, all their material, military and atomic resources to support and promote revolutions in the colonial countries".

This incitement to war, including atomic war, by a handful of Trotskyist provocateurs looked like the howling of maniacs. Subsequent events showed, however, that in his policy Mao is not far from following the advice of the Trotskyists.

The attempts of the Maoists to split the international communist movement and the community of socialist countries, and their categorical refusal to take joint action with the peace-loving forces were regarded by the U.S. imperialists as a direct invitation to unleash aggression.

The disgraceful war of the United States in Vietnam, its actions against Laos and Cambodia are arousing indignation in the whole world. At the Karlov Vary Conference held in 1967, the European Communist and Workers' Parties expressed their staunch determination to take active steps to bring about the isolation and defeat of the aggressive policies of U.S. imperialism, the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Vietnam and the granting to the Vietnamese people of the

possibility to resolve their domestic affairs themselves. The Communists called upon all forces opposing war, irrespective of their political and ideological views, to intensify their joint action to stop the American war in Vietnam and thereby to promote peaceful relations between peoples, to prevent the conflict in Vietnam from developing into a new world war.

China's attitude towards the war in Vietnam leaves no doubt that the Maoists are willing to sacrifice the fate of entire peoples for the sake of their hegemonistic aims. They refuse to participate in the united anti-imperialist front, declaring that they "will on no account agree to concerted action", that "thus it was, thus it is and thus it will always be". More than that, they deliberately obstruct assistance to the Vietnamese people.

Many people realise now that the U.S.A. would never have dared to escalate the war in Vietnam had it not been for China's stand. There is a direct connection between the escalation of the war in Vietnam and the fact that, while the Mao Tse-tung group confines itself to threats as far as U.S. imperialism is concerned, it actually opposes the Soviet Union, obstructs it and other socialist countries in their assistance to Vietnam, and endeavours in every possible way to prolong the conflict, hoping that it will grow into a world war.

Any initiative on peace talks, irrespective of its author, is immediately branded by Chinese propaganda as treachery and deceit. Every effort to bring peace to Vietnam, every attempt to extinguish the fire of war, is immediately declared "a conspiracy between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. aimed at a Munich in the east".

The Maoists make no secret of the fact that their aim is to provoke a world conflagration. They say that, if the U.S.S.R. really wants to help Vietnam, "it should undertake something in the centre of Europe to tie down the U.S. forces there and help the national liberation forces in Vietnam". What they really want is to provoke a clash between the Soviet Union and the U.S.A., to remain aloof from it themselves and, as the old Chinese proverb says, "to watch from the top of the mountain how the two tigers fight each other".

The attitude adopted by the Maoists towards the Israeli aggression against the Arab countries also removes all doubt about the desire of the Chinese adventurers to see the crisis in the Middle East grow into a world thermonuclear war. The Soviet Union, while giving comprehensive assistance to the Arab states in their struggle against imperialism, spared no effort to bring about an immediate ceasefire. Meanwhile, the Maoists have been thundering not against the imperialists, but against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in an open attempt to drive a wedge between the Arab states and the socialist world system.

Having launched their regular smear campaign against the U.S.S.R., the Maoists took no pains to conceal their desire for the Soviet Union to unleash a war immediately in Europe or, still better, to use its thermonuclear arsenal in defence of the Arabs.

Whatever happens in the world, the Maoist agents in all countries raise a hue and cry about the Soviet Union's lack of revolutionism.

The Spanish Communist Party's *Mundo Obrero* recently had some witty things to say about

such people in an article entitled "What Is the Soviet Union Doing?" Here is an extract from it:

"If there is a fascist coup in Greece these madmen scream: 'And what is the Soviet Union doing?' If the Americans escalate the war in Vietnam—it is the same old song. . . .

"According to this simplified logic, the Soviet Union is to blame for all the mistakes and failures of the revolutionary forces anywhere in the world. What it comes to is that the U.S.S.R. has to make revolutions for all peoples or to wage liberation wars on their behalf . . . that any party or group finding itself in an embarrassing position is entitled to draw the Soviet Union into a world thermonuclear war to help it overcome its difficulties.

"Actually, the reproach 'What is the Soviet Union doing?' is becoming a very convenient excuse by which all 'impatient' people and snobs try to justify their passivity, cowardice or impotence."

The newspaper justly concludes that all this is grist to the imperialist mill.

Every attempt to ease international tension is immediately proclaimed by the Maoists a crime against the world revolution. In 1959, Mao Tse-tung said at the meeting with the leaders of the Latin American Communist Parties: "None of you should fear international tension. I, for one, favour international tension."¹ His audience, hearing this from a person who claims to be a Marxist, thought that there must be some sort of a mistake. But Mao's subsequent foreign policy

¹ *World Marxist Review*, 1964, No. 6.

left little doubt about his desire to keep the world constantly on the brink of war.

As the Mao group's foreign policy isolated China ever more and undermined her international prestige, while their domestic policy continually heaped up difficulties, the Peking leadership began to stake more and more openly on war. The explosions of Chinese atomic bombs were the signal for military hysteria in the country. The Maoists now declare that the prospect of socialism in China depends directly on the victory of the world revolution. It appears that all China's problems, all her internal contradictions can be solved only if and when "the banner of Mao Tse-tung's ideas flutters over the entire planet".

For some time now, war propaganda has been assigned an important place in the Chinese press and radio. This propaganda is intensifying in connection with the grave difficulties the country is facing and has now literally become a hymn to armaments and war. "War," said Lin Piao, the Chinese Minister of Defence, "steels people and gives an impetus to history. In this respect, war is a great school." The Mao group does not conceal its intention to do everything in its power to make Chinese youth go through this school, irrespective of the sacrifices and consequences. "The cultural revolution," they say, "is preparation for war." Meanwhile the Hungweipings write in their papers: "Since our Hungweipings are soldiers, they will fight. We are a powerful reserve of the heroic People's Liberation Army. We have to prepare for world war. The great proletarian cultural revolution is a splendid training course to prepare the young people for a people's war."

How do the Peking adventurers picture future events? The answer to this question is contained in Lin Piao's article, "Long Live Victory in the People's War", which is advertised as the best expression of Mao's thoughts.

This document speaks of the need to repeat on a world scale the experience of the Chinese revolution. The encirclement of towns by the revolutionary countryside, which has "proved its worth" in China, Lin Piao asserts, "has now assumed general and very pressing importance for the revolutionary struggle of the oppressed nations and peoples of the world".

According to the old anarchist recipe, the Maoists have divided peoples into those able to carry out the revolution and those unable to do so. In the first category they place only the "poor peoples", predominantly in countries populated chiefly by peasants. North America and West Europe, they say, are the "world town", while Asia, Africa and Latin America are the "world countryside".

Instead of uniting all contemporary revolutionary forces—the world socialist system, the working-class movement in the capitalist countries and the national liberation movement, Mao Tse-tung's followers endeavour to split these forces, to oppose them to one another. They deny the revolutionary role of the European socialist countries and the hegemony of the proletariat, and assign the leading role in the struggle with imperialism to national liberation movements, which are of a peasant, petty-bourgeois and even bourgeois nature. "In a sense," writes Lin Piao, "the present situation in the world revolution can be characterised as an encirclement of the town by the countryside. On the

whole, the cause of the world revolution depends in the final analysis on the revolutionary struggle of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples. . . ."

Proclaiming a campaign for the encirclement of "the world town", into which they also include the European socialist countries, the Maoists state unambiguously against whom their main attack is spearheaded.

It is not imperialism, but the so-called revisionists that are declared to be the most dangerous enemy. Hence, the slogan: "To smash U.S. imperialism it is essential first of all to put an end to international revisionism."

Having declared that the socialist countries and the entire world communist movement are accomplices of the imperialists, the Maoists have decided that they can now reduce the fight against imperialism to vociferous threats while they concentrate their fire on the socialist countries and mount a campaign of unprecedented violence against the Soviet Union.

The armed provocations of the Maoists on the Soviet-Chinese border have the purpose of creating an atmosphere of war hysteria in China, of inciting the Chinese people against the Soviet people. The major military clashes instigated by the Mao Tse-tung group on Damansky Island on the Ussuri River were timed to coincide with the eve of the so-called Ninth Congress of the C.P.C. A suitable atmosphere had to be created for the congress, which its organisers intended to be a bellicose assembly of expansionists. The border provocations were to raise chauvinism in the country to a boiling point. But, at the same time, they pursue even more far-reaching aims.

The line followed by Mao is greeted with

unconcealed joy by the U.S. imperialists and aggressive forces in other countries, who hasten to utilise the anti-Sovietism of the Maoists to weaken the revolutionary forces and harm the Chinese people themselves.

In our day, when the issue of war and peace has become the most burning problem, the reliance of the Mao group on war and on struggle against the forces of world socialism can lead it only to complete bankruptcy. The Chinese people will sooner or later choose a different prospect: they will improve their relations with their genuine friends, the Soviet Union and all socialist countries and the Communist Parties, and will fight side by side with them for peace and the triumph of socialism.

The Maoist variant of the petty-bourgeois revolutionist idea that socialism can be achieved through world war is doomed to the same infamous fate that overtook its Trotskyist and other interpretations.

"BARRACKS COMMUNISM"

Socialist ideals have a long history. Once they were nothing but wish-dreams for a better future. But they had roots in ambient reality, for even in his dreams man cannot escape reality. Socialist utopias reflected the contemporary level of the productive forces and the experience mankind had accumulated by that time.

Among other things, the great revolution in socialist ideology made by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels freed socialist ideas from all mysticism and religiosity, placed them on a solid ground by pointing to the social forces who are able to build the new society and to the real economic prerequisites that had been created for it by preceding development. Once a utopia, socialism became a science.

To assert itself, scientific socialism had to fight many different utopian views, including those reflecting the narrow-mindedness of the peasantry, which reduced socialism and communism to the mere "just" distribution of property and simplified all aspects of the life of individuals and society. While the egalitarian aspirations of the peasantry had a revolutionary role to play in the liquidation of feudal property, they became reactionary when they were made a universal principle. Marx wrote in his early works how far the petty-bourgeois glorification of vulgar egalitarian communism denying the personality was from genuine communism.

Underneath the words about equality, about limiting consumption Marx discerned general

envy as "the disguise in which *avarice* re-establishes itself and satisfies itself, only in *another* way".¹ The desire for a general levelling, the idea of a certain minimum, of a definite limited measure, the abstract rejection of the entire world of culture and civilisation—all this, Marx said, was by no means genuine assimilation of abolished private property. Such ideas spring from "the regression to the *unnatural* simplicity of the *poor* and undemanding man who has not only failed to go beyond private property, but has not yet even attained to it".²

Egalitarian communism sought salvation from capitalism only in the establishment of communist communes. The hostility of egalitarian communism towards science, culture and the intelligentsia reflected the hatred of the small peasant and artisan for bourgeois society, their hatred and at the same time their complete despondency.

Censuring Wilhelm Weitling, a champion of this primitive sectarian communism, Marx said in March 1846 that the raising of fantastic hopes can lead ultimately only to the destruction and not to the salvation of the sufferers. "People without a positive doctrine," Marx said, "are unable to do anything, and up to now have done nothing but raise noise, caused harmful outbursts and the destruction of the cause they have taken up."³ Condemning the nihilist attitude of sectarian communism towards man's cultural

¹ K. Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, Moscow, 1967, p. 93-94.

² *Ibid.*, p. 94.

³ See P. Annenkov's Reminiscences about K. Marx in the collection *The Communist League—A Forerunner of the First International* (in Russian), Moscow, 1964, p. 72.

achievements, Marx said: "Ignorance is a demon which, we fear, will yet produce many a tragedy."¹

This prophecy was more than once proved true.

The revolutionary preaching of the anarchists was accompanied by primitive views about future society. The anarchists expounded views directly opposed to those of Marxism, but unscrupulously referred to the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* written by Marx and Engels. Anarchism, wrote Marx, "brazenly substitutes its sectarian programme and narrow theories for the broad programme and lofty aspirations of our Association. . . ."²

Nechayev's³ programme article, "The Main Principles of the Future Social System", which Marx and Engels called a "splendid example of barracks communism" is an example of the sectarian absurdities into which the anarchists fall.

This reactionary document proclaimed a society based on the principle: to produce "as much as possible and to consume as little as possible", to work much in order to consume little. Man's entire life—from birth to death—was strictly regimented. There were common dormitories, valuers and offices, regimentation of education, production, consumption, manual work obligatory for all, labour under pain of death. To achieve this society "the revolutionary catechism" of the anarchists demanded that all revolutionaries suppress in them all tender feelings of kinship, friendship, affection and gratitude,

¹ K. Marx/F. Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 1, S. 104.

² K. Marx/F. Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 18, S. 333.

³ Nechayev—"A Russian Revolutionary-Conspirator."

should know only the cold passion of the revolutionary. The revolutionary needed no knowledge, he "knows only one science—the science of destruction".¹ Intimidation and violence were to be his weapons.

Marx found it difficult to determine whether it was "buffoonery or baseness" that predominated in these ravings. The ground was taken away from under them by devastating Marxist criticism and the development of the productive forces. The organised working-class movement rejected "barracks communism". But the latter did not disappear without a trace, it made itself felt under new conditions, living on the difficulties of the struggle for socialism and always reflecting the most "revolutionary revolutionism" of the desperate petty bourgeois.

Many of the features of "barracks communism" with its cult of violence and intimidation were resurrected in Trotskyism. While Lenin emphasised that "... violence is, of course, alien to our ideals",² Trotsky praised violence and intimidation and widely resorted to it.

Speaking ten days after the victory of the October Revolution, Lenin said: "We have not resorted, and I hope will not resort, to the terrorism of the French revolutionaries who guillotined unarmed men."³ This expressed his deep conviction that the victorious working class must not resort to armed violence, to terror, except as a retaliatory measure, when forced to do so by representatives of the overthrown exploiting classes who are unwilling to lay down their arms.

¹ K. Marx/F. Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 18, S. 427.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 69.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 26, p. 294.

Trotsky, on the other hand, made terror a law of all wars and all revolutions. In his book, *Terrorism and Communism*, he maintained that "intimidation is a powerful means of policy, both foreign and domestic". He did not draw any distinction between war and revolution; to him every revolution was a war, and "war, like revolution, is based on intimidation". Like war, "revolution ... kills few but intimidates thousands".

The methods of leadership that Trotsky attempted to impose upon the Party in peace-time conditions clearly prove that the "intimidation policy" is an essential part of Trotskyism and was not called for by any special, military conditions.

When there was a temporary military respite in the spring of 1920, the Ninth Party Congress decided to use military units as working parties. The disruption of the transport system and the threat of renewed hostilities in the near future made it inadmissible to demobilise the army. It was therefore necessary to send the armies to places where large labour forces were required. This was a temporary and emergency measure, necessitated, as Lenin reported to the congress, by extraordinary circumstances.

Trotsky, however, did not regard the militarisation of labour as a forced measure, he considered military methods natural for socialist construction. His speech at the congress expressed his contempt for the working masses. Since, he said, "man strives as a rule to evade work, it can be said that man is a rather lazy animal", and therefore there should be militarisation under which every worker feels that he is a soldier of labour.

The Trotskyist endeavour to reduce the leadership of the masses to purely administrative methods was expressed even more clearly when the country entered the period of peaceful socialist construction. The discussion on the trade unions which the Trotskyists imposed on the Party at the end of 1920 and beginning of 1921 revealed the anti-democratic nature of Trotskyism, which strove to introduce military methods in the trade unions, to "shake up" all the leading personnel of mass organisations from top to bottom by purely administrative methods, and demanded "a tightening of screws".

In his speeches during the trade union discussion and on other occasions, Trotsky often spoke about the role of the masses in history and the need to maintain links with them, but the C.P.S.U. saw that all his talk was but a cloak for his deep mistrust of the masses, for his striving to use only coercive methods, since the Trotskyists, in fact, rejected persuasion, the Party's principal method of leadership.

Lenin's appraisal of the "actual differences" with Trotsky on the trade union question left no doubt that it was a question of "different *approach* to the mass, the different way of winning it over and *keeping in touch* with it. That is the whole point".¹

The striving for equalisation that was so typical of all variants of peasant utopian socialism and the "barracks communism" of the anarchists is also to be found in Trotskyism. Suffice it to recall Lenin's sharp criticism during the trade union discussion of Trotsky's thesis that "the equalisation line should be pursued in the sphere

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 22.

of *consumption*, that is, the conditions of the working people's existence as individuals. In the sphere of *production*, the principle of priority will long remain decisive for us. . . ." "This is a real theoretical muddle," Lenin said. "It is all wrong. Priority is preference, but it is nothing without preference in consumption."¹

The victory of the socialist revolution, which creates moral incentives to work unprecedented in any exploiting formations, does not mean that material stimuli have disappeared. When you ask people to do shock-work, Lenin said, you have to give them bread, and clothes, and meat. "It is wrong to think that food distribution is only a matter of fairness. We must bear in mind that it is a method, an instrument, and a means of increasing output."²

This was said at the Third All-Russia Food Conference in June 1921, when the country was starving. Later Lenin spoke even more extensively on material stimuli for developing production, on the correct combination of material and moral stimuli.

The economists of the Trotskyist trend, Preobrazhensky, for example, continued to assert that piece rates were a system of bourgeois incentives to work, that they "may begin to hamper the new system of labour organisation. . . ."

When the Soviet state was still in the transition from Civil War to peaceful construction, Lenin wrote in his article "New Times and Old Mistakes in a New Guise" that every turn of history calls forth some changes which assume

¹ Ibid., Vol. 32, p. 28.

² Ibid., Vol. 32, p. 448.

the form of petty-bourgeois vacillations and a Right-opportunist and anarchist character. In 1921 the Leftist bawlers wanted the almost immediate introduction of communism, taking as a model the policy of war communism which the Party had been compelled to introduce during the Civil War. Lenin spoke of the danger of petty-bourgeois impatience and lack of backbone which objectively further the ends of imperialism. The rout of the Leftists saved the country from the upheavals that would inevitably have taken place if an adventuristic line had been followed.

In China the Leftist adventurists were able to impose upon the country a policy which was practically tantamount to proclaiming the immediate introduction of communism. Simultaneously with the "big leap" slogan, they advanced the "people's communes" slogan. In 1958, communes were hurriedly set up in the countryside and were immediately declared to be "cells of communist society". The peasants' personal plots, poultry and cattle were taken over by the communes. Everything, including domestic implements and utensils, was socialised. Ten items were to be supplied free of charge: food, clothing, marriage, funerals, and so on.

Excited by its own propaganda, the leading group of the C.P.C. adopted decisions stating that "apparently the achievement of communism in China can no longer be considered a remote prospect". They wrote articles asserting that the Chinese People's Republic would be the first socialist country to effect the transition to communism, and that out of the ten prerequisites which Marx said were necessary to build communism, China had already realised 8, while

the other two: the combination of agriculture with industry and the combination of education with material production—were well under way in China (*Hung-chi*, No. 7, 1958). Actually, observers noted, the communes resembled militarised settlements, idealising poverty and self-denial.

One can deceive oneself, one can deceive others for some time, but one cannot outwit reality.

The establishment of communes by purely artificial means and the complete disregard of the fact that the principles underlying the building of these communes did not correspond with the level of the productive forces in the Chinese countryside had ruinous economic consequences. In three or four months the communes ate up as much rice as had been consumed formerly in a whole year. The peasants stopped working and were faced with the threat of hunger. The communes had to be dissolved, but the Chinese propagandists, disregarding facts, continue to speak of communes, although these have long since been dissolved and replaced by some sort of agricultural artels called production teams.

Having utterly failed in its economic policy, the Mao Tse-tung group had succeeded in one thing only, namely a "big leap" backwards from Marxism to the ideology of "barracks communism".

True to the logic typical of petty-bourgeois revolutionism, the Maoists began to look for a way out of their difficulties through militarisation, "the tightening of screws", the absolutisation of violence.

The entire able-bodied population in the people's communes in town and country, including

women, was organised along military lines into platoons, companies, battalions, regiments and divisions. After that, the Maoists launched an extensive campaign under the slogan "Learn from the People's Liberation Army".

There is no need to dwell on the numerous and extremely complicated slogans advanced during this campaign, such as the call to master the "three—eight" style and to act according to the "first four" rule, by which is understood the "style of cohesion", "style of tension", "style of severity" and the willingness to "bear the burden of enormous labour, considering it an honour" and many other slogans of that type. What all these seemingly incomprehensible numbers and words mean was explained in *Renmin ribao* laconically and unequivocally on February 1, 1964: one must learn from the army, which "carries out orders resolutely, quickly, strictly, without arguments or haggling" and "does as it is ordered". All this was said quite explicitly.

Comparatively recently still, in 1956, the Eighth Congress of the C.P.C. noted that the People's Liberation Army had won thanks to the leadership of the Party, that the Army should learn from the people, that "centralisation achieved only by force is false centralisation unable to withstand the test of time".¹ Later all this was rejected and nobody knows what has happened to the people who made these incontestable statements. The Maoists began to suggest that it is not the Army that should learn from the Party and the people, but that, instead, they should learn from the army, and centralisation

¹ *Materials of the Eighth All-China Congress of the Communist Party of China* (in Russian), p. 213.

based on force is now advertised as the most important principle.

The measures that were taken in China to organise labour along military lines and implant military discipline are proof that this was not merely a propaganda campaign. A whole system of political bodies vested with great authority was set up in industry and agriculture: political boards at ministries and large plants, political sections at medium plants, and political commissars at small ones. All these bodies were staffed with people trained in the army, and many army men were transferred to the political bodies of civilian organisations.

The "cultural revolution" is intended by its organisers to complete this process of militarisation. The Hungweipings and Tsaofans, who are called upon to stage the indignation of the "revolutionary masses" against those who disagree with Mao Tse-tung's adventuristic policy, are backed by military units. The army dissolves the lawful governing bodies and forms so-called revolutionary committees, in which it takes control of key positions.

The Army is charged with carrying out the sowing in spring, and with restoring production. Everything is being done to transform the country into a huge barrack. This has gone even further than the initial founders of "barracks communism" could imagine.

The anarchist slogan "Produce more and consume less" has been widely applied by the Maoists. The lawful demands of the workers for the betterment of their material conditions are branded as counter-revolutionary "economism". The Maoist propaganda apparatus has long since been trying to underpin the unfortunate neces-

sity to curb consumption with a theoretical basis. People who are able to limit their requirements to the barest minimum are given wide publicity. For example, a certain cook "who for 13 years did not take a single day off, did not buy a single pair of shoes or a single pair of socks" is receiving loud praise. The papers suggest that "we, revolutionaries, must not think about clothes, but about how to liberate all mankind". The principle of material incentives to work, and also the principle "Everything for the benefit of man, everything for the sake of man", proclaimed in the Programme of the C.P.S.U., are being cried down as leading to bourgeois degeneration.

Now "economism" has been declared "corruption", "a dagger with which people are killed without bloodshed, opium poisoning people, arsenic with a sugar coating". The stripping of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions of all its authority for its alleged "economism", the deprivation of the Chinese factory and office workers of all organisations able to stand up for their material and spiritual interests shows that the drum-beating and shouting about "arsenic with a sugar coating" is a dagger with which not metaphorical, but very real and very painful blows are struck at the workers' organisations.

The "cultural revolution", attended by the closure of schools and higher educational establishments to free the Hungweipings from the burden of studies, declared serious studies superfluous. As reported by a Hungweiping leaflet, Mao Tse-tung said early in 1964 to a group of students: "The curriculum of sciences could be cut by half. Confucius taught only six sciences: ceremonial, music, archery, chariotry, the holy books and arithmetic.... If we take the biography of

people advanced in science we shall find that there were no great leaders among them. . . . In the Ming Dynasty only two emperors—Tai Tsu and Chen Tsu—managed state affairs well. One of them knew no hieroglyphs, the other only very few. Reading a lot will not make you an emperor.” This leaflet in praise of ignorance was being disseminated far and wide throughout China.

Later it was officially announced that the duration of studies at institutions of higher learning would be shortened and that many subjects would be struck out of the curriculum; in schools that were reopening, tuition began with military training and the singing of the song about “the reddest of red suns”.

All this is logical—“barracks communism” is incompatible with real learning, genuine knowledge; it can thrive only on ignorance and darkness, on deception of people and incitement to fanaticism.

An oversimplified ideal of man impoverished and deprived of all natural feelings and requirements is the logical crowning of the artificial constructions of “barracks communism”.

Marx’s motto “I am human and nothing human is alien to me” is considered in China as sedition of the worst kind.

In Soviet art one frequently comes across a courageous fighter, a hero of the Patriotic War, but he never forgets his wife and children. Maoist literary critics would declare him a traitor for worrying only about his family. A commander must not regret the loss of his soldiers for they are dying for a great cause.

The Maoists label the grief, suffering, and bereavement of the Soviet people, who knew

from their own experience all the horrors of fascist occupation and, refusing to resign themselves to it, fought every hour and every minute of the day "bourgeois emotions of petty people". According to the "barracks communism" scheme, it is criminal to mourn the dead while rejoicing at the victory over fascism, to be ready to sacrifice oneself and yet to love one's wife and children, to be fearless in battle but openly to express joy when quiet reigns again, to work for a high social ideal and yet to wish for more of the good things in life.

The Chinese newspapers now print ad nauseam appeals to "learn from Wang Tse", "learn from Lei Feng," etc., etc. They are all aimed at making men blind tools of Mao. "I want to be a universal cog", says Wang Tse, while another widely advertised "hero"—Chang Hung-chi, who also wants to be a little cog, adds: "... no matter where I am installed—on a gun, on a farm machine, on a motor lorry, on a lathe—I am happy, everywhere I shall be a little cog." Soldier Lei Feng, another pretender for the role of an eternal little cog is supposed to have said the following: "A cog must always be cleaned to keep it from rusting. The same applies to people's ideas. They must be constantly checked, to prevent break-downs."

Shameless interference in the personal affairs of people, constant control over everybody, is becoming the rule. As early as 1957 the *Renmin ribao* (January 12) printed a reply to a letter protesting against the ruling that a Communist could get married only after his application had been considered by three Party instances and that Party organisations were obliged "to help those entering marriage to acquaint themselves

with each other's political views in order to avoid misunderstandings and possible regrettable consequences". The paper explained that Party organisations must give advice to those entering marriage "not only on the political views of the future marriage partner but also on other questions", help its members "to obtain a better knowledge of the character and cast of mind of their future marriage partner". The paper ended with the hypocritical statement: "This cannot be considered an encroachment on a Party member's freedom to marry."

The above "instructions" do not even mention such things as love or feelings. Later, the Maoists went even further. "Love" was replaced by the "instinct of attraction to the opposite sex", and that "instinct" was branded as one of the most harmful manifestations of bourgeois individualism.

The suppression of natural human feelings, narrow-mindedness made an ideal, and to top it all, the dictatorship of Chairman Mao, who mercilessly suppresses even the slightest deviation from the "communist" pattern he has thought out—such is the despotism being implanted in China.

The Maoists are extremely vociferous about the hegemony of the working class, the dictatorship of the proletariat. However, these concepts have lost their genuine content in China. Hundreds of thousands of people to be "re-educated" are sent to the countryside, none to workers' collectives. The difference in the living standard between the workers and peasants is used to incite the peasants against the workers, to accuse them of "striving for bourgeoisification". Some observers who know the country well note that

"the working class in China is often treated as the bourgeoisie was in the Soviet Union". The widely advertised "experience" of the Da-tsin oilfields, which are called "a socialist enterprise of the Chinese type", is essentially an attempt to make the workers themselves entirely self-supporting. Newspapers praise the workers for building mud huts for themselves and for building huts of reed. While the workers are busy in production the members of their families engage in agriculture. And all that is passed for an ideal.

The intention to make the workers simultaneously peasants is implemented also in other ways. Factories hire workers in villages on agreements for a season or for three to seven years. These workers are paid less than permanent workers and part of their wages goes to the social fund of the village community. Another system is the payment for the workers' labour according to workday units by the village. They are not allowed to take their family with them and are obliged to return to the village after their term of employment expires. In advertising this practice, the Chinese press emphasises the "incompatibility of a system of permanent workers with the ideas of Mao Tse-tung".

The experience of China shows that the petty bourgeoisie can be an ally of the working class, but can also work against it, implying by the word "proletarian", which is synonymous of revolutionary in the contemporary world, their own narrow primitive ideals.

Petty-bourgeois narrow-mindedness is implanted in everything not only in China's domestic affairs. It has become a state policy and extends also to foreign policy. The Chinese leaders want to equalise not only all members of their society,

but also all the socialist countries. According to them, the Soviet Union must suspend communist construction and use all its resources to bring all backward countries up to its level.

If the Soviet Union and other economically advanced socialist countries should really stop building the material and technical basis of communism and socialism, they would thereby deprive the peoples of the developing countries of the necessary assistance.

The striving for equalisation has always been strong in China, an immense country inhabited mainly by small peasants. From the very start, Communists had to fight absurd ideas about socialism evolved by the narrow-mindedness of peasants. As early as the Sixth Congress of the C.P.C. in 1928, the report of the Executive Committee of the Comintern pointed out that many people in China regarded socialism as a universal equalising share-out of property: "Divide all large estates—that is socialism; open up all the shops, take all the goods from them and divide them out—that is socialism; take the factories, workshops, etc., and pilfer them—that is socialism; confiscate the rice stocks in the granaries—that is socialism. Actually, however, that is not socialism, but only a universal division of property...."¹

At present the petty-bourgeois-peasant striving to "grab as much as possible" dictates the policy of the Mao Tse-tung group, which refuses to reckon with the interests of the world socialist system as a whole, and is willing, for the sake of equalisation, to deprive the world revolu-

¹ *Stenographic Report of the Sixth Congress of the C.P.C.* (in Russian), Book 1, Moscow, 1930, p. 17.

tionary movement, about which it talks so much, of its principal material basis—the economic and military might of the socialist camp.

The ideas of socialism travelled a complex path from utopia to science. Now Mao Tse-tung wants to go back along that road—to make the science of socialism a reactionary utopia. But there can be no reverse movement in history. It is possible to impede a progressive movement, but what is rooted in life will shoot through anything. The more efforts are made to compress the spring of history, the more powerfully it will rebound, overthrowing all resistance.

IDOL WORSHIP

The anarchists resolutely opposed any form of state power and wildly preached against any authority whatever. The Narodniks, on the other hand, although they borrowed much from the anarchists, extolled men of authority, "heroes" able to liberate the hoi polloi. The Trotskyists constantly flaunt their intolerance of any cult of the personality. In China the cult of Mao has assumed a frenzied fanaticism. Here there is an apparent contradiction. But a comparison of the methods used by representatives of the different varieties of petty-bourgeois revolutionism show that they have many common features linked with the personality cult.

The reason for these is not hard to see. Among small producers, lumpenproletarians, degenerated intellectuals, that is, all the social layers forming the social basis of petty-bourgeois revolutionism, outbursts of frenzied rebellion alternate with submission to fate and the hope that a "strong", "just" man will appear and arrange everything as it should be.

The Russian autocracy not only drowned peasant revolts in blood but also exploited the peasants' naive faith in the kindness of the tsar for a long time. Bonapartism laid its stake on the small-proprietor, conservative instincts of the peasantry. Hitler also used the desperation of the petty bourgeoisie unsettled by the crisis and even some of the most backward workers, to strengthen the power of the monopolies.

In the history of social movements, there have been many leaders whose authority rested on petty-bourgeois backwardness and narrow-mindedness.

Marxism has always had to fight against the penetration into the working-class movement of illusions and morals alien to the proletariat, including some which prove a fertile ground for the emergence of the personality cult.

The struggle Marxists led against subjectivism, which is part and parcel of all varieties of petty-bourgeois revolutionism, was at the same time also a struggle against an exaggerated idea of the possibilities of leaders of the liberation movement. Subjectivism develops in leaders such traits as faith in their own infallibility and intolerance to opposition. This explains why people of very different stature, living in very different epochs, people not deprived of individuality, but dominated by subjectivism, acquired features of character which gave them a certain resemblance to one another.

Among the representatives of pre-Marxian socialism there were many who claimed the role of prophets and were infatuated with their own teachings. Megalomania was a feature of many leading figures of petty-bourgeois socialism, whether they had a numerous following or not. It became an almost invariable trait in leaders of pseudo-revolutionism.

A letter to Marx written in June 1846 by Schapper, a League of the Just functionary, is a kind of generalised description of such people as the working-class movement has had to fight from its beginning up to our days. He wrote about Weitling, an ideologist of "egalitarian" communism, whose views were popular among

workers and craftsmen at the time when the German proletariat was only forming: "Wilhelm Weitling can get on only with those who follow his orders blindly, who do not consider a single book interesting if it was not written by Weitling. He thinks that he alone has the monopoly of truth and can save the world, that everything written by other people is sheer nonsense. For this reason he does not learn anything and does not want his followers to learn either—they must be content with his gospel. . . ." ¹

The megalomania of Weitling, who saw people envying him, rivals, secret enemies and machinations everywhere, left a certain imprint on the Charter of the League of the Just. That is what Marx had in mind when he wrote: "When Engels and I first joined the secret Communist Society we made it a condition that everything tending to encourage superstitious belief in authority was to be removed from the statutes." ²

Marx and Engels succeeded in having deleted from the statutes of the League of the Just everything that tended to make the admission of new members a semi-mystical ritual, required that they should take an oath, and threatened inevitable vengeance if they divulged any of the society's secrets. Everything that limited the rights of rank-and-file members, everything that opened the door to manifestations of despotism on the part of the leaders, was removed from the statutes.

¹ Y. P. Kandel, *Marx and Engels—the Organisers of the Communist League* (in Russian), Moscow, 1953, p. 126.

² K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, p. 310.

The new statutes were based on the principles of centralism and democratism, and provided, in particular, for the accountability of the elected bodies.

So long as the International Working Men's Association existed, Marx, "out of aversion," as he said, "for any personality cult", never permitted publication of the numerous appeals mentioning his services, never answered them, contenting himself with rare rebukes for them.

How this contrasted with Bakunin's self-glorification, his attempts to assume the role of infallible pope of the revolutionary movement! Negating all authority, he himself demanded implicit obedience and was pitiless to anyone who did not do his bidding. Analysing the ideology and practice of anarchism in *The Alliance of Socialist Democracy and the International Working Men's Association*, Marx and Engels showed that Bakunin's democratic declamations were aimed at perpetuating his own dictatorship in the Alliance.

Lenin also had to fight anarchist "leaderism". He exposed that ideology which in words rejected any authority but in practice led to the establishment of a small oligarchy of leaders. The principle of "free agreement" between the members of the organisation set up by the anarchists in opposition to democratic "subordination of the minority to the majority" was nothing but a demand for unrestricted freedom of action for the "leaders", who indulged in all sorts of scheming among themselves. The anarchist profession of "absolute freedom" inevitably degenerated into personality cult, since it was the "personality" itself that laid down the

limits of its rights and duties, the nature of its actions and deeds.¹

Trotsky's petty-bourgeois anarchistic individualism was shown in all its ugliness when he fought against the organisational principles of Bolshevism before, and still more after, the revolution. Like the anarchists, the Trotskyists camouflaged the anti-democratic essence of their ideas with words in praise of democracy. They did everything to depict themselves as fighters against personality cult. All reactionary forces in the world are actively spreading this myth. But there is not an iota of truth in it.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, adhering to the principles of Marxism-Leninism, considers the personality cult entirely incompatible with the democratic nature of socialist society. As is pointed out in the C.P.S.U. C.C. Theses on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, "In pursuing its course towards the further development of socialist democracy, the Twentieth Party Congress resolutely condemned Stalin's personality cult, which was expressed in the glorification of the role of one man, something that is alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, in departures from the Leninist principle of collective leadership, and in unwarranted reprisals and other violations of socialist legality which inflicted harm on our society. These distortions, for all their gravity, did not alter the nature of socialist society, nor did they shake the pillars of socialism. The Party and the people had abiding faith in commu-

¹ See A. D. Kosichev, *The Struggle of Marxism-Leninism with Anarchist Ideology and Modern Times* (in Russian), Moscow, 1964, p. 204.

nism, they worked with enthusiasm to implement the Leninist ideals, overcoming difficulties, temporary setbacks and mistakes".¹

After the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U., the so-called Fourth International attempted to make it appear that the condemnation of Stalin's mistakes was proof that Trotsky's views were sound. The reactionary press all over the world readily joined the propaganda campaign to pass off the Trotskyists as opponents of the personality cult. Never before, perhaps, had the bourgeois papers printed so many photos of Trotsky, so many excerpts from his works, biographical details, etc. But, all this fuss soon petered out, although attempts to revive it are made now and again. It was too obvious that the Trotskyists fought not the Stalin cult, as they tried to make out, but the Party which was building socialism in the country and had rejected the adventurist capitulationist policy of Trotsky, who denied the possibility of building socialism in the U.S.S.R.

The noisy propaganda made by the enemies of communism around Trotsky's person once again proved that the C.P.S.U. was right in fighting Trotskyism, for without its rout there could not have been any successful socialist construction.

There is no need to prove that Trotskyism does not oppose the personality cult. On the contrary, use of administrative methods, curtailment of democracy, individual instead of collective decision-making, arbitrary action, i.e., all the methods typical of the personality cult were characteristic of Trotsky more than of anybody else. In his

¹ *Fiftieth Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution*, p. 24.

"Letter to the Congress" (December 1922) Lenin characterised Trotsky as follows: "... he has displayed excessive self-assurance and shown excessive preoccupation with the purely administrative side of the work."¹

Administration by mere injunction was manifest in everything Trotsky did. Why then, it may be asked, did Trotsky advance the demand for greater democracy in his anti-Party struggle after Lenin's death? This question is easily answered: although the Trotskyists now strive hard to pass off Trotsky as a fighter against the dominance of the Party apparatus, against "Stalinist bureaucracy", etc., Trotsky was too experienced and subtle a politician not to know what horse to back. His demagogic and ingratiating appeals to the young were designed to implant an anarchistic idea of democracy, to set up democracy against leadership.

In attacking the Party apparatus, Trotsky was not against the apparatus in general (all his practical activities leave no doubt about that) but against the actual apparatus defending the Leninist line. He wanted to set up his own Trotskyist apparatus. When he criticised the system within the Party, Trotsky had no intention of developing genuine democracy. He was acting then as often in the past, in a way which Lenin, describing him and other factionalists like him, characterised as follows: they "... recognise the will of the majority of the class-conscious workers, *not* in the present, but in the future, only in the future event of the workers agreeing with them..."² No, the democratic phrases the Trot-

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 36, p. 595.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 20, p. 483.

skyists were and are using to further their political ends can deceive nobody. There is no doubt that Trotskyist methods resemble in many respects those of the personality cult. Striving to raise himself on a pedestal of grandeur, Trotsky profited by every occasion in and out of season to extol his person, scorning anybody who did not agree with him.

In his *My Life* Trotsky attempts to show how much the C.P.S.U. lost by rejecting him and how much it would have gained if it had appointed him its leader. But any unbiased reader immediately sees that the book is pervaded with the braggadocio of a man convinced of his own infallibility. He claims that in his early childhood, long before he was acquainted with Marxist literature, Trotsky was already a Marxist, and he "modestly" admits that when he later began to read that literature, he found "in the works of Marx, Engels, Plekhanov, Mehring what in gaol had seemed to me to be my own conjectures". Later, reading the correspondence of Marx and Engels, "I discovered not only my theoretical but also psychological kinship with the founders of Marxism".

Hence Trotsky was an accomplished advocate not only of the use of administrative methods and violence, but also of self-advertising, and self-praise which are typical of the personality cult.

Today we see repugnant manifestations of the personality cult in China which put in the shade anything of the kind known to history. In China, a peasant country where the emperor cult, the cult of the "father of the Celestial Kingdom", ruled for ages, conditions promoted idol worship. The influence of the petty bourgeois atmosphere of extolling "heroes" could be observed in the

Chinese Party long ago. As early as 1939, Liu Shao-chi said in a cycle of lectures he delivered at the Marxism-Leninism Institute in Yenan that there were many people in the C.P.C. who knew nothing of Marxism-Leninism but only juggled with Marxist-Leninist terminology imagining themselves a "Chinese Marx" or a "Chinese Lenin". "Moreover, they had no qualms of conscience in demanding that the members of our Party should respect them like Marx and Lenin, support them as 'leaders', and entertain loyalty and love for them. They could even appoint themselves 'leaders' without waiting to be nominated as such; they worked their way into responsible positions, ran the Party as though it were a patriarchal family, attempted to lecture our Party, condemned everything in it and inflicted blows at will on members of the Party, punished them and manipulated them as they saw fit."

The author of these lectures did not mention names, saying that all this took place in the past. However he asked: "Can we affirm beyond doubt that such elements will not re-appear in our Party?" and answers: "No, we cannot affirm that."¹

The Mao Tse-tung cult has assumed really monstrous proportions. All the achievements of the Communist Party and of the Chinese people, all the gains of the revolution and successes in construction are ascribed to Mao alone. The press controlled by Mao never mentions the names of those who founded the Party, the entire history of the Party is interpreted in such a way as to

¹ In 1962 a second, revised, edition of Liu Shao-chi's lectures appeared in Peking under the title *On the Work of Communists on Themselves*. A short time later, the edition was branded as "the theoretical basis of counter-revolutionary revisionism."

praise Mao alone. All decisions of the Party are nothing but the concrete expression of Mao's ideas, expressing the "supreme wisdom of the Chinese people". Crowds of propagandists vie with one another in inventing metaphors to glorify his name. There is a sort of pathological, hysterical competition in singing his praises. First Mao was compared with the sun, then it was said that there are "two red suns in the world—one in heaven, the other among people". Then even this was not enough since "the sun rises and sets, while the works of Chairman Mao always radiate light".

Everything Mao has written has long since been officially described as a universal "golden key" helping to solve all questions, big and small, including the tiniest ones arising in private life. All mistakes in economic policy which can no longer be hushed up are explained simply by blaming them on those who understood Mao's "brilliant instructions" one-sidedly and interpreted them wrongly. That is why the press constantly reiterates that all that is necessary to ensure success always and in everything is "to read the books of Chairman Mao, to obey Chairman Mao, to follow the instructions of Chairman Mao, to be a good fighter of Chairman Mao".

There is no point in trying to discover the secret of the skills of a surgeon who has carried out a successful operation, or of a sportsman who has set up a new record—the press always gives the same stereotype answer: they studied the works of Mao, were faithful pupils of the Chairman. Even to be successful in selling melons in the market place one has to follow Mao's precepts.

For many years, a campaign has been going

on in the country to make the people study the works of Mao. Propagandists describe production teams who formerly produced rejects, but now, having read the works of Chairman Mao, have begun to work well; they recommend that these works be studied by whole families, that new arrivals who stay in a hotel for more than six days be drawn into study circles; they praise those who declare that their spare time does not belong to them, who "revolutionise their spare time", that is, study Mao's writings, those who believe that "though it is possible to live without sleep or food it is impossible to live without reading the works of Chairman Mao".

Year in year out, the newspapers advise how to find a spare minute during the day for reading Mao's works. Peasant women, for example, are advised to fill in time on "rainy days, while resting, before and after meetings, while giving their child the breast, or putting it to bed, before preparing food, and, of course, during the study periods fixed by the Party cell".

Pablo Neruda, the well-known Chilean poet and journalist, a great friend of the Chinese revolution, sadly wrote: "In every street, on every door you will see Mao's portrait. Mao has become a living Buddha, isolated from the people by the court bonzes, who interpret Marxism and modern history at his wish. Peasants bow to the portrait of the leader and kneel before it. Is that communism? It is rather a ridiculous, unacceptable, mystical religious worship. The personality cult in China is leading to tragical consequences."

This was written a few years before the so-called cultural revolution. Now the religious worship of Mao has assumed a really monstrous

scale. "Come quickly and clasp my hand: my hands have just touched the hands of Chairman Mao!"—those, according to the Chinese newspapers, are the words of the one who had been found worthy to shake hands with the august Mao. Mao's sayings have been put to music and are sung like psalms. Children in kindergartens are made to learn them by heart, they are recited at meetings, read as prayers before a plane takes off. Everybody has to know the texts by heart to prove his loyalty to the Chairman.

Once, under the emperors, those applying for a post in the state apparatus had to recite the sayings of Confucius collected in a special book. Now the memory of civil servants is checked by their ability to quote Mao.

The entire population, including the illiterate, are instructed to study Mao's works. It does not matter whether they understand them, the only important thing is to learn them by heart. In medieval Europe, the peasants went to religious services held in Latin and prayed devoutly without understanding a word they said. In the same way, Mao's "thoughts" have become prayers in modern China. The little red book of the Chairman's sayings that every Chinese must possess is not so much a collection of "pearls of wisdom", as a talisman, a means of communion with the "deity".

In 1922, Lenin criticised the Left doctrinaires because, "far too often, instead of soberly weighing up the situation that was not very favourable for immediate and direct revolutionary action, they vigorously indulged in the waving of little red flags".¹ Lenin was speaking figuratively. In

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, p. 208.

China today, sober politics are literally replaced by the waving of red flags, only the flags are replaced by little red books of excerpts from Mao's writings.

All this profanation shows the deep contempt in which the Maoists hold the people, their shameless exploitation of poverty, ignorance and superstition. As early as 1958, Mao Tse-tung wrote: "In addition to other features, a specific feature of the 600 million Chinese, is its poverty and the fact that it is like a blank sheet. At first glance this may seem bad; actually, however, it is good. Poverty makes them strive for changes, forces them to action, compels them to make revolution. A blank sheet is empty, but on it can be written the newest, the most beautiful words, can be drawn the newest, most beautiful pictures".¹ Now it has become plain to all what "beautiful pictures" Mao paints, and what he wants to transform this great people into.

The insistent emphasis of Mao's group on faithfulness to the "line of the masses" cannot conceal its lack of faith in the masses. In one of its resolutions, the leadership of the Spanish Communist Party aptly noted: "Those who do not tell the masses the truth, even though they curry favour with them in words and extol them to the sky, show thereby that they do not believe in the masses."

Indeed, as Mao's policy has encountered growing resistance, it has become increasingly clear that he believes only in personal dictatorship relying on the army and that he will not allow anything to prevent him from achieving his

¹ *Pravda*, June 1, 1958.

objectives. He has advanced the downright voluntaristic slogan "Politics is the commanding force" to justify his actions in the economic sphere, his disregard for objective laws in giving any orders to his subordinates.

Demanding implicit obedience, Mao tramples on all democratic standards, even the most elementary. Party congresses have long ago been replaced by plenary meetings of the C.C. According to the C.P.C. Rules, these meetings must be called at least twice a year, but four years passed between the 10th and 11th meetings and the so-called 11th plenary meeting of the C.C. in August 1966, which proclaimed the "cultural revolution", was actually not a plenary meeting since only Mao's followers, who constituted the minority in the C.C., were admitted to it. The Central Committee of the C.P.C. has become a purely nominal concept. The C.C. has been replaced by the "group on questions of the cultural revolution". Local Party bodies have been dissolved. Mao has discarded the Party, which does not want to be his servile tool, and has replaced it by gangs of young hooligans organised from above.

In April 1969, 13 years after the Eighth Congress of the C.P.C., Mao decided to assemble all those in China on whose support he relied in his so-called cultural revolution. This gathering was called the Ninth Congress of the C.P.C. This designation once more proves how willfully the Maoists handle terms. While preserving Marxist terminology, Mao uses it deliberately in order to create the semblance that his policies are in some way connected with Marxism-Leninism. Actually, however, there are no grounds whatsoever for calling the April gathering in Peking the Ninth Congress of the C.P.C.

The Communist Party of China, which has traversed a long and glorious path, is now deprived of every possibility to convene congresses. The Party has in fact ceased to exist. This determined the composition and nature of the "Ninth Congress". The delegates to it were not elected, but appointed. Chief among them were the military, who have become the backbone of the regime.

Even though the Rules adopted by the congress speak of democratic centralism, they fix no periods for convening congresses and plenary meetings of the Central Committee, and make no mention of the Party members' rights. Now the anti-democratic practices will be carried on not in violation of the Rules, as Mao Tse-tung had to do up to now, but on perfectly "legal" grounds. The Rules, which are permeated with the spirit of the personality cult, contain an unprecedented item—Lin Piao is proclaimed Mao's successor. Mao has adapted the imperial dynasty's principle of hereditary succession by appointing his successor in his lifetime.

His successor declared at the "Ninth Congress" the following: "Anybody, ever and under any circumstances, daring to oppose Chairman Mao Tse-tung, or Maoist ideas, will be condemned by the entire Party and punished by the whole country."

The personality cult is harming the people's interests, obstructing the struggle against imperialism, for socialism. The personality cult dazzles not only those who worship the idol, but also the idol himself. In his effort to win immortality, Mao throws so much fuel onto the critical fire of history that the myths he himself created will sooner or later be burnt to ashes.

NO SQUEAMISHNESS ABOUT MEANS

Social psychology has so far given no explanation why renegades become the bitterest enemies of the views and organisations they have betrayed, far more bitter than those who always fought on the other side of the barricade. It is difficult to say whether this is due to a desire to atone for their sins, to the morbid ambition of non-recognised leaders or some other motives. Whatever the reason, from biblical days to our times those who have betrayed the cause for which they once fought have always become its worst enemies.

The history of the working-class movement knows many such examples. It shows that when petty-bourgeois revolutionism suffers defeat and loses its positions in the working class it spearheads its attacks not against the exploiting system (it only heaps curses on its head) but against workers' organisations.

Being in the ranks of the First International and having lost all hope of winning a leading position in it and imposing their views, the anarchists engaged in subversion against the International. The letter of the General Council to all members of the International Working Men's Association drafted by Frederick Engels in August 1872 says: "In the history of the struggle of the working class this is the first instance of a secret plot within the working class itself, aimed at destroying not the existing system of exploitation but the Association that is waging a relentless

struggle against that system. That plot is a plot aimed against the proletarian movement itself.”¹

The struggle to thwart the plot demonstrated relation between the ideology of a political trend and the methods it uses. This was subsequently corroborated by the entire history of the working-class movement.

A closer look at the history of the struggle between anarchism and Marxism in the late 19th century shows the gulf that divides these ideologies and their different approaches to the struggle inside the Party. On the one hand, there is the principled and at the same time flexible line of the Marxists, discipline and observance of joint decisions; on the other, the anarchists’ haughty disregard for other people’s opinions and for organisation and their lack of elementary decency in dealing with people of other views. The anarchists were not squeamish about the means to attain their ends: lies, slander, intimidation, perfidy, etc., were all part of their arsenal. The secret conspiratory society formed within the International directed “its blows not against existing governments but against the revolutionaries who reject its dogmas and leadership”.²

This description fits the methods used today by the Trotskyists and the violence practised by the Maoists. The reason is that, though time and conditions may change, the methods by which petty-bourgeois revolutionism fights proletarian revolutionism essentially remain the same and can all be expressed by the simple and unscrupulous formula: everything is fair in war.

What methods does petty-bourgeois revo-

¹ K. Marx/F. Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 18, S. 120.

² *Ibid.*, S. 333.

lutionism use against Marxism, and how is this struggle generally escalated?

It usually begins with the formation of factions which refuse to abide by general decisions, deny any obligations towards their comrades-in-arms, and recognise the will of the majority only if the majority agrees with them. The anarchists maintained that the rights of the individual are unlimited and Trotskyism "enriched" this theory by demanding unlimited freedom for factional activity.

Before the 1917 October Revolution the Trotskyists attempted to conceal their factional activity by advancing the slogan of supra-factionalism, and disguised their splitting activity with talk about unity. That is why Lenin branded them the most dangerous of all factionalists and Trotsky was for ever nicknamed Judas. After the victory of the revolution, the Trotskyists more and more openly declared themselves a faction with the intention of superseding the Leninist Party.

Typical of Trotskyism during that period was the striving to carry out factional activities not only within the country, but also on an international scale. The Trotskyists sent emissaries to the Communist Parties of Germany, France and other countries to set up within the working-class movement a bloc of all opposition groups, irrespective of their aims, accepting opportunists of any brand.

The Maoists are copying these methods of factional activity and are using them on an international scale. And it was no mere chance that at the Moscow Meeting of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties in 1960, they objected against the condemnation of factional activities. But, in spite of them, the Statement included

a decision on the inadmissibility of any action tending to undermine the unity of the world communist movement. However, the C.P.C. leadership did not reckon with it.

Wherever possible Peking representatives brainwashed members of the fraternal parties and knocked together factions, in order to disorganise the normal work of the leadership elected by Party congresses.

Lawrence Sharkey, at that time General Secretary of the C.C. of the Communist Party of Australia, told the plenary meeting of the C.C. at the end of 1963 how he and other functionaries of the Communist Party had been "wooded" during their visit to China, how the Maoists had "tried to impose upon us a policy that could only isolate us from the working class, from the masses and reduce us to an impotent sect. . . .

"Then we were offered. . . some 'literature'—a book written by a whiteguard for the U.S. State Department and a Trotskyist book. We rejected these 'gifts'."

Seeing that the attempts to draw the leadership of the Communist Party of Australia over to its side were hopeless, Peking immediately turned its attention to the renegade Hill, who had been expelled from the Party, and whom the Mao group now invariably calls the Chairman of the Australian Communist Party, while styling its real leaders "the former leadership".

With Chinese assistance, a group of factionalists became active in the Belgian Party. When they were expelled from the Party, Peking immediately proclaimed this group the new Communist Party of Belgium. The same happened with the faction in the Ceylonese Communist Party and a number of other parties.

The political face of those whom the Maoists enlist on their side is a matter of no concern to them. They get in touch with all sorts of turn-coats, "ultra-Left" extremists, political adventurers, with those whom the Communist Parties have weeded out of their ranks. In Mexico, the Maoists sought the support notably of Trotskyist groupings. In Colombia they enlisted the support of an adventurer who had been expelled from the Communist Party 14 years earlier. In Chile, they picked a Trotskyist, who was connected with the police and was expelled from the Party in the thirties. In Ceylon, the Seventh Congress of the Ceylonese Communist Party (April 1964) reported, they resorted to direct bribery: they gave 5,000 rupees to one of their supporters to pay his debt, 1,000 rupees for the repair of another's motorcar, the mortgage on a house belonging to a third, etc.

Slander, bribery, blackmail are methods widely used by the Mao Tse-tung group. In a letter dated June 14, 1963 outlining the notorious 25 items of its programme, the C.P.C. leadership threatened that, if Communist Parties should reject them, the leadership of these Parties would be taken over by new people, who "may or may not be members of a given Party". The Trotskyists acted in a similar way in 1926 when they warned the Communist Party of Germany that if it should support the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), they would split the Party and form a new "Left" German Party.

The general method used by Trotskyists in their struggle against Communist Parties was to set the Party masses against the leadership of the Party, to concentrate fire on those who defended the Party line. The Chinese leaders have adopted

this method in their struggle against the C.P.S.U. and other Communist Parties; they also strive to contrapose the Central Committees of the Parties to the Parties themselves, to slander Party leaders.

Openly enthusing over this subversive activity, the Trotskyists in the "Fourth International" called on the Maoists to promote the split "by all means at their disposal: money, people, technique". On February 8, 1963, the "Fourth International" banking on the success of the subversive activity of the Chinese dissenters, advocated the setting up of a new communist International "the need for which has been confirmed as never before by the latest events, and for the establishment of which the Fourth International has fought ever since its foundation".

However, the policy of setting up pro-Peking "parties" in opposition to the Communist Parties faithful to the decisions of the Meetings of 1957 and 1960 ended in failure in most countries. Even though Peking continues pompously to welcome and see off the heads of the groups they have set up in some countries (whom the Chilean Communists have aptly dubbed "pocket parties"), the whole world, including even the Maoists themselves, realises that their attempt to set up in opposition to the world communist movement a bloc of renegades with its own platform and its centre in Peking has failed miserably.

When at one time an identical attempt of the Trotskyists failed, they adopted the double-dealing tactic which the "Fourth International" called "entrism", from the French "entrer", meaning to enter. "Entrism" means to worm one's way into Party and mass organisations by accepting in words their aims, tactics and discipline. The

aim was to undermine the organisations from within, to recruit followers without showing their true face. In the developed capitalist countries the Trotskyists, as *World News*, the journal of the Communist Party of Great Britain (No. 42, 1958) noted, clearly realise that "at times when the situation sharpens at great speed some workers respond to the super-revolutionary appeal, the slogans promising socialism on the cheap, through some short cut, some quick single act". In the colonial and dependent countries the Trotskyists most often acted under cover of Left radicalism, which clearly betrayed the features of anarcho-syndicalism.

Of course, the Trotskyists do not advertise their "entrism", the "special penetration", as they call it. The essence of these double-faced tactics demands secrecy. But the experience of the working-class movement in fighting anarchism, Trotskyism and other manifestations of petty-bourgeois revolutionism shows that, when the enemies of Marxism suffer defeat in their direct attacks, they resort to secret methods of recruiting followers, to setting up a clandestine network of agents, and that requires high vigilance on the part of Communists.

When the Trotskyists were still in the Party ranks, they always attempted to carry the discussions on Party differences outside the Party.

Mao Tse-tung also adopts similar tactics. Before the discussion of the differences that had arisen in the communist movement, Peking published in April 1960 a book, *Long Live Leninism*, in all main languages. It was directed against the line worked out jointly by Communist Parties in 1957. A month later, the Chinese leaders began to work on members of the Council of the World

Federation of Trade Unions, which was holding a session in Peking. Since then, the Chinese delegates have been making splitting speeches at all gatherings of international non-party mass organisations: the sessions of the World Peace Council, the conferences of the Organisation of Afro-Asian Solidarity, the World Youth Forum, the World Women's Congress, etc. The Maoists use any channels to disseminate their theories through the press and continually broadcast them on the radio.

The Trotskyists always used in their polemics a tone precluding any possibility of resolving differences. They did not endeavour to discuss or convince, they wanted to destroy, they acted by means of ultimatums and threats. In 1904, Lenin said "these efforts to destroy instead of convince show their lack of consistent principles, lack of faith in their own ideas".¹

In their methods of destroying the Maoists outdo anything known hitherto. They behave as though they were the supreme judges, the depositaries of supreme wisdom. They did not recognise the traditional practice accepted in the Party of exchanging views, but announced "incontestable truths", considering it below their dignity even to listen to the arguments advanced by others. They turned all discussions into squabbles and abuse, using the vilest slander, and thereby excluding any possibility of agreement from the very start. Their speeches were never intended to overcome differences but to aggravate them to the extreme.

The representatives of petty-bourgeois revolutionism discredited themselves in the eyes of all

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 7, p. 364.

honest people not only by resorting to any means, fair or foul, but also by their alliance with the enemies of the working people.

In the mid-twenties, having started underground activity in the Soviet Union, the Trotskyists used all sorts of foul connections to set up an illegal printing shop. At a time when the imperialists were threatening to attack the Soviet Union, the Trotskyists advanced the slogan of conditional defencism, that is, they actually refused to defend the U.S.S.R. unless it changed its policy.

These were not mere words, as can be seen from their behaviour in other countries. At the most critical period of the Civil War in Spain, the Trotskyist POUM (Partido Obrero de Unificacion Marxista) engineered an uprising against the Republican Government in Barcelona, motivating their act of treason by saying that the war was only for democracy and not for socialism. The Trotskyists did everything to spread defeatist moods and to demoralise the people in the republican zone. The subversive activities of the Trotskyists and anarchists were exploited by Franco's agents.

In its splitting activity, the Mao Tse-tung group is supporting the most reactionary regimes. In Spain, where the Communists have had to go underground and are subjected to cruel persecution, the official authorities quite readily disseminate all Peking publications. Moreover, with the help of Peking, they even print fake issues of the Communist *Mundo Obrero*. The bulletin *Mundo Obrero Revolucionario*, which was passed off as the organ of the so-called new Spanish Communist Party is published with the assistance of a special service of Franco's Ministry

of Information. This bulletin calls the leaders of the Communist Party "revisionists", "capitulationists" and "Social-Democratic reformists". The main efforts of the authors of this bulletin are directed at splitting the anti-fascist movement successfully developing in Spain. The democratic press justly considers that the fact that the conditions provided by the Spanish authorities for the publication of this bulletin show that there exists an alliance between the fascist dictatorship and the Peking propagandists in Spain.

Hundreds of establishments in American capitals distribute letters, pamphlets, and all sorts of information propagandising the views of Mao-Tse-tung to private addresses. Information agencies actively disseminate documents of the Maoists and the pro-Peking dissenting groups. The bourgeois press in many countries, which never published material on any of the Communist Parties, gives extensive coverage to the actions of Mao's supporters.

The struggle Marxism had to wage against petty-bourgeois revolutionism in its early stages has assumed a much wider scale in the new conditions. While the members of the First International were persecuted and arrested in nearly all countries, the members in the conspiratorial Alliance enjoyed immunity.

The extreme views of the anarchists could scare, as Marx said, only "bourgeois cretins", while sober bourgeois politicians understood only too well what use they could draw from the arch-revolutionary phrase-mongering of the anarchists. The security services of many states encouraged the "ultra-revolutionaries". Significant in this respect is the report of the Special Commissioner of the Swiss police of December 30,

1871 on the activity of the anarchist newspaper *Révolution Social*, which, according to him "... undermined ... the International more thoroughly than the wisest writings could.... It would be unpleasant (he considered)—if this paper ... were to cease its existence". He suggested that the necessary funds should be released "to prolong the life of this paper", in order to enable it "to liven up its destructive and disorganising activity in the ranks of the Swiss internationalists".¹

In the twenties and thirties, while imperialist reaction still hoped that Trotskyism would succeed, they lavishly financed Trotskyist publications. In a number of countries the authorities disseminated Trotskyist material at enterprises and among political prisoners in gaols. While Communists were subjected to cruel repressions, the Trotskyists were given full freedom of action. Small wonder the imperialist reaction encouraged in every way the Trotskyists, who, in their bitterness, slander, and attacks on the first socialist country, left far behind all varieties of anti-communism.

Today imperialist reaction strives to exploit the Maoists' malicious campaign against the world communist movement, the socialist countries, particularly against the Soviet Union.

After the Trotskyists nobody has exhibited such open hostility against the Soviet Union or slandered the achievements of the Soviet people with such hatred as the Maoists do. Even the anti-communist publications and radio transmis-

¹ N. Y. Kolpinsky, V. A. Tvardovskaya, *Bakunin in the Russian and International Liberation Movement* (in Russian), *Uoprosy Istorii* magazine, 1964, No. 10, p. 82.

sions from capitalist countries may seem almost pro-Soviet in comparison with the stream of anti-Soviet invectives let loose by the Mao group.

Peking spends enormous sums on anti-Soviet propaganda; it lavishly finances any renegades or adventurists provided their struggle against the Soviet Union, the socialist countries and the communist movement is disguised by ultra-revolutionary phrases.

Instead of fighting imperialism, the Mao group spearheads its attacks against the Soviet Union, the socialist countries and the international communist movement. That is why the imperialists are so readily supporting the Mao group, and fitting it into their far-reaching plans. But petty-bourgeois revolutionism, upon which the class enemies vainly pinned their hopes in the past, will let them down this time as well.

When fighting Trotskyism before the revolution, Lenin described the methods used by Trotsky's supporters, as follows: "This is abuse coming from impotent little groups, who are angry at their own impotence."¹

Naturally, we cannot compare the possibilities of these little groups with those of the Maoists. Heading a big state the latter have the possibility to carry on subversion on an unprecedented scale. But it is still true that abuse is a sign of one's own weakness, the weapon of the impotent who are angry at their own impotence. Abuse is the means by which the Maoists try to incite fanaticism in their followers, it is a cover for the groundlessness of Mao's claim to be the leader of the world revolution.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 321.

The methods used by the various brands of petty-bourgeois revolutionism did no little to discredit the ideas they wanted to popularise. The impermissible methods they resorted to opened the eyes of those who but recently laboured under illusions and believed the new prophets. The means to which the anarchists resorted to fight Marxism lost them many of their followers. When the Trotskyists were finally exposed as double-dealers and provocateurs, they found themselves in a social vacuum. The Maoists will not win much sympathy by their frenzied anti-Sovietism and their excesses. When progressive people the world over compare Peking's hysterics with the calm and dignity displayed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet people, the entire communist movement, they feel a deep respect for those who resist all provocations and consistently and confidently defend the purity of their convictions.

BELLICOSE NATIONALISM

To proletarian internationalism petty-bourgeois revolutionism contraposes either narrow nationalism or cosmopolitanism. Early in their political career, Marx and Engels criticised the narrow nationalistic views of the German artisans who regarded German culture as the crown and ultimate aim of world history, and the "German nation as a model nation". In Italy, the anarchists held that the Italian people was the "most revolutionary", that it was called upon to show other peoples how to achieve liberation. The Russian anarchists spoke of the particular revolutionary spirit and the historical mission of the Slavs. These were all variants of narrow nationalism, inflated national conceit.

Trotskyist ideology is essentially cosmopolitan. It denies the importance of national movements and considers that "national interests" are a purely bourgeois concept. When Trotsky spoke of "patriotism" and "nation", it was only to deride them. In 1923, Trotsky maintained that "the 'national' problems of the backward peoples can no longer have any independent significance". In keeping with this absurd "prophecy" the Trotskyists advanced slogans of the proletarian revolution in any country, even the most backward colony, drawing no distinction between the imperialist bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie, and so on.

For the Trotskyists, the concept of the motherland and its fate is merely an element of the "grandiose historical confrontation on the out-

come of which the fate of mankind depends". Since they believe that any question can be solved only on an international scale, their national nihilism justifies their view that war is necessary to "make happy" the working people of the foreign countries. Thus, the Trotskyists' denial of the "national question" assumes for them the right to interfere in the fate of other peoples, i.e., it objectively becomes great-power chauvinism.

As for Maoism, both in ideology and in practice, it has turned into fanatical chauvinism cloaked in internationalist phraseology.

China's specific historical development explains the roots and tenacity of nationalism in that country. A land with an ancient culture, China for a long time was out of touch with other peoples of equal or higher culture. The thousands of years of isolation, the self-centred life, produced suspicion of everything foreign, promoted the spread of racialism and reactionary ideas on the special historical mission of the yellow race and the cultural superiority of the "Celestial Kingdom" over the rest of the world.

The Manchu rule established in China in the early 17th century led to a state of affairs, Marx noted, in which "hatred against foreigners and their exclusion from the Empire, once the mere result of China's geographical and ethnographical situation, have become a political system..."¹ When the invasion of China by foreign capital began in the 19th century under cover of men-of-war "... the barbarous and hermetic isolation from the civilised world was infringed..."² and

¹ K. Marx and F. Engels, *On Colonialism*, Moscow, 1968, p. 25.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.

national oppression was imposed on the country, nationalist feelings reached the boiling point and every foreigner became a "long-nosed foreign devil". All this could not fail to leave an imprint on the ideology of the petty bourgeoisie, including those sections members of which had entered the Communist Party.

When China's Communist Party was created, its members considered the fight against nationalistic views a high-priority task. Li Ta-chao, one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party, wrote at that time: "Peasants do not know what imperialism means, but they know the foreigners who embody it. Our task is to explain to them the nature of imperialism, which is oppressing China and exploiting the Chinese peasantry, to direct their anger against it. This will enable us gradually to overcome the narrow nationalistic ideas of the peasants and will help them understand that the revolutionary workers and peasants of the world are their friends."¹

When the Communist Party had to transfer its activity to the countryside, the nationalistic tendencies among the Communists themselves, reflecting the feeling of the peasants around them, also became stronger. The people saw that foreigners were supporting the Chinese reactionaries. Chiang Kai-shek was receiving a profusion of weapons, equipment, instructors and military advisers from abroad.

The victory of the people's national liberation revolution in China naturally brought an enormous upsurge of national consciousness, national pride which, had there been correct international-

¹ Li Ta-chao, *Selected Articles and Speeches* (in Russian), Moscow, 1965, p. 287.

ist guidance, could have become a source of enthusiasm for building a new society in China and have promoted a rapprochement between the Chinese and other peoples. It could have played a major part in overcoming "national egoism and national narrow-mindedness"¹ so viable in countries with a long history of national oppression.

It cannot be said that there were no people among the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party at that time who did not see the danger of nationalist degeneration. The article "Once More About the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", written on the basis of a discussion of that question at an enlarged meeting of the Politbureau of the C.C., C.P.C., says: "We, Chinese, must remember particularly that during the Han, Tang, Ming and Chin dynasties our country was also a great empire, although for about a hundred years, since the second half of the 19th century, having become an object of aggression, it was transformed into a semi-colony, and that, while it is at present still backward in economic and cultural respects, when conditions change, the tendency towards great-power chauvinism will undoubtedly become a serious danger unless everything is done to prevent it. It should also be pointed out that at present this danger is already manifesting itself among some of our leading personnel." This was published on December 29, 1956.

But the voice of those who warned against the dangers of great-power chauvinism was suppressed. The Mao Tse-tung group, which had taken the upper hand in the Party leadership, began to purge from the people's minds everything

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 150.

that could develop in them a feeling of internationalism and friendship for other peoples, and cultivated chauvinism instead.

This could be seen in their attitude towards the minorities in the country and the peoples of other countries.

China is a multinational country. In addition to the Chinese, her population includes over fifty other nationalities, totalling about 43 million people. Although the non-Chinese nationalities live in a compact mass, they are deprived of the right to self-determination. As distinct from the Soviet Union, where the nationalities question was resolved on the basis of the Leninist principle of the full equality of nations, the recognition of their right to self-determination up to and including secession and the formation of independent states, the Mao group pursues the policy of splitting small nations.

Formally these peoples had been granted autonomy but actually this was the case only for small administrative units. The largest among them is the autonomous region. There are five such autonomous regions in China but they have been artificially reduced by the establishment of autonomous areas and smaller administrative units. For example, the Tibetan Autonomous Region has common borders with nine autonomous areas, which are also inhabited by Tibetans. The Chuan people also live in a compact mass, but are not united in a single autonomous unit.

This division is deliberate and pursues great-power aims designed to perpetuate the inequality of the peoples and their forceful assimilation. In 1960, the *Xinjiang Hung-chi* wrote that it was necessary to merge all nationalities on the basis

of the nucleus of one nationality. "Speaking of China, the Chinese are to become this nucleus." The *Xinjiang ribao* declared that "those who are against such assimilation, are against socialism and communism, against historical materialism".

What they call socialism, communism and historical materialism are nothing but shameless nationalism. The regions inhabited by non-Chinese are flooded with Chinese, the culture of the other peoples is being sinicised, the Mongols are told that "the Mongolian language and writing are not destined to be long-lived", the desire to study one's own language is condemned as "revisionism" and an attempt to evade the study of Mao Tse-tung's ideas. The well-known Mongolian revolutionary Ulanfu, First Secretary of the C.P.C. Regional Committee and Chairman of the National Committee of the Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia, was dealt with summarily by the Hungweipings for advocating the study of the Mongolian language and opposing great-Chinese chauvinism.

The concept "great Chinese" or "Great Han" chauvinism, against the danger of which the C.P.C. once warned, is now never mentioned. All anger is directed against so-called local nationalism. Under the pretext of fighting against it, national cadres, local intellectuals are persecuted and eliminated and all commanding posts are concentrated in the hands of Chinese.

If we discard the "Marxist", "revolutionary" phrases, with which the Maoists are juggling, it is easy to see that in the country they are essentially pursuing the nationalist policy of old China and are great-power chauvinists of the first water.

Peking's policy towards its closest neighbours is also chauvinistic and full of disrespect for the

national dignity of other peoples. The anti-Mongolian campaign, the overbearing attitude of the Maoists towards the people of Burma, the constant threats against Nepal, India, Kenya—these are some of the numerous manifestations of the Maoists' hostility to other countries. Wherever they can, the Maoists resort to provocations, enlisting Chinese students or the local Chinese population. Even in diplomatic documents, the Chinese leadership resorts to direct insults, intimidation and threats. No wonder the slogan "Down with Chinese imperialism!" has appeared at mass protest meetings as was the case in Nepal.

The Maoists also pursue a chauvinistic policy towards the international communist movement.

Chinese authors on the history of the C.P.C. endeavour to present the entire activity of the Party in isolation from the international communist and working-class movement, which contributed so much to the victory of the Chinese revolution. The book by Miao Chu-huan *A Short History of the Communist Party of China* as well as other works mention the Comintern only when they speak of the period preceding Mao Tse-tung's advent to power. No mention of the Comintern is made after Mao became the leader of the Party. Nothing is said of the Comintern's role in the struggle against Right opportunism and Leftist adventurism in China, of the correct strategy and tactics of the Comintern in the Chinese revolution; no mention is made either of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, which marked a watershed in the Party's history, since it led to the proclamation by the C.P.C. of the united national anti-Japanese front.

Mao Tse-tung's "Decision on Some Questions of the History of Our Party" does not even men-

tion the international communist movement, while all the political directives of the Comintern which were justified in the course of the Chinese revolution and which played such an important role in ensuring its victory Mao Tse-tung ascribes to himself.

Passing over in silence the role of the Comintern Mao could not then fail to mention the significance of the Soviet Union's assistance to the Chinese revolution, the impact exerted on it by the rout of fascism in the Second World War. "Let us consider what would have happened," Mao Tse-tung wrote in June 1949, "if the Soviet Union had not existed, if it had not routed fascism in the Second World War, if Japanese imperialism had not been smashed, if the countries of the new democracy had not emerged, if the oppressed peoples of the East had not risen in struggle, if there had been no struggle of the popular masses in the United States of America, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and other capitalist countries against the reactionary cliques ruling there, if all these factors had not been combined, the forces of world reaction threatening us would have been incommensurably greater than they are now. Could we have won under such circumstances? Naturally, not. And even if we had won, we could not have consolidated our victory."

But a short time passed and everything reminiscent of internationalist solidarity with the Chinese people was weeded out.

The Museum of the People's Liberation Army was opened in Peking in 1959 on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Chinese People's Republic. It is a large new building. Many exhibits show the struggle for the liberation of the

country in great detail, drawing particular attention to Chairman Mao's "military genius".

However, not only the exhibits make the museum interesting to the visitor, but also those that are conspicuous by their absence. He will not find anything about the extensive campaign of the international working class under the slogan "Hands off China!", about the solidarity with the Chinese people shown by the world's working people, of their assistance given to the Chinese people. Everything in the museum is calculated to suppress the feeling of internationalism.

The role of the Soviet people in the liberation of China is also never mentioned. A few years ago, Chen Po-ta, speaking of the initial stages of the war against Japan, recalled that "weapons, petrol, lorries came in a steady stream from the north-west. Soviet people shed their blood on vast territories in defence of China". Soon however every reminder of the Soviet Union's role was prohibited. The young people in China know nothing of Soviet flier I. Gubenko, who shot down 7 Japanese planes, of the heroic exploits of G. Kulishenko's squadron, who said: "I feel the sufferings of the Chinese people as I would those of my own people." The pilots of his squadron destroyed hundreds of enemy planes. The Chinese called them the "aerial tigers".¹

Nobody mentions now what Mao Tse-tung wrote in August 1945 of the invaluable assistance given by the Soviet Army to China, of the enormous amount of armaments handed over to the People's Revolutionary Army by the Soviet Command after Japan's defeat, which created the con-

¹ See B. A. Borodin, *Soviet Assistance to the Chinese People in the War Against Japan, 1937-1941* (in Russian), Moscow, 1965, pp. 165-66.

ditions for the success of the Chinese revolution.¹

Yet this silence about the internationalist solidarity displayed by the Soviet Union and its role in the victory of the Chinese revolution was only the beginning. The Soviet union's enormous economic assistance to China was discredited in every way. At Mao's orders unbearable conditions were created for Soviet experts engaged at the many building sites and in the reconstruction of industrial projects. They were demonstratively ignored and various obstacles were raised to make their work impossible. The Soviet Union had to recall them. Then the Maoists unleashed a smear campaign, accusing the U.S.S.R. of refusing economic co-operation with China. A little time passed and all the trademarks were removed from the large batches of equipment and machinery coming from the U.S.S.R. For nothing was to remind of the role the Soviet people played in raising China's economy. A few years later, the Maoists resorted to shameful anti-Soviet provocations before which everything the fascists had done paled.

The Maoists understand internationalism as unconditional support of their views, the right to receive assistance from other peoples and the right to interfere without any scruples in their internal affairs.

The Communist Parties of many countries had first-hand experience of the practical results of the Maoists' claiming the right to speak on behalf of other peoples and to impose their views on them. The propaganda about the "universal character" of the experience of the Chinese revolu-

¹ See A. M. Dubinsky, *The Liberating Mission of the Soviet Union in the Far East* (in Russian), Moscow, 1966, pp. 556, 572.

tion is openly chauvinistic and subordinated to great-power aims.

Everybody knows the consequences the application of the "Chinese experience" has had for Communists of some Asian countries. The Communist Parties which, in the absence of a broad peasant movement, resorted to insurrection without mass support found themselves isolated from the people. They were driven out to the jungles and their sectarian policy prevented them from exerting any real influence on the life of the nation. The fact that the leadership of the Indonesian Communist Party followed the course mapped out by Peking has had tragic consequences for it. The biggest Communist Party in Asia was cruelly defeated, and hundreds of thousands of Communists were brutally exterminated.

Lenin always warned against mechanical transplantation of the Russian experience to different conditions; he insisted on creative application of only the fundamental principles of the experience of the October Revolution. Mao Tse-tung and his group, on the other hand, proclaim that the road travelled by their country is compulsory for the whole world, in particular for the Asian, African and Latin American countries.

In their recommendations to follow the Chinese road, the Peking "strategists" of the world revolution have lost all sense of proportion and are printing material which looks like a parody. "An Italian friend" (whose name was naturally not divulged) is reported by the Chinese press to have said: "Formerly I thought that conditions in Italy differed from those in China, that there was no need to wage a long armed struggle there. Now, after many visits and studies, I realise that Italy must take the road of long armed struggle.

To be able to carry out the revolution in Western Europe, it is necessary systematically to study the works of Mao Tse-tung."

Everything, it appears, is wonderfully simple. All one has to do is to copy the Chinese experience and the success of the revolution is guaranteed. The Maoists threaten those who refuse to follow their directives and exert pressure on them. The methods Mao's followers used early in 1967 show that these are the same third degree methods which are so popular with the Hungweipings.

In 1966, a C.P.C. delegation held talks with the leadership of the Communist Party of Japan. The Japanese Communists did not agree to Mao's demand to place the C.P.S.U. on the same footing as the U.S. imperialists, to create a united anti-American, anti-Soviet front. Some time later the Hungweipings pasted up posters containing coarse attacks on the Japanese Communist Party all over Peking.

On January 24, 1967, the Japanese communist newspaper, *Akahata*, condemned the attacks of those who "trampled on the norms of international communist, democratic movement, which are based on independence, equality and non-intervention in the internal affairs of each other". The newspaper refused to accept "implicit and blind observance of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theories" as the test of adherence to Marxism-Leninism or revisionism.

Then the Peking Hungweipings began to threaten that Tokyo's turn would come and that they would "smash the dogs' heads" of the Japanese revisionists. Soon after the Chinese students in Japan, incited by the Peking radio, smashed the premises of the

Japanese-Chinese Friendship Society. Once again rejecting the claim of the Maoists to regard as revolutionaries only those who recognise the ideas of Mao Tse-tung as the acme of modern Marxism-Leninism, the *Akahata* emphasised that "precisely this imposing of the views of the leader of a definite Party upon the Party of another country is a clear manifestation of great-power chauvinism. . . ." After that *Renmin ribao* began to call the Communist Party of Japan "counter-revolutionary", a "party of fascist cut-throats", etc.

The nationalistic propaganda and unequivocal hegemonistic strivings of the Maoists in the international liberation movement repel even those who were formerly willing to believe in the sincerity of Peking's appeals. While denying all nationalism in words and even pretending to be indignant when accused of it, the Maoists endeavour to underpin their chauvinism with an ideological basis.

Marxist-Leninist history and philosophy have always fought resolutely against bourgeois Europe-centrist conceptions. But the views Marxists hold on the general laws of the world historical process, the respect they show for the contribution made by every people to the treasury of world culture, obviously differ from the ideas of the Maoists. The nationalistic methodology of Europe-centrism is quite to the liking of the Maoists, except that they replace European "centrism" by Asiatic, or rather Chinese "centrism". Racist views on world history are becoming ever more widespread in China. For example, the dawn of modern times is explained as follows: "the leading position of the people of the yellow race in Asia was seized by people of the white

race coming from Europe." That, the Maoists claim, was responsible for innumerable calamities to mankind.

For a number of years now, everything Chinese is played up and the idea of the leading role of the yellow race in world civilisation is implanted in China. The Chinese press tries very hard to find proof that when "the present so-called cultured people were still hunting wild animals in the forests, China already possessed a high culture"; that everything in China was "classical"; that even the slave-owning system anticipated everything that was later introduced in Greece and Rome. America was "discovered" by the Chinese 1,400 years before Columbus. This overrating of everything Chinese goes hand in hand with belittling of everything foreign, the striving to isolate China from everything that is foreign, to raise a new "Great Chinese Wall", and with territorial claims upon neighbouring countries. Great-Han China-centrism is becoming the official interpretation of world history.

All facts which do not fit into the new scheme, do not conform to the requirements of chauvinist ideology and racialism are discarded, and new ones are rapidly invented. Quite recently still, Chinese historians described the Mongolian yoke as sanguinary and destructive and as having caused enormous harm to social development in China. Genghis Khan was called "an aggressor, such as there have been few in the history of mankind". Now Genghis Khan has become a sort of Kulturträger. It appears that "his battle horses broke through the iron walls of 40 states, big and small, in which the peoples were imprisoned..." The destruction of 40 states naturally involved

bloodshed and destruction, but what is all that if we consider that the conquered peoples "became acquainted with a higher culture from which they could learn".¹

Imperialist penetration to the East was attended by the fanning up of white racialism. Kipling, the singer of Western expansion, expressed it saying "For East is East, and West is West. And ne'er the two shall meet".

The internationalist ideology of the working class has exposed the racialist ideology of imperialist conquests. Progressives in all countries reject all manifestations of racialism, apartheid and genocide.

Mao makes the racialist slogans of imperialism serve his great-power ends and ambitions. He also suggests that East and West will never meet and that the time has come when "the east wind prevails over the west wind".

Mao Tse-tung's followers endeavour to foster Afro-Asian isolationism in every way, to sow mistrust of everything western, irrespective of whether it concerns the forces of reaction or the working-class movement, imperialist states or the socialist countries. In his talk with a delegation of the Palestinian Arab Organisation in April 1965, Mao expressed his nationalist, racialist views more clearly than ever before. The Beirut press quoted Mao's words: "Asia is the largest continent. The West wants to continue to play the role of exploiter in Asia. The West does not like us and we must recognise this fact. The struggle of the Arabs against the West is a struggle against Israel. Therefore you Arabs should

¹ R. V. Vyatkin, S. L. Tikhvinsky, *On Some Questions of Historical Science in the Chinese People's Republic*, (in Russian), *Uoprosy Istorii* magazine, 1963, No. 10, pp. 12-13.

boycott also all representatives of the West, Europe and America."

As we see, Mao does not attack the imperialist countries, does not expose Israel as the tool of U.S.-British imperialism; no, he strives to set up the Arabs against the West in general, including also the socialist countries—the real supporters of Arab national independence.

The way Mao's followers substitute the struggle against the West in general for the struggle against imperialism can be seen also from their policy towards the developing countries, from their flirting with the reactionary forces in Japan and other Asian countries. No internationalist phrases can conceal this nationalistic line.

It becomes increasingly clear that to the Maoists the world revolution, of which they speak so much, is nothing but a realisation of Peking's great-power aspirations.

"CULTURAL REVOLUTION"— CRISIS OF MAOISM

Practice is the impartial and inexorable test of the correctness of views. History provides numerous examples of most acute differences inside a party or between different parties being settled not only by the principled struggle of ideas alone, but also by life itself, political practice.

The objective laws of social development, Lenin said, "simply brush aside erroneous opinions, making them pointless and devoid of any interest".¹

It has happened that what still recently seemed strong and promising became deteriorated and went under, while what was subjected to cruel attacks and defamation proved its correctness. "The class struggle," Lenin said, "does indeed teach in practice that any false note in the position of any party immediately lands that party where it deserves to be."²

The false positions of the anarchists made this once strong and dangerous trend a nonentity in most countries. There still exists an anarchist International—the Workers' International Association—who knows about the activities of this artificially maintained organisation, which has neither real power nor influence?

Or take the so-called Fourth International, whose formation was accompanied by so much drum-beating? The Trotskyists declared that the "crisis experienced by mankind is explained in

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 9, p. 146.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 28, p. 27.

the main by the crisis of the revolutionary leadership" and that their International would assume this leadership. Several decades have passed, and the Trotskyists must now console themselves with having "carried out laboratory experiments", as they term them. Constant quarrels and splits, reunions and new disintegration are characteristic of this movement of small groups of intellectuals, minor groupings and lone individuals. Some of them struggle for "orthodox Trotskyism", others consider that Trotskyism has outlived itself and should be revised. There are groups accusing the "Fourth International" of revisionism and threatening to set up a new International, and also some which resolutely demand "an end to the tradition of splits and the practice of organisational sectarianism, which has had such a devastating influence on our development".

All these squabbles and mutual accusations typical of this organisation, which gives shelter to various political renegades and adventurers, are proof that history has landed the Trotskyists where they deserve to be, that their false positions have been refuted by the course of development.

Even though the Maoists spare neither money nor efforts on self-advertisement, on exalting their "prophet" and on intimidating all those who disagree with them, they too are beginning to feel the action of inexorable objective laws.

China has had many opportunities of discovering how cruel a vengeance life wreaks upon those who refuse to reckon with its laws.

The pitiful results of the attempt to make a leap in metallurgy by setting up small artisan furnaces in almost every village and district are common knowledge. On October 1, 1958, *Renmin*

ribao reported that close on 100 million people were participating in smelting steel and pig iron, that a major victory had been scored in the technical revolution and that "the veil of mystery obscuring steel production has now been torn to shreds". However the laws governing the development of modern production made short work of all these braggings about "the Chinese being able to do what is beyond the power of Europeans", and the hue and cry that was raised about the "leap" in metallurgy. Two years after this subjectivist attempt was made, in 1960, Chinese guides took care to steer visitors away from the abandoned artisan stoves and other sad reminders of that ridiculous voluntarism.

A modern motor works for 30,000 cars a year was built with Soviet assistance in Changchun. At the beginning of the "big leap", it was announced that the Soviet specialists held "old ideas" and that the yearly output could be raised to 300,000 a year. This was a purely "voluntaristic" decision, which was supported by no calculations.

The accusation that the Soviet specialists working in China were conservative and "limited", and unable to take a revolutionary approach to technology, went hand in hand with infringements of technical norms. The result was that a lot of valuable equipment was wrecked and many factories had to stop operation.

Any infringement of the laws of physics, technology, or biology is immediately felt. Machines break down, yields drop, money and efforts are wasted. Violations of the objective laws of social development lead to somewhat different results. Their violation may not tell immediately, but only some time later, and not directly, but

through the actions of people, their moods, the demands of classes and social strata.

The proclamation of the "big leap" and "people's communes" was bound sooner or later to evoke public resistance. The ruling group and Mao himself felt comparatively soon that they could not violate the laws of social development without incurring inevitable punishment. This realisation was reflected in the decision of the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the C.C., C.P.C., held from November 28 to December 10, 1958.

This decision begins on a pathetic note: "In 1958, on Eastern Asia's broad horizon, there emerged like a rising sun a new social organisation—the big people's communes in the villages of our country." Although in August China was still said to be on the threshold of communism, the December decision declared that it would be wrong "to indulge in pure fantasy about being able to jump into communism, by-passing the stage of socialism". The most remarkable thing was that the plenary meeting approved Mao's decision not to advance his candidature to the position of Chairman of the Chinese People's Republic. This was motivated by the need to give him more time for theoretical work, for concentrating on questions dealing with the political course. Many observers, however, thought that this was a manoeuvre of Mao's to evade the responsibility for the unavoidable failures of the "big leap" and the "people's communes".

For several years, Mao attempted to remain in the shade, but when the economic position improved slightly he endeavoured to resume the old course, adding to it an adventuristic foreign policy. But the sad lessons of the past had not been wasted. The masses had learned from their own

political experience and a large part of the population, notably intellectuals and Party workers, were growing increasingly dissatisfied with Mao Tse-tung's dangerous policies.

Now it became impossible to continue this policy without removing all those protesting against it, without suppressing and destroying morally and even physically all those who refused to bow to the "wisdom" and "genius" of Mao and were unwilling to follow him blindly wherever he liked.

But first it was necessary to accumulate strength. Mao began to woo the army's support through Defence Minister Lin Piao, and to organise numerous detachments of adolescents and young people in various educational establishments to defend Mao's ideas.

When Trotsky began his campaign against the C.P.S.U. in 1923, he also attempted to draw the young people in educational establishments over to his side, considering that, by virtue of their youthful enthusiasm and responsiveness, they would be willing to translate their feelings into "immediate action". Trotsky expected, as he expressed it, that the young people would react with particular vigour to bureaucratism, and strove to portray his struggle against the Party as a struggle against bureaucracy in the Party apparatus, although he himself had broken all records for red tape on the posts he had held.

Mao Tse-tung is trying to succeed where Trotsky failed. It is not the working class and the peasantry who support his power, but the young people in educational establishments and adolescents who not only lack political experience, but are generally ignorant. The striving of young people "to translate their feelings into immediate

action" was used to persecute intellectuals, to wreck institutions and to perpetrate various outrages. The Maoists also encouraged careerism among their young followers, promising them the positions of those whom they would help to "overthrow". This place-hunting assumed such a scale that the Maoists soon had to rebuke the young people for excessive careerism and for forgetting ideals. Later they even had to threaten those participants in the "cultural revolution" "who selfishly think only about themselves" and "do not fight anarchism"; the Shanghai newspaper *Wenhui pao* even wrote on July 21, 1967: "we in no way believe that anybody will fight for power for himself."

Dissatisfaction with Mao Tse-tung's policy is not a recent development. Yang Wen-yuan, a member of "the group for the cultural revolution under the C.C., C.P.C.", said in an article published on January 3, 1967, that Mao Tse-tung had already demanded in July 1964 that dissatisfaction with his line should be suppressed. Mao's letter warning that "if we should fail to take re-education seriously" grave consequences may be expected, was sent out to all Party organisations as an official document and served as "an impetus to the cultural revolution throughout the country".

Mao needed over two years to accumulate enough strength for his offensive—for the "great proletarian cultural revolution". The resolution of the Eleventh Plenary Meeting of the C.C., C.P.C. (August 1966) declared that it was to be a mighty onslaught on bourgeois and feudal ideology, on old morals and old customs. It was also announced that the "brave initiators of that movement will be a large detachment of hitherto

unknown boys, girls and adolescents". This detachment was warned that "words should be used in discussions, and not force".

But the "brave initiators" understood perfectly well that this warning was unadulterated hypocrisy. They humiliated scientists, writers, Party workers and old Communists, reviled books of the old Chinese classics, smashed art objects created over the centuries, did away even with the Chinese traditional opera, with hundreds of schools and trends, which the people loved so much. All this was done under the pretext of fighting bourgeois and feudal ideology, morals and customs.

It may be asked why the Maoists, those bellicose nationalists, chauvinists, suddenly attacked the spiritual wealth which was the pride of the Chinese people.

The answer to this question is to be sought in the development of the "cultural revolution". Early in spring 1966, a blow was struck at the "black gang" of Teng To, one of the secretaries of the Peking Party Committee, former editor of *Renmin ribao*.

He was accused of having published since 1961 articles under the title "Evening Chats at the Foot of the Yanshan Mountain". These were parables written in the Chinese manner with references to events from ancient history, fairy tales and legends.

Here is one of them—"The Wealth of One Egg". "In the period of the Ming dynasty, under the administration of Wen Li, there lived a writer named Chiang In-he. In his collection, *The Tales of Sue Tao*, the following anecdote is cited. Once there lived a townsman. He was so poor that when he had breakfast he knew not

where his dinner would come from. Once he found an egg and happily ran to his wife shouting: 'We have become rich.' She asked: 'Where is our wealth?' He showed his wife the egg, saying: 'Here it is. It must still grow for 10 years.' Then he told his wife of his plans. 'I shall take the egg to our neighbour and ask him to place it under the brood-hen. When the chicks are hatched I shall pick out a hen.' "

The townsman then went on to reckon what the hen would bring him, how he would have 300 hens in two years, then five cows, how he would lend out for interest the money he made, and, when he was really rich, would get himself a concubine. The wife flared up and broke the egg.

Five years later, Teng To was persecuted because this anecdote was regarded as a "slandorous accusation that our big leap had suffered a setback".

Teng To's article referring to a monk who had acted arbitrarily and had lost popularity was said to insinuate that "we are committing arbitrary action and violence and have lost popularity". In other tales too they saw accusations of Mao clad in Aesopian language, accusations of "excessive conceit and disrespect for the masses", attacks against the general Party line, etc., etc.

Small wonder, therefore, that the Chinese opera with its traditional allegories, with its good and bad generals, emperors, and despots, and noble popular heroes, was banned. In every character, in every situation, the Maoists' sick imagination felt an allusion, a hidden implication. Was it not wiser to use the excuse of struggling against old morals and customs in order to abolish what might

become a source of trouble? "Indeed, miserable is he whose conscience is not clean."¹

However, in their struggle for "spiritual re-education", the Maoists take a differentiated approach to China's cultural heritage. For example, according to the old laws and customs, children were not allowed to give evidence against their father, and were taught to respect their elders. When youngsters were made to humiliate old people, to spit at them and to beat up their teachers, these old customs became an obstruction, and they were rejected as feudal customs. But, at the same time, the Confucian demand for unquestioning obedience to the "sage" fully falls in with the wishes of the Maoists.

At one time Academician V. M. Alexeyev was surprised by the popularity in old China of all sorts of inscriptions. "The fashion for epigraphs," he wrote, "which the masses took over from the feudal elite, where it took root apparently with the introduction of hieroglyphics, persists stubbornly. China is a country of inscriptions. One finds them in places where we usually never place inscriptions—on door posts, on door panels, above windows, and so on. The inscriptions are naturally not written by the inhabitants of the poor houses and little shops" since they are "unable to read the inscription, yet they know very well what it contains".²

The Maoists are encouraging this old custom dating back to feudal times, and their Datsy pao (newspapers printed in large hieroglyphs) cover all walls, and hieroglyphs are printed on pavements, on the railway rolling stock, etc.

¹ Quoted from *Boris Godunov* by Alexander Pushkin.

² V. M. Alexeyev, *In Old China* (in Russian), p. 35.

The system of ideological indoctrination of the population, the so-called rural talks, began under the Manchu dynasty of Chin and continued up to the revolution of 1911. As early as 1652, a decree of the emperor formulated the "6 Rules" of moral behaviour in the form of aphorisms. There were special "advocates", who on the 1st and 15th of every month were to explain the emperor's aphorisms at "rural talks" and at the same time to reveal cases of their violation. About 20 years later, the 6 Rules became 16 Sermons, among which were: "reject false teachings in order to assert genuine knowledge"; "do not conceal fugitives so as not to become an accomplice in their crime"; "participate in the mutual security system ... to suppress thieves, robbers, and so on".¹

The system of constant indoctrination with these imperial rules and sermons, feudal "loyalty checks" and mutual security has not been included by the Maoists in the list of old morals and customs to be abolished in the course of the "cultural revolution"; on the contrary, it has been modernised and developed on an unprecedented scale.

The following sayings of the Manchu emperors also sound very modern: "In governing the Celestial Kingdom, my main worry is to correct the people's minds. To correct the people's minds, I strive first of all to exterminate heresy"; or: "In my efforts to establish supreme control over the entire world, I not only observe laws and rules, but first and foremost work changes by introducing ideas."²

¹ *Manchurian Rule in China* (in Russian), pp. 13-16.

² *Ibid.*, p. 12-13.

Particularly widespread in China today is the idea that what is of importance is not what a person thinks or feels, it is his ability not to "lose face", keep one's outward dignity, and enjoy the respect of others. Observers have long since noticed that public criticism and self-criticism is used in China not to make the criticised person draw conclusions, but for the purpose of humiliating him, of breaking him, of making him lose face. When the Maoists saw that even such criticism did not have the required effect, they made their victims wear a dunce's cap and shameful inscriptions, and literally flung mud at them.

Naturally, the Maoists are not uprooting all old customs, habits and ideas, since Mao Tse-tung's teachings rely mainly on ancient Chinese philosophers and old parables. It has been calculated that 22 per cent of the quotations in Mao's works are Confucian or neo-Confucian, 12 per cent from Lao Tse and his pupils, and 13 per cent from folklore and legends.

An ideology must indeed be corrupt when, growing on a national basis, it needs to enter into conflict with all the progressive traditions of the people and declare them the fruit of feudalism and capitalism in order to maintain its positions.

Mao and his followers attack everything progressive, everything universally human that ancient Chinese culture contained. They also ban the works of world literature—the books of Shakespeare, Romain Rolland and Tolstoy, because their humanism is opposed to the inhumane ideology and practice of the Maoists.

How great must be the spiritual bankruptcy of people who reject all the great treasures of world

culture and see their salvation in obscurantism, in building a new "Chinese wall"!

The "cultural revolution", its purpose, methods and means of implementation, demonstrate the deep ideological crisis into which Maoism has fallen and which has turned into a political crisis accompanied by acute social conflict and clashes in the country.

Those who but yesterday were the accusers today themselves become "black bandits", "dogs' heads" and "vipers' nests"; a functionary whose policy-making speeches were disseminated throughout the country and the entire world is now styled a "hellish ruler of the former propaganda department"; new organisations arise among the Hungweipings and Tsaofans which clash with one another. All this shows how far the crisis has progressed.

Mao's group has thrown the country back not only economically, but also socially. It has greatly weakened the positions of the Communist Party and the working class of China, has opened the door to petty bourgeois, anarchist lawlessness, creating a serious threat to China's revolutionary achievements. The Maoist group has taken a road fraught with the danger of degeneration into a military-bureaucratic dictatorship similar to Asiatic despotism, using fascist methods to maintain its rule and likely to resort to all sorts of foreign policy adventurism.

Mao's policies, however, cannot fail to evoke resistance. Almost two years after the proclamation of the "cultural revolution" *Hung-chi* (No. 10, 1967) was compelled to admit that "at present the great proletarian cultural revolution is developing in our country unevenly". By that the journal meant that the Maoists had not succeeded

in seizing power in all provinces, that they were not receiving the support they had expected.

That is why they are forced to manoeuvre, to flirt with those upon whom they only yesterday heaped insults, to censure "anarchistic slogans calling for the systematic purge of all leaders only because they are leaders", to explain to the Hungweipings that they "should abstain from 'dissension', from attacking each other, should resolve the contradictions dividing the people not by abuse and beatings, thuggery and robbery".

However, these are only crafty manoeuvres intended to deceive those who are offering resistance, to win allies among the victims of the purges, to strengthen the positions of Maoists so as to enable them to continue their adventuristic course. "We must always bear in mind Chairman Mao Tse-tung's latest directive", says the decision of the Shanghai revolutionary committee of June 2, 1967, "the great cultural revolution is being carried out for the first time. It will undoubtedly be repeated many times." There is no stopping the adventurists. However, the sane forces in the Communist Party, in the working class, the peasantry and other layers of the Chinese population cannot be suppressed by any repressions, whether they take the form of "cultural revolution" or any other form.

* * *

No matter how much the progressive movement of China is impeded by the present policy of her leaders, the inexorable objective laws of social development cannot be abolished or Maoised; they will assert themselves and erode the ground on which the obsolescent ideas of China's present leaders are built.

Real requirements will compel the Chinese leadership to develop industry. The working class will grow and exert an ever greater influence on the country's domestic and foreign policy.

Nobody can ignore economic factors for a long time. Some demagogues like Mao Tse-tung may exclaim: "It is horrible to think of the time when all people will live in wealth!" Nobody can afford to ignore the people's material and spiritual requirements. Slogans alone without material stimuli cannot promote steady development of production for a long time. This law will of necessity assert itself and will make short work of all the artificial schemes the Maoists use to replace progressive development by the barracks socialism of poverty.

The same can be said also of the notorious slogan of "reliance on one's own forces". The policy denying the need for mutual assistance between the socialist countries reflects a level of development of the productive forces at which the question of co-operation in production with other countries has not yet become acute. But the growth of the productive forces will crush these tendencies towards economic autarchy and, however complicated and contradictory the process, will make China part of the world economy, first and foremost the socialist world economy.

The growth of the productive forces will also erode the nationalism at present cultivated by the Chinese leaders. Socialist internationalism is not an artificial ideological structure. Internationalism, an inalienable feature of working class ideology, arises as a reflection of the objective process of development of the productive forces which brings nations closer together and strengthens eco-

conomic and cultural relations between them. The future belongs to internationalism.

But the conviction of Marxist-Leninists that the fate of other variants of petty-bourgeois revolutionism is also in store for Maoism does not at all mean that one should sit back and wait until history passes its sentence. A passive attitude towards hostile ideology, waiting for everything to come right in the end is an attitude deeply alien to Marxism.

The views disseminated by Mao's followers, their dangerous activity, do great harm to the world communist movement and to the Chinese people themselves; they delay the revolutionary process, even though Peking claims the opposite.

Whether they wish it or not, the Maoists are acting in the interest of the imperialists, who do not fear revolutionary talk and know only too well that they can turn to their own profit what is behind these resounding but harmless speeches.

Never yet has adventurism disguised by revolutionary phrases constituted as great a danger as at present, when it has become the official ideology of the ruling group of an enormous country, with the largest population in the world. What is happening in China is not only a tragedy for her people, it also causes enormous harm to the world communist movement and all the liberation forces in the world. Never before has anti-communism had such ideological support as it is receiving from the Mao Tse-tung group, never before has anybody dealt such heavy blows to the ideals of socialism as the Maoists do now.

Anti-communism has many faces, and its methods of struggle against the forces of progress are subtle. But their main method consists in deliber-

ately ascribing to the Communists views and actions which have nothing in common with communism and which discredit the lofty ideals of socialism.

In the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* Marx and Engels revealed the groundlessness and baseness of the accusations levelled against Communists of desiring to eliminate all personal property, to destroy the family, to introduce community of women, etc. The bourgeoisie always strove to pass off the ideas of "barracks communism", the terrorist methods of petty-bourgeois revolutionism as Marxist ideas.

All present anti-communist literature—from the pamphlets intended for mass distribution to the pseudo-scientific fat books—depicts Trotskyism as "classical Marxism", widely using Trotskyists' statements to discredit the communist ideology.

The attempt to pass off various distortions of socialism and departures from its principles as socialism and petty-bourgeois revolutionism as Marxism-Leninism is a method constantly used by anti-communism. An enormous propaganda apparatus is maintained to capitalise on deviations from socialist norms, if there are such deviations, and to invent them if there are not.

At present, the anti-Communists do not have to invent lies about communism to scare the working people, they simply say that the practice in China is the very system for which all Communists are struggling, and that, wherever the Communists succeed in seizing power, conditions will not differ from those in China.

The international communist movement develops through the joint struggle of all parties for common aims with strict adherence to the prin-

ciple of independence of every party, and non-interference of one party in the affairs of others. But just as the successes and achievements of one party multiply the strength of the whole movement, distortions and the rejection of jointly adopted principles and decisions by one party, especially that of a large country, harm all the other parties.

No wonder the Communists and socialists lost some seats at the parliamentary elections in Japan in 1967 although they had every chance of success. The reactionary forces successfully capitalised on Mao's "cultural revolution". If you want the same thing to happen here as is going on in China, they said, vote for the Communists and socialists. Thus, the ruling party of Japan maintained its positions and can thank Mao Tse-tung for that.

The events which unfolded in the spring of 1968 in France also showed who profits from the extremist hysteria of the Maoist brand. The grandiose, well organised strike that embraced 10 million working people shook the foundations of the regime. But the country's ruling forces succeeded in strengthening their positions with the help of the Maoist, Trotskyist and anarchist groups. The provocations and outrages these groups were responsible for created an atmosphere of insecurity and fear which the powers that be used to strengthen their position. That is why the bourgeois newspapers were right in saying that, if ultra-revolutionary groups had not existed in France, they should have been invented.

Naturally all Marxist-Leninist Parties are interested in the real development of the revolution and not in shouting about it, in the true unity of the international communist movement, and

they condemned the Maoist group, dissociated themselves from it and declared that its practices had nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism.

It is not socialism that has created the present conditions in China, but the trampling on its principles. Communists the world over know that socialism has nothing in common with the militarisation of society, organised slander, public humiliation as a method of administration, the personality cult fanned up to hysteria, the negation of culture, and anti-Sovietism.

The plenary meeting of the C.C. of the French Communist Party (June 1967), which condemned the nationalistic, aggressive, adventuristic line of the Mao Tse-tung group, emphasised: what is happening today in China is not a "variant" of Marxism, of scientific socialism, which could be explained or justified by the specific conditions prevailing in an Asian country or in economically backward countries in general. The politics and theses supported by the Chinese leaders have nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism, with communism. We must not be expected, the French Communists said, to connive at their ideas and their activity which harm the interests of peace and socialism and are alien to our ideals.

We cannot remain quiet and indifferent, Dolores Ibarruri said on behalf of the Spanish Communists, when the Chinese leaders impudently mock at human dignity, trample on the elementary standards of proletarian friendship and internationalism. We must not keep quiet when the Soviet people, its Government and the C.P.S.U. are subjected to insults and provocations.

The reactionary forces expect a lot from the Maoists and use their policies to further their ends. Therefore the Communists in capitalist

countries regard the exposure of Mao Tse-tung's ideology as a component part of the struggle for peace, democracy and socialism.

There was a time when the struggle of Marxism against petty-bourgeois revolutionism was only a struggle of ideas. The Marxists opposed the views of "barracks communism" with the principles of scientific socialism, defended and developed the latter. Now, when socialism is being built in practice, one can dissociate oneself from petty-bourgeois revolutionism, which discredits socialism, not only by developing the theory of socialism, but also by improving the actually existing socialist system.

As the productive forces develop and new experience is amassed, the views on socialism also become richer in content. The practical experience of the U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries shows ever more convincingly that the building of socialism is not only socialisation of the means of production, but also the general flourishing of culture, of the human personality, the development of democracy, law and legality, of genuine humanism.

The development of socialist society will increase the attractive force of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism in all countries and accelerate the progressive movement of mankind. "The building of communism in the U.S.S.R. and the all-sided improvement of Soviet socialist society are the basic contribution made by the C.P.S.U. and the entire Soviet people towards the world revolutionary process, towards the struggle of all peoples against imperialism, for peace, national independence, democracy and socialism."¹

¹ 23rd Congress of the C.P.S.U., Moscow, 1966, p. 300.

The struggle for the victory of socialism in the whole world requires cohesion of the Communist and Workers' Parties based on the principle of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. The subversive activity of the Mao Tse-tung group in the international communist movement weakens the revolutionary forces. But at the same time, all those who cherish communist ideas increase their striving for unity, and this creates the prerequisites for strengthening that unity.

Marxist-Leninists do not think that there are sincere and honest revolutionaries only among them. They support all fighters against imperialism, irrespective of whether they hold Marxist views or not. The sectarian fanaticism of the Maoists, recognising as revolutionaries only those who worship their idol, is alien to Communists.

But Marxism teaches us to judge parties and people not by what they think of themselves or how they picture themselves, but by their actions. Revolutionism today is the struggle against imperialism, the main obstacle to the progressive development of mankind; and all those who hinder that struggle and split the anti-imperialist front place themselves outside the ranks of the revolutionaries, no matter what loud phrases they use as camouflage.

REQUEST TO READERS

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BORIS LEIBSON, D. Hist., is a lecturer at a higher educational establishment. He has written many articles and books on the history of the liberation movement in various countries.

The subject of this book is a topical question—China's "cultural revolution". Comparing anarchism, Trotskyism and Maoism, the author considers their common features and differences, warns against drawing superficial analogies and parallels. The book explains why Maoism is theoretically untenable and politically dangerous and shows its degeneration into chauvinism, into an ideology alien to the progressive movement of our day.